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ABSTRACT 
Yvonne M. Dutton 
(Ph.D., Department of Political Science) 
Treaty Content and Costs:  Explaining State Commitment to the International Criminal Court 
Thesis directed by Dr. Moonhawk Kim 
 
The International Criminal Court is the first permanent, treaty-based international 
criminal court established to help end impunity for perpetrators of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.  More than 100 countries have ratified the treaty creating the court.  
By doing so, they have agreed to cede to an independent prosecutor the power to prosecute the 
state‘s own nationals for mass atrocities when the prosecutor and the ICC court determine the 
state is unwilling or unable to do so domestically.  But, why have states committed to an 
institution like the ICC which has serious enforcement mechanisms to punish noncompliant 
behavior?  States do regularly ratify the many toothless treaties designed to hold states 
accountable to respecting individual human rights.  However, because enforcement mechanisms 
in those treaties are weak or non-existent, states can show their good will by ratifying, yet ignore 
treaty terms when compliance becomes inconvenient.     
This dissertation examines the puzzle of ICC commitment.  I theorize that states will 
view the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and only commit if their 
retrospective cost calculations about their ability to comply with treaty terms show that 
commitment will not lead to a significant sovereignty loss.  In this case, states should consider 
(1) the institutional design of the treaty – specifically, the level of enforcement mechanisms to 
punish noncompliance and (2) the state‘s domestic characteristics relating to its ability to comply 
iv 
 
with treaty terms.  Empirical findings here provide support for the credible threat theory.  In 
contrast to prior studies empirically examining state commitment to international human rights 
treaties, I find that states with poorer human rights practices are less likely than states with good 
practices to commit to the ICC.  Although this means that member states tend to have relatively 
good human rights practices, it does not imply that the ICC will not positively influence state 
behavior.  Indeed, the ICC is uniquely situated to improve international cooperation on human 
rights matters since it has been designed so that commitment requires compliance.  All states that 
have joined the court – including those with poor practices – will have to comply or face 
sovereignty losses.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Puzzle of State Commitment to the International Criminal Court 
The creation of the International Criminal Court (the ―ICC‖) on July 1, 2002 is a 
remarkable event for many reasons.  The existence of the court is the result of a journey that 
commenced with the Nuremberg trials after the conclusion of World War II and during which 
nations have searched for ways to ensure that states and individuals protect against, and are 
deterred from committing, human rights abuses.  The idea of a permanent international criminal 
court dates from at least 1948 when the Genocide Convention referenced the possibility of 
individuals being tried by ―such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.‖1  The 
International Law Commission (the ―ILC‖) was tasked with preparing draft statutes for such a 
permanent court in 1951.  However, the Cold War intervened, and it was not until another four 
decades had passed that the global community again took up the idea of an international criminal 
court.
2
   
But even after the idea of a permanent international criminal court again became a reality, 
the 1994 ILC draft statute envisaged a relatively weak institution which would allow states to 
guard much of their sovereignty.  For example, regarding the court‘s jurisdiction, the 1994 ILC 
draft provided that by virtue of ratifying the statute creating the court, states would only confer 
―automatic jurisdiction‖ over the crime of genocide. 3  For other crimes, such as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, all states that could otherwise assert jurisdiction over the matter (for 
example, the state where the acts were committed or the state with custody over the accused) 
                                                 
1
 Genocide Convention, Art. VI.   
2
 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2
nd
 Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 323-28.   
3
 1994 ILC Draft, Art. 21.  The ILC‘s 1994 Draft is available at Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its forty-sixth session, U.N. GAOR, 4
9th 
Sess., Supp. 10, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).   
2 
 
would have to consent to conferring jurisdiction upon the international criminal court.  As to the 
initiation of investigations and prosecutions, only states or the Security Council – as opposed to 
an independent prosecutor – could commence proceedings.4  Finally, according to the ILC draft, 
any permanent member of the Security Council would be able to use its veto power to prevent 
the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over a matter since no prosecution could be commenced 
without Security Council approval.
5
  
Despite the opposition of some major powers, however, the majority of states rejected 
this conservative institutional design that preserved state autonomy and sovereignty and instead 
opted to create an entirely new type of international human rights institution.  By the Rome 
Statute which was adopted in July 1998,
6
 states created an ICC with a strong and independent 
prosecutor and court with significant and legally-binding enforcement powers to encourage state 
compliance with the goal of ending impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
 7
  By committing to the Rome Statute, states 
grant the court automatic jurisdiction over those core crimes.
8
  Moreover, states agree that an 
independent ICC prosecutor may initiate investigations against their nationals for the covered 
                                                 
4
 1994 ILC Draft, Arts. 23 and 25.   
5
 Adriaan Bos, ―From the International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994-1998), in Antonio Cassese, 
Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court:  A Commentary, 
Volume 1 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), 49-50.   
6
 The Rome Statute was finally adopted in July 1998 during a United Nations conference in Rome.  Attending the 
conference were 160 states, 33 international governmental coalitions, and a coalition of more than 200 non-
governmental organizations (―NGOs‖).  Caroline Fehl, ―Explaining the International Criminal Court:  A ‗Practice 
Test‘ for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches,‖ European Journal of International Relations 10 (2004): 362. 
Of those states in attendance, 120 voted in favor of adopting the statute, seven voted against, and 21 abstained.  In 
July 2002 after the required 60 states had ratified the statute, the ICC came into existence. 
7
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/9 (1998), Preamble, ¶¶ 4 
& 5.  At the present time, the crimes over which the ICC does have jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. Art. 5. The parties to the Rome Statute also declared that the ICC will have jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted defining that crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the court can exercise jurisdiction over it.  Arts. 5-8. The parties agreed to that definition at the 2010 Rome 
Statute Review Conference in Kampala.  However, the ICC will not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression until after January 1, 2017, and after the parties vote to amend the Rome Statute accordingly.  See 
Resolution RC/Res. 6 at Annex 1, ¶ 2 & 3(3). http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-
ENG.pdf. 
8
 Rome Statute, Arts. 5-8, 11, and 12(2).   
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crimes on his own with the approval of the court or based on referrals from a State Party or the 
United Nations Security Council.
9
  The prosecutor and court operate without direct United 
Nations Security Council oversight, with the Council having no veto power over what situations 
are investigated or prosecuted.
 10
  In addition, the treaty does not recognize any immunity that 
states may otherwise grant to heads of state who engage in criminal activity.
11
  
Finally, although it is true that under the ―complementarity‖ provision of the Rome 
Statute the ICC operates as a court of last resort, the ICC will obtain jurisdiction over the 
nationals of States Parties where the state is ―unwilling or unable genuinely‖ to proceed with a 
case.
12
  ―Unwillingness‖ includes instances where national proceedings are a sham or are 
inconsistent with an intention to bring the person to justice, either because such proceedings are 
unjustifiably delayed or are not being conducted independently or impartially.
13
  The idea behind 
including the ―unwillingness‖ provision was to preclude the possibility of sham prosecutions 
aimed at shielding perpetrators due to, for example, government participation in, or complicity 
with, the offense.
14
  A nation‘s ―inability‖ to prosecute includes instances where, because of the 
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the nation cannot obtain the accused or 
the necessary evidence, or is otherwise incapable of carrying out the proceedings.
15
 It bears 
noting that the ICC – not States Parties – will determine whether the ―unwilling or unable‖ bases 
for proceeding before the court have been met.  
Accordingly, although states initially envisioned creating a weak institution or one 
                                                 
9
 Rome Statute, Arts. 13-15.   
10
 Christopher Rudolph, ―Constructing an Atrocities Regime:  The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals¸‖ International 
Organization 55 (2001): 679-80; Lionel Yee, ―The International Criminal Court and The Security Council:  Articles 
13(b) and 16,‖ in The International Criminal Court:  The Making of the Rome Statute, ed. Roy S. Lee (Springer, 
1999), 143-52; Jack Goldsmith and Stephen J. Krasner, ―The limits of idealism,‖ Daedelus (2003): 47.   
11
Rome Statute, Art. 27.   
12
 Rome Statute, Preamble ¶ 10 & Art. 17(1)(a). 
13
 Rome Statute, Art. 17(2).   
14
 John T. Holmes, ―The Principle of Complementarity,‖ in The Making of the Rome Statute, 50.      
15
 Rome Statute, Art. 17(3).   
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controlled by powerful nations when the idea of the ICC again resurfaced in the early 1990s, 
during the course of negotiations, the majority of states ultimately determined instead to create 
an institution with stronger enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance with treaty terms 
and punish noncompliant behavior.  That the 1998 ICC negotiations produced a stronger 
institution than what was originally anticipated is interesting.  Indeed, as discussed in more detail 
below, the ICC is different from other human rights treaties that have gone before it since most 
of those treaties contain weak or non-existent enforcement mechanisms.  The ICC is also 
different from the ad hoc criminal tribunals which are specially created and which are generally 
imposed by powerful states upon the perpetrators of particular atrocities.  Nevertheless, while 
questions about why and how states decided in July 1998 to create this unique institution with its 
unique enforcement mechanisms is certainly an interesting question, once states enacted the 
Rome Statute, its existence became exogenous to each state.  The purpose of this study is to 
better understand the ratification decisions states made given the ICC treaty‘s particular 
institutional design.   
Thus, the question this dissertation asks is why states would commit to an institution like 
the ICC inasmuch as commitment can have such profound effects on their sovereign right to 
mete out justice within their own borders?  It is true that the ICC treaty is not the first treaty 
which purports to bind states to protect individuals against human rights abuses occurring within 
the state‘s own territory.  And, it is true that states regularly commit to such international human 
rights treaties.  But, those treaties typically contain weak enforcement mechanisms that pose 
little risk for the state that fails to comply with treaty terms.  As such, states can join them almost 
indiscriminately and without any intention of complying.
16
 In the case of the ICC, however, 
                                                 
16
 Oona A. Hathaway, ―The Cost of Commitment,‖ Stanford Law Review 55 (2003): 1856-57; Oona A. Hathaway, 
―Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,‖ Yale Law Journal 111 (2002): 1982-87; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 
5 
 
states run the risk that the ICC prosecutor will choose to investigate the state‘s own citizens and 
haul those citizens to stand trial at an international criminal court situated in The Hague.  
Therefore, while it may be reasonable for states to commit to treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms, the fact that more than 100 states have now committed to the ICC and its strong 
enforcement mechanisms poses a puzzle.
17
   
That more than 100 states have ratified the ICC treaty is puzzling because states typically 
guard their sovereignty and are reluctant to join international treaties with strong enforcement 
mechanisms – particularly if they cannot comply with treaty terms.  Can we expect that the more 
than 100 states that have ratified the ICC treaty all will abide by treaty terms and protect against 
human rights abuses and/or domestically prosecute any of their citizens who perpetrate mass 
atrocities?  Does the fact that these states willingly committed to an international human rights 
treaty with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms mean that they are also committed to the 
goal of ending impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities?  After all, the intent of strong 
enforcement mechanisms must be to enforce compliance with treaty terms – in this case by 
ensuring that perpetrators or mass atrocities are brought to justice and other potential perpetrators 
are deterred as a result.   
On the other hand, approximately 90 states are still not parties to the ICC treaty, and 
some states that do belong to the court ratified the treaty less swiftly than others.  Why did these 
states fail to ratify the Rome Statute or ratify more slowly than others?  Given the treaty‘s 
                                                                                                                                                             
& Kiyoteru Tsutsui, ―Human Rights in a Globalizing World:  The Paradox of Empty Promises,‖ American Journal 
of Sociology 110 (2005): 1374. 
17
 As of October 2010, some 139 countries had signed the Rome Statute, and 114 had actually become States Parties 
to it.  Of the States Parties, about 20 are from Western Europe, 17 are from Eastern Europe, 31 are from Africa, 14 
from Asia, and 25 are from Latin America and the Caribbean.  The United States, Israel, China, Russia, Indonesia, 
and India are notable powerful states that have declined to ratify the treaty.  Also not parties to the treaty are a 
number of Islamic and African states, including Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen, Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d‘Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, 
and Zimbabwe.  In June 2010, Bangladesh became the first country from southern Asia to join the court. 
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relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, should we expect that states with the worst human 
rights practices are among the states that have not ratified?  For these states, joining international 
human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms may be in their rational self-interest.  
Joining the ICC, however, is a different matter.  But, if the majority of states joining the court are 
also those that already have the best human rights practices, can the ICC really have a significant 
impact on improving universal respect for human rights and deterring mass atrocities?   
This dissertation explores these questions and seeks to understand the puzzle of state 
commitment to the ICC.  By exploring this puzzle, this dissertation will contribute to our 
understanding of why states joined or refused to join the ICC.  In addition, the dissertation 
should also contribute to our understanding of how institutional design – and enforcement 
mechanisms in particular – affects state commitment and compliance in the context of the 
international human rights regime more broadly.  Understanding commitment and also why 
states refuse to commit is important for evaluating the role of international human rights treaties 
and state ratification of those treaties in bettering state human rights practices and ending 
impunity for those who abuse individual human rights.  
Moreover, this study is unique in that it examines the puzzle of ICC commitment using 
both quantitative methods and qualitative case studies.  Indeed, few studies have empirically 
examined the puzzle posed by state commitment to the ICC treaty, and none have specifically 
examined whether and how the apparently strong enforcement mechanisms associated with the 
treaty creating the court influence state commitment decisions.
18
   
                                                 
18
 Moreover, the few studies that do empirically examine state commitment to the ICC posit different theories, 
employ different dependent variables in different empirical models, and reach different conclusions about what 
variables are and are not driving ICC state behavior.  See Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, ―Credible 
Commitments and the International Criminal Court,‖ International Organization 64 (2010): 240-46 (arguing that 
non-democracies with recent civil wars are most likely to commit to the ICC because they want to tie their own 
hands and limit their ability to commit mass atrocities); Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins, ―A Funny Thing 
Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations,‖ The Journal of Politics 71 
7 
 
The Argument:  Strong Enforcement Mechanisms as a Credible Threat  
Building on existing scholarship,
19
 I theorize that commitment to international human 
rights treaties is a function of two considerations relative to the costs of noncompliance:  (1) the 
institutional design of the treaty – specifically, the level of enforcement mechanisms to punish 
noncompliance – and (2) the state‘s domestic political characteristics relating to its ability to 
comply with treaty terms.   
Traditionally, international human rights have been designed with weak enforcement 
mechanisms.  For example, most require only that states self-report compliance.
20
 Even the 
additional optional enforcement mechanisms contained in some treaties – whereby states agree to 
accept state or individual complaints alleging noncompliance – are far from strong.21  In fact, the 
committees who review the complaints are not empowered to issue decisions that are actually 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2009): 977 (arguing that a state‘s dependence networks are a primary influence on ICC commitment); Judith 
Kelley, ―Who Keeps International Commitments and Why?  The International Criminal Court and Bilateral 
Nonsurrender Agreements,‖ American Political Science Review 101 (2007): 573 (testing ICC commitment 
preliminary to the study‘s main focus on determining why states that joined the ICC would also sign or refuse to 
sign bilateral immunity agreements with the United States ).      
19
 Oona Hathaway is generally credited with first examining empirically the relationship between state human rights 
ratings and their tendency to enter into international human rights treaties.  However, in her 2003 study, the only 
variables she used to test treaty commitment to several human rights treaties were a state‘s human rights ratings and 
whether or not it was a democracy – without accounting for the timing of ratifications.   Although she acknowledged 
that other variables may influence commitment, she purposely limited her study.  Hathaway, ―The Cost of 
Commitment,‖ 1849. In a later study, Hathaway included some additional variables testing commitment to several 
human rights treaties using a Cox proportional hazards model, though her study did not include the ICC.  Oona A. 
Hathaway, ―Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007): 588.  
20
 For example, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ―ICCPR‖), states agree to submit 
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40.  The main treaties of the five other international human rights treaties similarly provide only that states self-
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Torture to hear complaints by states and individuals, respectively.  Under Article 41 of the ICCPR, states may agree 
to recognize the competence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee to consider complaints of one state 
against another claiming the party is not fulfilling its obligations under the treaty.      
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binding on the states.
22
  At least some scholars have suggested that these traditionally weak 
enforcement mechanisms may explain why states with poor domestic human rights practices 
nevertheless ratify these treaties designed to protect and promote human rights.
23
  Even states 
with poor domestic practices may view commitment to these treaties as essentially costless from 
a sovereignty standpoint simply because the treaty enforcement and monitoring mechanisms are 
weak.
24
 In short, the indirect – and sometimes intangible benefits – associated with appearing to 
be a state that embraces international human rights norms may outweigh the costs of 
commitment where treaty enforcement mechanisms to punish noncompliant behavior are weak 
or non-existent. 
However, as compared to the international human rights treaties that have preceded it, the 
ICC treaty has a unique institutional design.  It contains relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms in that it delegates enforcement authority to an independent decision-making body 
with resources that can be used to prevent abuses or punish offenders.  If states view the 
enforcement mechanisms associated with the ICC treaty as strong enough to pose a credible 
threat to their sovereignty, they should only commit if their retrospective calculations about the 
costs of complying with treaty terms suggest that the risks to their sovereignty by joining the 
court are minimal.  First and foremost, compliance with ICC treaty terms requires that the state 
have good human rights practices since the state can best avoid the specter of an ICC prosecution 
if its leaders and citizens do not commit the kinds of mass atrocities within the court‘s 
jurisdictional purview.  As a secondary matter, states can also comply with ICC treaty terms and 
avoid having their citizens tried in The Hague if they have independent domestic law 
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enforcement institutions that are also capable of prosecuting any human rights violations within 
their own states.   
As such, good human rights practices and independent and capable domestic law 
enforcement institutions are each individually sufficient for states to conclude that ratifying the 
ICC treaty will not be overly costly.  Thus, if a country has either good human rights practices or 
independent and capable domestic law enforcement institutions, it should conclude that ICC 
ratification is relatively costless and should commit to the court.  In addition, for a state to 
conclude that ratification of the ICC is essentially costless because the state can comply with 
treaty terms, either good human rights practices or independent and capable domestic law 
enforcement institutions are a necessary condition to ratification.  However, because the ICC is 
able to scrutinize whether member states‘ domestic prosecutions are adequate to ward off an ICC 
investigation, I suggest that good human rights practices become almost a necessary condition to 
ratification.  Indeed, states concerned about compliance costs may not want to rely only on their 
own assessment of the independence and capability of their domestic institutions and would be 
wise to insure that their human rights practices are sufficiently good before committing to the 
court.  On the other hand, a state with weak domestic institutions could nevertheless conclude 
that commitment to the ICC treaty would be relatively costless as long as the state‘s human 
rights practices are good.  Of course, even states that meet these conditions may decline to 
commit to the ICC for other reasons.  
Accordingly, I predict that states with better human rights practices and independent and 
capable domestic law enforcement institutions will view the costs of complying with the ICC 
treaty‘s terms as relatively minimal and more readily commit to the court.  In fact, because the 
primary way in which states can avoid an ICC investigation and prosecution is by having 
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relatively good human rights practices, even with weak domestic law enforcement institutions, 
those states should conclude that the costs of ICC commitment will be relatively minimal.  States 
with poor human rights practices and biased or incapable domestic law enforcement institutions, 
however, should view commitment to the ICC treaty as costly – even if previous studies suggest 
they regularly commit to other international human rights treaties.  Indeed, even with 
independent and capable institutions (and there may be few states with such characteristics, in 
any event), a state with poor human rights practices may  view the costs of compliance as being 
significantly high that it will refuse to commit to the court.   
This study focuses on the costs associated with ICC commitment, rather than any benefits 
states may receive as a result of joining the ICC, precisely because the ICC‘s relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms can result in a significant loss of state sovereignty.  As a preliminary 
matter, it is worth noting that on the whole, international human rights treaties are different from 
other treaties – like arms control agreements and trade agreements – which by their very terms 
provide tangible reciprocal benefits to states in exchange for their pledge to act in particular 
ways.
25
  But, the ICC treaty is different even from other international human rights treaties 
because it has relatively strong enforcement mechanisms that can punish noncompliant behavior.  
Thus, while states might still behave rationally by ratifying toothless international human rights 
treaties solely because ratification can provide them some intangible benefits (such as the 
feelings associated with being a legitimate member of the world community) or indirect benefits 
(such as increased aid or trade), states should be less likely to approach ICC ratification by 
focusing primarily on such potential benefits.  In short, although states might still hope to gain 
some benefits from joining the ICC and signaling their legitimacy as a state that respects and 
protects human rights, for a state that cannot comply with the ICC treaty‘s terms, any of those 
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uncertain benefits will be overwhelmed by the sovereignty costs associated with noncompliance.  
Thus, I expect states will first calculate the potential costs of commitment and forgo those 
potential intangible and indirect benefits unless they can and will comply with treaty terms.   
I particularly focus on the compliance costs derived from the specific language of the text 
of the ICC treaty – rather than any costs of commitment that may be unrelated to the treaty‘s 
precise terms (for example, the costs associated with a state‘s domestic ratification processes) – 
for several additional reasons.  First, in all cases of treaty ratification, one primary guide of a 
state‘s obligations and the risks associated with failing to comply with those obligations is the 
terms and provisions of the treaty.  Second, in the case of the ICC, the institutional design of the 
treaty and its enforcement mechanisms are unique.  This is not a case where states can look to 
other similar treaties or the actions of treaty bodies that oversee compliance with other similar 
treaties to help them interpret the actual strength and meaning of a treaty‘s enforcement 
mechanisms.  In addition, by contrast to the previous international human rights treaties which 
contain only weak enforcement mechanisms, states should inherently have something to fear 
from an independent prosecutor and court.  And, while states that wait to ratify the ICC may be 
able to look at the actions of the ICC prosecutor and the court to help them determine whether 
the treaty‘s enforcement mechanisms are actually as strong as they appear to be on paper, states 
that ratified promptly had only the treaty text on which to rely when making their commitment 
decisions.   
Finally, I focus specifically on the costs associated with complying with treaty terms 
because in the international human rights context (and others as well), a treaty‘s institutional 
design and its enforcement mechanisms can have implications for understanding state behavior 
and also the likelihood that the treaty‘s purposes and goals will be realized.  The ICC treaty has 
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an institutional design and enforcement mechanisms that set it apart from other prior 
international human rights treaties.  Presumably, states structured the ICC treaty in this way 
because they wanted to ensure compliance with its terms and deter human rights abuses by 
ending the culture of impunity whereby domestic governments either commit such abuses or fail 
to bring to justice those within their jurisdiction who perpetrate atrocities.  Knowing why states 
commit to such a regime, and the kinds of states that commit to such a regime, should provide 
insights about whether structuring international human rights treaties with stronger enforcement 
mechanisms can ensure greater compliance with international human rights norms.   
Research Design 
I use a mixed methods research design to test the credible threat theory.  Using event 
history analysis and case studies, I examine whether states view the ICC‘s enforcement 
mechanisms as a credible threat and actually engage in retrospective cost calculations about their 
ability to comply with treaty terms and provisions – and, as such, their level of human rights 
practices and the independence and capability of their domestic law enforcement institutions – 
when making commitment decisions.  The quantitative analyses test state commitment to the 
ICC drawing on a database that includes more than 190 countries over the time period between 
1998 and 2008.  Although it is not, nor could it be, conclusive, the empirical evidence provides 
support for the idea that states view the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and 
more readily join the court when their retrospective calculations about their ability to comply 
with treaty terms indicates that commitment will not impose significant sovereignty costs.  The 
results indicate that states with better human rights practices are more likely than states with 
poorer human rights practices to commit to the court.  In addition, although the evidence is less 
conclusive about the role domestic law enforcement institutions play in state ratification 
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decisions, there is evidence showing that democracies are more likely to commit to the court – 
even the relatively few democracies with poorer human rights practices.  This finding provides 
support for the idea that states that already have checks on government power, such as through 
independent judicial institutions, view commitment to the ICC as less costly.  Thus, these states 
have less to fear from the additional threat of an ICC prosecution since they should expect that 
they or their citizens would be prosecuted in any event if they committed the kinds of mass 
atrocities within the ICC‘s jurisdiction. 
The quantitative tests comparing state decisions to commit to the ICC with state decisions 
to commit to 13 other international human rights treaties, articles, and/or optional protocols – 
which I arrange according to their level of enforcement mechanisms – provide further support for 
the credible threat theory.  The results of event history analysis for the years between 1966 and 
2008 show that states commit to treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms (state 
reporting) willingly and regularly, but without regard to their level of human rights practices.  
Rather, the empirical examination of state commitment to six different human rights treaties with 
the same weak enforcement mechanism suggests that states view treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms as costless and commit for the purpose of ―window dressing‖ only and without 
regard for compliance concerns.
26
  The results of tests of ICC commitment are in stark contrast 
to these findings.  A state‘s human rights ratings are a highly significant and positive predictor of 
whether a state will join the ICC treaty and risk running afoul of its relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms.  Thus, where enforcement mechanisms are relatively strong, the empirical evidence 
indicates that calculations about the costs of commitment are significantly influencing states‘ 
ratification behavior.   
I use case studies to add depth and understanding to the empirical findings by tracing the 
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historical and political processes underlying state ratification behavior, particularly as they relate 
to a state‘s ability to comply with treaty terms and the calculations states make in that regard.  
The four cases selected for study demonstrate variance on the dependent variable of ICC 
commitment and also on the main independent variables of interest: a state‘s level of human 
rights practices and the quality of its domestic law enforcement institutions.  In addition, the 
cases for individual study both fit and do not fit my theoretical expectations.  For example, both 
Germany and Trinidad and Tobago have had consistently good human rights practices since the 
ICC treaty was available for ratification in 1998.  Germany also has independent and capable 
domestic law enforcement institutions; Trinidad and Tobago‘s institutions, however, are 
somewhat weak.  Both countries promptly ratified the ICC treaty, and the evidence suggests that 
they did so based on rational and backward-looking calculations about the costs of compliance – 
which for both countries were minimal given their relatively good human rights practices.   
On the other hand, both Rwanda and Kenya have had, and continue to have, poor human 
rights ratings and biased and/or weak domestic law enforcement institutions.  Rwanda did not 
ratify the ICC – which is behavior consistent with theoretical expectations because the country‘s 
past and present human rights records and its relatively weak domestic law enforcement 
institutions indicate it may have difficulty complying with treaty terms.  Furthermore, the case 
study analysis indicates that the costs associated with ICC compliance best explain Rwanda‘s 
refusal to commit to the court.  By contrast, Kenya did join the ICC in 2005 – a decision which is 
inconsistent with the expectations of the credible threat theory since even at that time, Kenya‘s 
prospects for compliance with ICC treaty terms were at least uncertain.  And, Kenya has not 
complied with treaty terms.  Rather, Kenya has become the subject of the ICC‘s most recent 
case, and the prosecutor has charged six suspects with instigating violence following the 
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December 2007 election of Kenya‘s current president, Mwai Kibaki, which violence resulted in 
the deaths of more than 1000 people.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
 In Chapter Two, I review the existing literature on commitment to international human 
rights treaties generally, and the international criminal court in particular.  In this chapter, I 
expand on the credible threat theory, and suggest that even though prior studies have shown that 
states often ratify international human rights treaties without regard to their ability to comply, 
states making ICC ratification decisions should be guided primarily by retrospective calculations 
about the costs of complying with treaty terms given the strong and legally-binding nature of the 
ICC treaty‘s enforcement mechanisms.   
 The next two chapters are quantitative tests of the credible threat theory.  In Chapter 
Three, I empirically examine state commitment to the ICC using event history analysis.  
Employing a database of over 190 states for the period from 1998 to 2008, I examine the extent 
to which both constant and time-varying factors influence the probability that a state will ratify 
the ICC treaty in a given time period.  As noted above, those results provide support for the 
credible threat theory and the idea that compliance costs influence ICC ratification behavior in 
that the human rights practices measure is a highly significant and positive predictor of whether 
or not a state will join the ICC.   
In Chapter Four, and to provide additional context for the findings regarding state 
commitment to the ICC, I quantitatively examine state commitment to the ICC in the 
comparative context of 13 other international human rights treaties, articles, and/or protocols.  
Again, as noted above, the results of event history analysis for the period between 1966 and 2008 
provide additional support for the credible threat theory.  I find that states with poor human 
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rights ratings regularly ratify treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms.  Those states, 
however, are less likely to readily ratify the ICC treaty.  
 Chapter Five serves as an introduction to the case study chapters and explains the logic of 
case study selection.  More particularly, it explains the additional implications of the credible 
threat theory I examine through an in-depth analysis of a country‘s ratification behavior.  For 
example, unlike the quantitative chapters which study the state‘s ratification behavior at a 
particular point in time, through the qualitative analyses, ratification behavior can be studied 
over time.  Through the case studies, we can see whether state ratification decisions are 
influenced by any changes in domestic behavior, attitudes, or institutions.  In addition, although 
the results of the empirical analyses indicated that cost of compliance calculations did influence 
ICC ratification behavior, the qualitative analyses will permit a more complete exploration of 
those calculations and any trade-offs states make when considering commitment.  Finally, and 
among other things, the case studies allow us to focus on states‘ post-ratification behavior.  If 
states are truly concerned with the ICC‘s strong enforcement mechanisms and the costs of 
compliance, then we should see post-ratification efforts to comply.  In sum, the case study 
chapters should allow for a better and deeper understanding of the inferences derived from the 
quantitative analysis since they will go beyond correlation arguments.  
The four chapters that follow are case studies of Germany, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Rwanda, and Kenya.  Chapter Six examines Germany‘s decision to ratify the ICC in historical 
and political context – which historical context is particularly interesting in that it suggests that 
Germany‘s ratification of the ICC should not be taken for granted.  Not long ago, Germany was a 
country with terrible human rights practices and domestic institutions that were complicit in 
furthering government policies designed to abuse – rather than protect – human rights.  During 
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those times, Germany was hostile to the idea of punishment and a role for the world community 
in implementing that punishment, and it avoided international human rights treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms.  However, in recent decades, and after Germany‘s human rights 
practices improved and its domestic law enforcement institutions began enforcing the rule of 
law, Germany began showing an interest in – and committing to – international human rights 
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms.  And, while one might expect that Germany 
might feel pressured to join the ICC because of its history and so as to signal its intention to 
remain a legitimate state, the case study shows that Germany did not join because of pressure.  
Rather, Germany took a leadership role in arguing for a strong and independent prosecutor and 
court and it promptly committed to the court.  Indeed, the case study of Germany provides 
support for the credible threat theory because it shows that Germany committed to the Rome 
Statute and its strong enforcement mechanisms only after concluding that ICC compliance costs 
would be minimal, meaning that Germany would likely not suffer a loss of sovereignty by 
having its citizens prosecuted in The Hague. 
 In Chapter Seven, I turn to Trinidad and Tobago, a state instrumental in pushing for a 
permanent international criminal court.  But, Trinidad and Tobago had suggested a court to help 
it deal with narcotics trafficking problems.  Nevertheless, the country promptly committed to the 
ICC even though at the conclusion of the Rome Conference, states voted to include within the 
court‘s jurisdiction only the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  Case 
study analysis helps explain why Trinidad and Tobago promptly committed to the ICC even 
though the court was not the one it initially envisioned.  In fact, although many of the country‘s 
statements suggest it committed because it believed in the norms advanced by the Rome Statute, 
the record shows that Trinidad and Tobago did not put norms before compliance concerns.  The 
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evidence shows that Trinidad and Tobago carefully guards its sovereignty and does not commit 
to treaties that run counter to its domestic interests or with which it has no intention of 
complying.  At present, for example, the country is only a party to the international human rights 
treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms that require self-reporting.  And, the evidence 
shows that Trinidad and Tobago was equally as concerned with its sovereignty and the costs of 
compliance when deciding to commit to the ICC.  Although Trinidad and Tobago has narcotics 
trafficking problems, its government and its citizens have no history of committing the kinds of 
mass atrocities that would subject the country to the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms and the concomitant risks to its sovereignty.  Therefore, since Trinidad and Tobago 
would be unlikely to suffer a loss of sovereignty by ratifying the ICC treaty, it could commit to 
the court and also be able to present itself to the world community as a legitimate state that 
respects international human rights norms.   
Chapter Eight‘s case study examining Rwanda‘s behavior tests the explanatory power of 
the credible threat theory in the context of a state with poor human rights practices and weak 
domestic law enforcement institutions.  It also compares the explanatory power of the credible 
threat theory to that of the other primary theory discussed in the literature which also attempts to 
explain the ICC ratification behavior of states with poor human rights practices – the credible 
commitment theory.  According to the credible commitment theory (advanced by Beth Simmons 
and Allison Danner), states with poor human rights practices, but that are also non-democracies, 
will commit to the ICC so as to tie their hands to act as they wish and demonstrate to their 
domestic audience their commitment to end a cycle of violence and impunity.  The case study of 
Rwanda, however, shows that non-democracies with poor human rights practices – and leaders 
who have concentrated power – are not necessarily likely to commit to the ICC in order to tie 
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their hands and demonstrate to their domestic audiences an intention to respond non-violently to 
crises or to end any prior cycle of impunity.  Contrary to the predictions of the credible 
commitment theory, the case study shows that Rwanda‘s leader, President Kagame, does not 
want to surrender any of his power to the ICC.  In fact, he wants no constraints on his power to 
rule domestically as he sees fit – even if that means using violence and allowing perpetrators of 
certain acts of violence to escape justice.  Even though some in the international community have 
severely criticized Kagame for failing to hold his soldiers sufficiently accountable for acts of 
violence committed during the 1994 genocide and thereafter, he continues to maintain that he – 
and Rwanda – should be the judge of what justice is proper in Rwanda for acts involving its 
citizens.   
Thus, Rwanda has not ratified the ICC treaty, and the evidence indicates that it has not 
done so because commitment would be costly from a sovereignty standpoint.  Rwanda continues 
to be a country with poor human rights practices and institutions that do not necessarily follow 
the rule of law.  And, just as Rwanda has generally declined to commit to other international 
human rights treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms, it rationally engaged in 
retrospective calculations about whether it could comply with the ICC treaty‘s terms and avoided 
committing to a treaty with which it may not be able to comply and which could impose 
significant costs on its sovereign rights to rule and administer justice as it believes is necessary 
and warranted given its history.  For Rwanda, commitment to the ICC could result in a 
significant loss of sovereignty, not only because it might commit the kinds of atrocities covered 
by the ICC treaty, but also because President Kagame would have to surrender some of his 
power to make his own determinations about what persons and what actions are actually 
deserving of judicial punishment.    
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 Finally, in Chapter Nine, I examine Kenya‘s decision to join the court in 2005, 
notwithstanding the fact that for many years – and today – Kenya‘s human rights ratings and the 
quality of its domestic law enforcement institutions are both poor.  An in-depth analysis of the 
Kenyan case is important for further exploring the explanatory power of the credible threat 
theory and understanding why states commit to the court even when the evidence indicates that 
the compliance costs associated with commitment are apparently significant.  In addition, 
because Kenya has consistently had poor human rights practices, and because it was a non-
democracy until 2002, the Kenyan case study allows for a test of the explanatory power of the 
credible commitment theory as well.   
Here, although the case study shows that Kenya‘s decision to ratify the Rome Statute in 
2005 is inconsistent with the credible threat theory, it also shows that Kenya‘s ratification 
behavior is inconsistent with the credible commitment theory.  Kenya committed to the ICC in 
2005 – after it became a democracy and after it had made some domestic reforms – such as an 
increased role for civil society – which provided some checks on the president‘s previously 
unlimited power to govern as he saw fit.  And, the record reveals that both the domestic civil 
society and the international community played a role in convincing Kenya‘s leadership to 
commit to the ICC.  But, contrary to the predictions of the credible commitment theory, Kenya 
did not thereafter embrace the ICC‘s potential hand-tying mechanisms and commit to ending any 
cycle of violence and impunity.  As noted above, the record shows unequivocally that Kenya did 
not normatively change to the degree necessary to ensure its ability to comply with the ICC 
treaty.  Because of ethnic-based violence in the aftermath of Kenya‘s 2007 presidential elections 
in which governmental leaders and the police participated, and because Kenya has not 
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domestically held the perpetrators of that violence accountable, Kenya has become the ICC‘s 
most recent case.   
Nevertheless, although Kenya was selected for case study analysis precisely because its 
ratification behavior was apparently inconsistent with the credible threat theory given its poor 
human rights practices, that analysis has actually produced evidence showing that Kenya was – 
and is concerned – with the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms and the costs of 
failing to comply with treaty terms.  First, Kenya failed to ratify the Rome Statute for another six 
years after signing the treaty in 1999.  During all of that time period, the evidence shows that 
Kenya had poor human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement institutions.  And, 
the evidence further shows that Kenya has generally avoided international human rights treaties 
with stronger enforcement mechanisms – a fact which is not only consistent with the credible 
threat theory, but also consistent with the idea that Kenya refused to ratify the ICC treaty for so 
many years because it was concerned with the costs of complying with treaty terms.   
Second, Kenya‘s behavior after ratifying the ICC treaty in 2005 also shows that Kenya is 
concerned with the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms and the costs of failing to 
comply with treaty terms.  Specifically, in connection with the ICC investigation into the 2007 
post-election violence, Kenya‘s actions have demonstrated that it does not now want to be bound 
to a treaty which is imposing significant costs on its sovereignty.  Not only has the government 
failed to hold those responsible for the post-election violence accountable, but it has also failed 
to fully cooperate with the ICC‘s recommendations and its investigation.27  In fact, Kenya‘s 
response to the prosecutor‘s announcement that he was charging six prominent Kenyans with 
having committed crimes against humanity for their roles in the 2007 post-election violence 
                                                 
27
 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, ―Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,‖ (March 31, 2010), ¶¶ 183-186, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc854287.pdf.   
22 
 
serves to further demonstrate that Kenya does not want to be subjected to costly compliance.  
Indeed, since the prosecutor announced the six suspects, Kenya has been on a campaign designed 
to release itself from its costly commitment.  For example, in December 2010, the legislature 
voted to withdraw from the ICC – although time will only tell if Kenya will do so.28  For all of 
these reasons, Kenya‘s actions both before and after commitment show a country that is 
concerned with compliance costs and which does not want to be subjected to the ICC‘s relatively 
strong enforcement mechanisms.       
 In the Conclusion in Chapter Ten, I address implications and how to structure 
international treaties so that states perceive them as credible threats to punish bad and 
noncompliant behavior.  I argue that the implication of both the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence is that where enforcement mechanisms are stronger, states take their commitment to 
human rights treaties more seriously, and more often than not, commit based on retrospective 
calculations about their ability to comply with treaty terms.  Indeed, although states with poor 
human rights practices regularly and readily commit to international human rights treaties with 
weak enforcement mechanisms, on the whole, they are more wary of committing to the ICC.   
The empirical evidence further suggests that, on the whole, states only view the very 
strongest enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat.  Accordingly, if we hope to improve 
states‘ domestic human rights practices using international human rights treaties, we should 
structure those treaties with ―hard law‖ enforcement provisions that are clear, precise, binding, 
and backed by resources to coerce compliance and punish noncompliance.  Although one effect 
may be that fewer ―bad‖ states will join international human rights treaties since they will view 
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commitment as costly, it may be something of a distinction without a difference.  Studies show 
those same ―bad‖ states join treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms, but thereafter do not 
improve their practices.   
In any event, even if fewer states with poor human rights practices join the ICC than join 
other international human rights treaties, this does not imply that the ICC and its strong 
enforcement mechanisms will play no role in improving human rights practices or insuring that 
perpetrators of mass atrocities are punished.  First, because of the ICC‘s relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms, even states with good human rights practices will have reason to 
insure that their practices remain good or improve so as to avoid running afoul of treaty terms.  
Second, the ICC‘s jurisdictional reach extends beyond States Parties since the United Nations 
Security Council is able to refer cases to the court – as it has done with both the Sudan and, very 
recently, Libya.  Accordingly, the existence of the ICC and its independent prosecutor and court 
should stand as a warning to all states that human rights abuses will not be tolerated, and will 
instead be punished.   
Finally, the evidence shows that like Kenya, other states with bad human rights practices 
have joined the ICC.  Like Kenya they will realize, if they have not already, that an unintended 
consequence of ICC commitment may be that they will have to improve their bad human rights 
practices or face a costly loss of sovereignty to the ICC.  Unlike the many other treaties which 
are designed to induce compliance with international human rights norms, the ICC has strong 
enforcement mechanisms to punish bad and noncompliant behavior.  In short, the good news is 
that when the ―bad‖ states like Kenya join the ICC, the ICC can use its strong enforcement 
mechanisms to bring about good results.  Indeed, it seems that one way or another, because 
Kenya joined the ICC, at least six of the alleged perpetrators of the 2007 post-election violence 
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will be prosecuted.  There seems little point of continuing with the traditionally toothless regime 
that encourages ―bad‖ states to commit to international human rights treaties, but that has no 
power to insist on positive change.   
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CHAPTER TWO  
THEORIES OF COMMITMENT 
 
Existing Literature 
Although little scholarly research empirically tests the question of why states commit to 
the treaty creating the ICC, ample literature examines and tests state decisions to join 
international institutions, including international human rights treaties.  I group this literature 
according to its theoretical underpinnings as follows:  ―the rationalist view‖ and ―the normative 
view.‖  The rationalist view assumes that states are self-interested actors behaving based on the 
logic of consequences.  Under this view, states commit to treaties where the costs of commitment 
are low or where the costs of commitment are otherwise outweighed by some benefits that may 
be derived from joining the treaty.  By contrast, under the normative view, states may ratify 
human rights treaties even if commitment is costly – for example, because at that moment they 
are unable to comply with treaty terms.  Ratification of treaties embracing positive norms may 
simply be the appropriate thing to do if a state is to be viewed as legitimate.
29
 Of course, states 
may also conclude that doing what is appropriate and embracing the norms favored by other 
important or influential actors provides additional benefits as a result of being viewed as 
legitimate.  For example, by ratifying human rights treaties, states may be able to reap uncertain, 
extra-treaty benefits, including increased aid or trade.  
The Rationalist View  
Under a rationalist view, states engage in cost/benefit calculations and join those treaties 
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that are least costly and most beneficial to them.
 30
  Those costs and benefits will often be 
incurred or derived in the future after ratification.  However, states‘ pre-ratification 
determinations regarding any future costs and benefits may be based on calculations that are 
more or less retrospective or prospective in nature.  As discussed below, according to some 
theories, states will, and can, determine the likely consequences of treaty commitment by looking 
to their past practices and actions.  On the other hand, according to some theories, the treaty‘s 
potential to influence state practices and actions in the future may impose costs or benefits that 
will guide state determinations about the consequences of treaty ratification. 
Retrospective Calculations 
Compliance Costs:  Domestic Practices and Policies 
The most direct costs associated with treaty ratification, and costs that a state will likely 
calculate by looking backwards at its recent past practices and policies, are those related to 
complying with treaty terms.  According to George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, 
most governments prefer to guard against restrictions on their sovereignty, and thus, will avoid 
costly commitments – namely commitments to institutions with which they cannot comply.31  
Indeed, these scholars suggest the reason we may see widespread compliance with at least some 
treaties is because states will not negotiate or join treaties that require ―deep‖ cooperation – 
meaning cooperation that would require the state to depart from what it otherwise would have 
done in the absence of the treaty.
32
  Therefore, states wishing to guard their sovereignty and 
avoid costly decisions will have incentives to look backwards to determine whether their 
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practices and policies are consistent with those required by the terms of the treaty.  To the extent 
their practices and policies are consistent, states should commit to the treaty since compliance 
costs – and the concomitant loss to state sovereignty – should be minimal.33  
In the case of international human rights treaties, a state‘s domestic political realities and 
its prevailing human rights practices should best predict its compliance costs, which will in turn 
affect the state‘s willingness to commit to the treaty.  First, regarding the state‘s domestic 
political configuration, democratic states generally protect basic human rights, apply the rule of 
law fairly, and limit state power.  Consequently, for those states, state policies should be such 
that ratification of human rights treaties will not affect the status quo ante.
34
 Autocratic regimes, 
on the other hand, tend not to place legal restraints on their own power.  Therefore, because they 
have not in the past committed to protecting human rights or limited their own ability to respond 
violently to crises, these states may conclude that ratifying human rights treaties poses significant 
risks to their sovereignty:  if they maintain the status quo ante, they risk failing to comply with 
treaty terms.
35
 Aside from their political configuration, however, states with a recent history of 
better domestic human rights practices should also be more likely to ratify treaties protecting 
human rights.  For these states, too, the costs of noncompliance – and the risks to state 
sovereignty – should be low.36    
Along these same lines, Christine Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui argue that compliance 
with human rights norms may be easier for wealthier and more developed countries.
37
  They note 
that economically developed countries tend to be more politically stable and also have citizens 
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who embrace progress and post-materialist values – such as the need to protect citizens against 
human rights abuses.
38
  Governments in states that are economically healthy may also already 
have in place the policies permitting easy compliance with most international human rights 
treaties.  On the other hand, countries that are less economically developed may not be able to 
devote sufficient resources to ensuring that human rights are observed, particularly if the 
economic situation also leads to violence or political instability.  Those states may find 
compliance with international human rights treaties would require a substantial commitment to 
policy change – a fact which may cause them to avoid ratifying.   
The nature and terms of the ICC treaty, however, may impose additional compliance 
costs on states than might some other international human rights treaties.  Because the crimes 
covered by the ICC include ―war crimes,‖ states with a greater military presence may be more at 
risk for prosecution of their citizens – and therefore view ICC ratification as more costly – than 
states with a smaller military presence.  For example, the United States argued during 
negotiations that its military forces should be exempted from ICC jurisdiction because those 
forces were present throughout the world, were critical to international peace and security, and 
would be more exposed to accusations of wrongdoing than would citizens of other states with 
less international military involvement.
39
  Therefore, even though a state is a democracy and 
otherwise protects human rights, states that have a larger military presence within the world 
community may also find compliance with the ICC treaty is more costly and requires more 
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policy change (perhaps in the form of military training) than would states with a smaller military 
presence.
40
  
Finally, the costs of complying with international human rights treaties is reduced even 
for states with practices and policies that do not conform to treaty terms where the mechanisms 
designed to enforce compliance are weak or nonexistent.
41
  For example, where treaties require 
only that states self-report compliance, the punishment states face for failing to report or 
reporting poor conduct is negative comments by the treaty‘s committee members.  Of course, 
states may further risk comments by other states and non-governmental organizations (―NGOs‖) 
when they violate human rights in their territories, but this is a risk they probably face even 
absent ratification of a human rights treaty.  Because treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms are not designed to make states accountable for their commitments, even rights-
abusing governments may readily bind themselves to international treaties designed to promote 
and protect human rights.   
Indeed, as noted above, a number of studies have found that states with poor human 
rights practices are just as likely as states with good practices to bind themselves to treaties 
which require them to protect human rights, but that those states thereafter do not change their 
poor practices.  For example, Oona Hathaway found that non-democratic nations with poor 
human rights ratings were just as likely, and sometimes even more likely, to commit to 
international human rights treaties than non-democratic nations with better human rights ratings.  
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She attributed this finding to the absence of both external and internal enforcement mechanisms.  
Specifically, not only did the treaties themselves lack significant enforcement mechanisms, but 
autocratic nations also lacked internal enforcement mechanisms in the form of an active and 
vocal civil society or others who ordinarily push for better practices in democracies.
42
  In another 
study, Hathaway found that approximately the same percentage of countries with the most 
recorded acts of torture ratified the Convention Against Torture as did countries with no recorded 
acts of torture.
43
  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui have reported that the average 
state has ratified a steadily increasing number of human rights treaties, but that the percentage of 
states apparently repressing human rights has grown over time, suggesting that states may ratify 
only as window dressing without any intention of actually improving their practices.
44
   
Domestic Ratification Costs 
In addition to compliance costs, another cost that may influence a state‘s ratification 
behavior, and which may require states to examine their past and present practices, is the cost of 
a state‘s domestic ratification processes.  Beth Simmons identifies the domestic ratification 
process as a primary cost that governments face when deciding whether or not to commit to 
international treaties.
45
  For a state to bind itself to an international human rights treaty, it must 
follow whatever domestic processes are required to make any ratification legal and legitimate.  
As Simmons notes, governments face the fewest political costs to treaty ratification when they 
fully control the process:  for example, where the head of state has the sole right to make 
ratification decisions.  However, many states are subject to a much more onerous process: states 
may require parliamentary debate or majority or supermajority votes by legislative bodies before 
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the government is permitted to bind itself to an international treaty.  With the presence of a 
greater number of domestic legislative veto players, governments may face opposition to, or 
delays in, the treaty ratification process that can make commitment to an international human 
rights treaty too politically costly for a government to pursue.
46
  
Prospective Calculations    
Uncertainty Costs 
According to some theories, states will also have reason to look into the future to 
determine the likely consequences and costs associated with ratifying a particular treaty.  For 
example, some states may face unique uncertainty costs that will cause them to avoid ratifying, 
or move slowly in ratifying, international human rights treaties.  In particular, states that follow a 
common law tradition may find commitment to international legal tribunals more costly than will 
states following a civil law tradition.
47
 Generally speaking, the treaties to which a state commits 
also become part of that state‘s law.  In the common law tradition, however, the judiciary is 
generally independent from the government and there is some possibility that it will apply treaty 
law in a way that creates new government obligations to the state‘s citizens and others.48  This 
uncertainty in how treaty law will be applied in the future after ratification may cause common 
law states to be wary of ratifying international human rights treaties – even where they agree 
with its principles and have policies in place that enable compliance with treaty terms.  
Credible Commitment 
Even where the costs of complying with treaty terms are significant, Beth Simmons and 
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Allison Danner suggest that some states rationally calculating the costs of treaty commitment 
will conclude that those costs are outweighed by the future domestic benefits states can obtain by 
credibly committing to a treaty with strong enforcement mechanisms.  Specifically, Simmons 
and Danner suggest that in the case of the ICC, non-democracies with poor human rights 
practices will join the court precisely because it has strong enforcement mechanisms that will 
allow them to signal a credible commitment to their domestic audience to end the cycle of 
violence and, instead, in the future, respond non-violently to crises.  These scholars argue that 
where the potential gains from making a credible commitment are high, the sovereignty costs of 
joining the court are overridden, and the state will be rational in deciding to tie its hands and 
commit to acting differently in the future.
49
  In short, Simmons and Danner argue that non-
democratic states with poor human rights practices and a history of violence have incentives to 
calculate the costs of ratifying the ICC by looking ahead – rather than backwards.  And, the 
results of event history analysis provide evidence supporting their theory.  Simmons and Danner 
find that states that have experienced mass atrocities and that have poor practices (measured by 
whether the state had experienced a civil war with more than 25 deaths between the period 1990 
and 1998) are likely to join the ICC as long as those states also have weak institutions of 
domestic accountability (measured by, among other things, democracy and rule of law ratings).
50
  
States with poor practices, but strong institutions of domestic accountability, however, are less 
likely to join the ICC, a result which Simmons and Danner attribute to the fact that such states 
already had domestic institutions – such as a civil society and courts that followed the rule of law 
– which could ensure leaders would be held accountable for any future acts of violence.51   
Simmons and Danner are likely correct that some states make prospective calculations 
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and join the ICC notwithstanding their past and present inability to comply with treaty terms so 
as to commit to better their practices in the future, but I am not convinced that non-democratic 
states with poor human rights practices would overwhelmingly calculate their ICC commitment 
decisions in the way these scholars suggest.  Rather, I am more persuaded by the underlying 
logic of Oona Hathaway‘s argument which suggests that states are more retrospective in their 
treaty ratification calculations inasmuch as they look to their past human rights practices and will 
generally refuse to commit to treaties with which they cannot comply unless enforcement 
mechanisms are weak.  Indeed, Hathaway argues that the reason autocratic states with poor 
practices commit to human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms is because of the 
absence of both external and internal enforcement mechanisms.
52
  Thus, according to 
Hathaway‘s reasoning, autocratic states with poor practices are not committing to international 
human rights treaties because they want to credibly commit and tie their hands so that they 
cannot act violently in the future.  Instead, those autocratic states with poor practices commit to 
international human rights treaties because commitment will not tie their hands, thus enabling 
them to continue to disrespect human rights and repress their domestic audience without facing 
consequences for doing so.  And, it makes sense that an autocratic regime which has declined to 
place domestic constraints on its power to do and act as it pleases may not want to place 
international constraints on that same power by committing to an international human rights 
treaty like the ICC which has relatively strong enforcement mechanisms.  Therefore, and as 
Hathaway found, I expect that non-democracies with poor practices will typically be more 
retrospective in rationally calculating the costs associated with joining an international human 
rights treaty and be wary of joining treaties other than those with weak enforcement mechanisms 
that cannot be used to punish noncompliant behavior.   
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In any event, even aside from the logic of Simmons‘ and Danner‘s theory, I am not 
convinced that their ―recent civil wars‖ variable captures the concepts it was designed to 
measure:  namely, a state‘s level of human rights practices or its likelihood of committing mass 
atrocities.
53
  First, 25 battle deaths in a year does not necessarily capture ―violent states‖ or states 
at risk of committing mass atrocities since 25 battle deaths is not an enormous number and does 
not account for whether the deaths were the result of ―criminal‖ action or poor practices on the 
part of the government or any rebel group.  In addition, 25 battle deaths are not even sufficient to 
constitute a civil war as most scholars understand it.  The Correlates of War dataset which is 
widely used classifies civil wars as those having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of 
conflict.  If ―recent civil wars‖ does not capture the concept of a state with poor human rights 
practices or a tendency towards committing mass atrocities, there may be reason to question 
Simmons‘ and Danner‘s empirical results showing that autocratic states with these qualities were 
more likely to commit to the ICC so as to tie their hands against acting violently in the future.  
Finally, even accepting that ―recent civil wars‖ is an adequate measure for the concepts 
tested, an examination of Simmons‘ and Danner‘s Appendix of states that had experienced such 
―recent civil wars‖ provides evidence contrary to their theory.  It shows that the autocratic states 
among those with recent civil wars were not more likely than the democratic states to commit to 
the ICC.  Of the 22 democratic states listed, 9 had joined the court, while 13 had not.
54
  Of the 
non-democratic states listed, 9 had joined the court, but some 16 had not.
55
  Thus, even putting 
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aside questions about measurement error, it seems that a smaller percentage of the non-
democratic states had joined the court – yet these non-democratic states with ―recent civil wars‖ 
are the very states that Simmons and Danner argue will join the court to demonstrate their 
credible commitment to end the cycle of violence.  Accordingly, for this reason, and the reasons 
outlined above, I suggest that the logic behind Oona Hathaway‘s argument is more sound, and 
that we should expect autocratic states with poor human rights practices will commit to 
international human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms, but be wary of 
committing to international human rights treaties that would impose external constraints on their 
ability to do as they please.  
 Democratic Lock-In  
Finally, and along these same lines, Andrew Moravcsik also suggests that some states 
will have reasons to be forward-looking in rationally calculating the costs and benefits associated 
with ratifying a particular treaty.  Specifically, Moravcsik argues that new, transitioning 
democracies can outweigh the sovereignty costs associated with joining international human 
rights treaties by locking in the treaty‘s democratic principles and thereby constraining the 
activities of future governments that may seek to subvert democracy.
56
  In testing this theory, 
Moravcsik found evidence that dictatorships and established democracies voted against binding 
human rights guarantees during negotiations of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ―ECHR‖), whereas the newly-created 
democracies supported binding guarantees.
57
 Similarly, Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse 
have concluded that newly democratizing nations are especially likely to enter international 
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organizations because doing so would allow the state to ―credibly commit to carry out 
democratic reforms and . . . reduce the prospect of reversions to authoritarianism.‖58  
Accordingly, some newly democratic countries may conclude that the costs of complying with 
international human rights treaties are relatively low since they would have adopted – or at least 
intend to adopt – policies that are consistent with treaty terms.  Furthermore, the benefits that 
new democracies may realize by locking future governments into following their liberal policies 
may outweigh the risk that the state may not be able to immediately and fully comply with treaty 
terms.  However, when Moravcsik‘s theory was tested in connection with state decisions to 
support the Convention Against Torture, it found little support.
59
   
The Normative View 
Under the normative view, states will join international human rights treaties even if it 
may not appear to be in their rational self-interest to do so – for example, because at the precise 
moment in time, compliance with treaty terms may be difficult.  According to normative 
theories, states act based on the ―logic of appropriateness‖ and indicate their commitment to 
particular international norms because they are led to believe that behavior consistent with those 
norms is appropriate and necessary for states wishing to be viewed as legitimate.
60
  Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue that after new norms are adopted by a significant number 
of states, a ―norm cascade‖ will follow, such that other states will feel pressured to commit to the 
norm as well.
61
  Norms are spread by, and states are subjected to normative pressures from, 
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powerful democracies, transnational governance regimes like the United Nations, and global 
civil society.
62
  
In this regard, and as many scholars have noted, states may initially succumb to 
normative pressures because they receive rewards as a result: for example, investment, aid, and 
trade.
63
  Although they would prefer to guard their sovereignty and avoid external constraints, 
states may join international human rights treaties in the hopes that ratification will make them 
appear more legitimate, and thus, more suitable recipients of investment.  Weaker or poorer 
states may commit to international human rights treaties because they are indirectly or directly 
pressured to do so by the greater powers on which they rely for aid or trade.
64
  It makes sense 
that states would believe more powerful and wealthier states want them to embrace favorable 
human rights norms in order to receive certain benefits from them.  As Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 
points out, many preferential trade agreements not only govern market access, but they tie that 
access to a state‘s ability to comply with various human rights standards.65     
States may also be pressured directly or indirectly to embrace the norms and policies that 
their neighbors embrace.  If many states in a region are committing to a particular treaty, other 
states may feel pressured to similarly commit.  A state‘s ratification of international human rights 
treaties can signal to others in the region that it is a legitimate member of that region.  In 
addition, states may be led to understand that with their legitimacy established, they will be 
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eligible for other rewards – for example, participation in regional trade arrangements.66  
In addition to the pressure from their neighbors to signal appreciation of certain norms, 
where the ICC is concerned, states may have been subjected to normative pressure to join the 
ICC by pro-ICC NGOs.  In his study of state decisions to join the ICC, Michael Struett found 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that NGOs played a large role in convincing states that joining the 
ICC was necessary to be considered a legitimate state: one that would promote the appropriate 
norm of supporting an international court to help end impunity for crimes against humanity.
67
   
Synthesis and Analysis: Literature Addressing State Decisions to Join the ICC 
As mentioned above, although scholars have generally examined state commitment to 
international human rights treaties, there is little scholarly literature empirically addressing the 
precise question of why states commit to the ICC.  Research has revealed only four works that 
propose and empirically test general theories about the issue.  Furthermore, those works posit 
different theories about commitment decisions; they employ different dependent variables in 
different empirical models; and they reach different conclusions about what variables are and are 
not driving ICC commitment decisions.  Indeed, the findings from these studies differ 
significantly on the variables I argue should be most relevant to state decisions to commit to the 
ICC:  (1) a state‘s level of human rights practices and (2) the independence and capability of its 
domestic law enforcement institutions (which, as described below, I measure primarily by using 
a rule of law indicator).  Table 1 compares these works in terms of the methods used, their 
dependent variables, and their main findings. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Empirical Works Testing Commitment to the ICC 
Work Theory Model Dependent 
Variable 
Main Finding Conclusion 
Re Human 
Rights 
Conclusion 
Re Rule of 
Law 
Kelley 
(2007) 
Concerns 
state 
decisions 
about signing 
bilateral 
immunity 
agreements  
Logit for 
preliminary 
analysis of 
ICC 
ratification 
ICC 
ratification; 
signature on 
bilateral 
agreement 
States with 
most affinity for 
the ICC and 
high rule of law 
states that 
ratified are least 
likely to sign 
bilateral 
agreements  
States with 
better 
human 
rights 
practices are 
more likely 
to ratify  
Higher rule of 
law states are 
no more likely 
to ratify 
Struett and 
Weldon 
(2007); 
Struett 
(2008)
68
 
Normative: 
NGOs 
influenced 
ICC 
ratification 
Logit ICC 
ratification 
NGO influence 
not significant 
(likely because 
of measurement 
difficulty) 
No measure No measure 
Goodliffe 
and 
Hawkins 
(2009) 
Normative:  
Dependence 
networks 
determine 
state support 
for a strong 
ICC 
3 Models:  2 
Fixed Effects; 
1 Random 
Coefficients 
Support for a 
strong ICC 
(evidenced by 
statements 
made during 
ICC 
negotiations) 
A state‘s trade 
dependence 
networks are a 
primary 
determinant of 
state support for 
a strong ICC 
Higher 
human 
rights 
practices led 
to support 
for a strong 
ICC in 1 of 
3 models 
No measure 
Simmons 
and 
Danner 
(2010) 
Rationalist 
and 
Prospective:  
Non-
democracies 
with recent 
civil war join 
ICC to signal 
credible 
commitment 
Event History  Treaty 
ratification 
and signing 
Non-
democracies 
with recent civil 
wars are most 
likely to 
commit to the 
ICC 
No measure 
(or used 
civil war as 
measure) 
Measured in 
robustness 
check for 
democracy as 
accountability 
measure; 
weakest rule of 
law states 
more likely to 
commit to ICC 
 
As Table 1 shows, there is anything but a clear consensus as to what influences state 
decisions to commit or refuse to commit to the ICC, indicating that further study of the issue is 
necessary.  The present study is unique in that rather than offering and testing rather obscure 
theories about ICC commitment decisions, it focuses on the precise terms of the treaty and asks 
whether states consider those terms, and the costs associated with failing to comply with them, 
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when making decisions about whether to join the court.  In other words, while it may be 
interesting to test theories about whether states are motivated to join international regimes 
because they are persuaded by their trade partners or NGO representatives to do so, the fact 
remains that by ratifying a particular treaty like the Rome Statute, states are presumably binding 
themselves to its precise terms.  And for states behaving rationally and according to the logic of 
consequences, treaty terms should be the best and first guide as to whether treaty ratification 
makes sense from a cost/benefit standpoint.  Furthermore, because noncompliance with the 
ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms could result in a significant sovereignty loss, doing what is 
appropriate is more likely something states will consider after they determine they can comply 
with the treaty.
69
  In short, in the case of ICC commitment, states should be more likely to focus 
first on the costs of compliance, rather than any uncertain, intangible, or indirect benefits that 
they might hope to derive from appearing to be a legitimate state that embraces international 
human rights norms.    
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practices and domestic institutions.  My theory, however, posits that where a treaty contains significant enforcement 
mechanisms like this one, a state will be primarily concerned with the costs of having to comply with the treaty, 
since it is noncompliance that can subject the state to the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanism and a loss 
of sovereignty.  In the case of the ICC, if the state‘s cost calculation leads it to conclude that it is highly unlikely to 
violate the treaty‘s terms, I expect that state to join the ICC – because the costs of commitment are minimal.  
Nevertheless, and although my theory envisions a rational state most concerned with costs when making decisions 
about commitment to regimes like the ICC, I can imagine several benefits those same states might believe they 
would obtain from joining the ICC (all of which are likely extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quantify).  For 
example, states with better human rights practices likely believe the norm of protecting human rights is worth 
spreading to the rest of the world.  Thus, there may be some moral benefit to supporting an organization with a 
mission to improve global human rights practices.  Furthermore, a state with good practices may conclude that an 
organization like the ICC has the potential via its enforcement mechanism to deter future mass atrocities – atrocities 
which presumably can produce negative consequences beyond the state in which they are occurring – by, for 
example, disrupting trade patterns and inhibiting production of goods or the extraction of resources.  In addition, 
where mass atrocities occur, other states are often called upon to provide peacekeeping forces or foreign aid, goods, 
services, and housing to the innocent victims of such atrocities.  To the extent such atrocities are deterred by the 
ICC, all of these negative consequences can be mitigated, thereby creating a potential benefit to the states that 
otherwise ―pay‖ in some sense for those consequences.  In any event, a state may conclude that as with the ad hoc 
tribunals set up by the United Nations, there is some deterrence value – and no harm to itself in the sovereignty 
sense – in having in place an organization that can prosecute the citizens of other states for mass atrocities – 
particularly one that might be able to deter those atrocities before they even occur.   
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Treaty terms should particularly guide state decisions to commit to the ICC given that its 
institutional design is unique amongst other international human rights treaties.  Only the ICC 
treaty provides for an independent prosecutor and court with the ability to require states to 
surrender their own nationals for prosecution by an international criminal court if those states fail 
to comply with treaty terms.  The uniqueness of this enforcement mechanism alone should cause 
states to scrutinize it and its implications for their behavior – especially when it is contrasted 
with the usually weak enforcement mechanisms that accompany international human rights 
treaties.  Moreover, since the ICC‘s enforcement mechanism is unique, states are not able to look 
to other similar treaties or the actions of treaty bodies that oversee compliance with other similar 
treaties to help them interpret the actual strength and meaning of a treaty‘s enforcement 
mechanisms – and accordingly, the likelihood that they will be held accountable for failing to 
comply with treaty terms.  And, while states that wait to ratify the ICC treaty may be able to look 
at the actions of the ICC prosecutor and court to help them determine whether the treaty‘s 
enforcement mechanisms are actually as strong as they appear to be on paper, states that ratified 
promptly had only the treaty text on which to rely in making their commitment decisions.   
Furthermore, as noted above, I disagree with Simmons and Danner who suggest that 
autocratic states with poor practices should commit to the ICC precisely because its strong 
enforcement mechanisms (per treaty terms) enable those states to demonstrate their credible 
commitment to respond non-violently to any future crises.  On the contrary, I argue that rather 
than calculating the costs of treaty commitment prospectively, autocratic states with poor 
practices are those that should most logically look retrospectively to calculate their costs of 
committing to the ICC.  States that have experienced significant episodes of violence in the past 
and that have a history of poor human rights practices have reason to believe that based on that 
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history, compliance with a treaty promoting good human rights practices may be difficult.  
Because compliance may be difficult, autocratic states with such a history of violence and poor 
practices should be very wary of committing to the ICC – a treaty with relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms that can operate to punish those states for their noncompliance.  
Autocratic states generally have not implemented domestic machinery, such as independent 
courts that follow the rule of law or other checks and balances on their power, to hold them 
accountable to responding non-violently to any future crises.  It accordingly makes little sense to 
conclude that such states would want to commit to an international institution that could hold 
them accountable – especially, where, as here, the consequences of failing to respond non-
violently could result in government actors being arrested and brought to stand trial in The 
Hague.  For these states, commitment would necessarily entail a costly loss of sovereignty and 
reduce their power to rule and punish as they see fit.   
In sum, states should view the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms as a 
credible threat and should act accordingly.  Even though prior studies have shown that states 
often ratify human rights treaties without regard to their ability to comply, in making decisions 
about ICC commitment, states should be concerned with their ability to comply with treaty 
terms.  Testing the potential for compliance with ICC treaty terms necessarily requires that any 
model include measures relating to the ability to comply:  in this case, variables measuring a 
state‘s level of human rights practices and the independence and capability of its domestic legal 
institutions.   
Strong Enforcement Mechanisms as a Credible Threat 
Although, as is evident from the above discussion, there may be many reasons why states 
are motivated to commit to, or refuse to commit to, international human rights treaties, my focus 
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is on compliance costs and the potential threat posed by strong enforcement mechanisms.  When 
I refer to enforcement mechanisms in this context,
70
 I refer to the formal grant of power from 
states to some entity or institution with authority to oversee state compliance with treaty terms.   
The weakest enforcement mechanisms are characterized by ―soft law‖ provisions – using 
the language of Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal.
71
 ―Soft law‖ exists where legal 
arrangements are weakened by lacking clear obligations, precision, or a clear delegation of 
authority or responsibility.
72
  Stronger, ―hard law‖ enforcement mechanisms are precise and 
binding:  for example, a formal grant of power to a committee or court to engage in authoritative, 
institutionalized, and legally binding decision making.
73
  As Darren Hawkins notes, to constitute 
strong enforcement, there must be authorized decision makers who are ―officially empowered by 
states to interpret and apply the rule of law and who control resources that can be used to prevent 
abuses or to punish offenders.‖74  States should view strong enforcement mechanisms as a 
credible threat because they are costly:  they impose precise and binding restrictions on the 
state‘s sovereign right to control matters of domestic governance.   
As a rule, international human rights treaties are characterized by ―soft law‖ enforcement 
mechanisms
75
 because they are lacking clear obligations, precision, or delegation of authority or 
responsibility.
76
  Traditional human rights treaties typically delegate only the power to monitor 
                                                 
70
 I draw on several scholarly works for this discussion about enforcement and legalization.  See Darren Hawkins, 
―Explaining Costly Institutions:  Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms,‖ International Studies Quarterly 
48 (2004): 781; Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan 
Snidal, ―Legalization and World Politics:  An Introduction,‖ International Organization 54 (2000): 385; Abbott and 
Snidal, ―Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,‖ International Organization 54 (2000): 437; and Jack 
Donnelly, ―International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,‖ International Organization 40 (1986): 603-05.   
71
 Abbott and Snidal, ―Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,‖ 422-24.   
72
Ibid.       
73
 Ibid. at 421.   
74
 Hawkins, ―Explaining Costly Institutions,‖ 781.   
75
 Abbott and Snidal, ―Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,‖ 422-24.   
76
 This absence of enforcement mechanisms in international human rights treaties is a fact Oona Hathaway 
emphasized when explaining her results which showed that non-democracies with poor human rights ratings were 
just as likely as non-democracies with good human rights ratings to commit to such treaties.  She notes that non-
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state behavior, as opposed to the power to enforce state compliance with treaty standards.  For 
example, most human rights treaties require only that the state submit regular reports to a 
committee about its efforts to comply with treaty terms.  Furthermore, as Jack Donnelly notes, 
―whatever the quality of the report, once it has been reviewed, the monitoring process typically 
ends until the next report is due in five years.‖77 Additional articles and the optional protocols to 
these treaties have somewhat more significant enforcement mechanisms in that states can 
recognize the competence of a committee to receive and review state or individual complaints 
alleging that a state party has not fulfilled its treaty obligations and has either failed to protect or 
abused human rights.   
None of these enforcement mechanisms, however, is particularly strong since none 
involves state delegation of power to another entity to make legally binding decisions.
78
  Simply 
put, in no case are the committees given the power to issue legally-binding decisions:  rather, 
while they can issue decisions, by the very terms of the treaty, committee decisions are in the 
nature of recommendations only.  It is true that by binding themselves to treaty terms, states may 
feel some moral obligation to abide by committee recommendations and suggestions regarding 
how to resolve individual or state complaints.  However, states have not delegated power to the 
committee to make legally binding decisions, nor have they provided the committees with any 
                                                                                                                                                             
democracies have few or no internal enforcement mechanisms – such as domestic civil society – which might be 
used to pressure non-democracies to honor their commitments.  Therefore, in the absence of external enforcement 
mechanisms associated with the treaty, non-democracies could conclude that commitment was essentially costless – 
and perhaps even beneficial, as it would enable them to appear legitimate.  Hathaway, ―The Cost of Commitment,‖ 
1856.   
77
 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (3d ed.) (Boulder:  Westview Press, 2007), 85.  Donnelly further 
explains that while reporting procedures are useful in that they provide a concrete reminder for states to review their 
practices, those procedures cannot be used to force recalcitrant states into actually improving their practices.  87.  
78
 See, for example, Achene Boulesbaa, The U.N. Convention on Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement 
(Springer,1999), 63 (discussing the Committee Against Torture); Henry J. Steiner, ―Individual Claims In A World 
Of Massive Violations:  What Role For The Human Rights Committee,‖ in The Future of UN Human Rights 
Monitoring, eds. Philip Alston and James Crawford (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 37 (noting 
that the Human Rights Committee has no authority to act punitively against any state offending the ICCPR or to 
impose sanctions against it).   
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resources or powers to punish those who do not comply with their recommendations.   
This does not mean the enforcement mechanisms associated with traditional human rights 
treaties are not helpful or meaningful steps in inducing state compliance or improving human 
rights.  The reports, decisions, and comments by the committees on state noncompliance can be 
used by NGOs or individuals in an effort to shame the state into compliance.  Other states may 
also use the evidence contained in those reports as ammunition to force a state into compliance:  
for example, states may withhold aid or trade until a state agrees to improve its human rights 
record.  Even if a state fails to cooperate with its obligations or follow committee 
recommendations, the committee‘s decisions and reports may be valuable in persuading the state 
to comply.  However, regarding the level of the enforcement mechanisms to which states bind 
themselves pursuant to the treaty‘s terms, the fact is that the committees do not have legally- 
binding adjudicatory power coupled with resources to compel compliance with their comments, 
views, and recommendations.  Moreover, even had the state not joined the particular treaty, 
NGOs, states, or civil society probably could find equivalent evidence about the state‘s poor 
human rights practices to shame it into improving those practices.   
As compared to traditional human rights treaties, I suggest that only the ICC is governed 
by ―hard law‖ enforcement mechanisms.  The ICC treaty describes in detail the elements of the 
covered crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
79
  By the terms of the 
treaty, states have also designated to an independent entity the authority to determine that there is 
evidence to believe an individual or group committed one of the covered crimes within the 
territory of a State Party.
80
  In addition, they have delegated the power to determine whether the 
state which would otherwise have jurisdiction over the matter is itself either unwilling or unable 
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 Rome Statute, Arts. 5-8.   
80
Rome Statute, Arts. 1-4 (describing the establishment of, and powers, of the court) and Art. 15 (describing the 
powers of the ICC prosecutor).   
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to prosecute the wrongdoers.
81
  Furthermore, the ICC has resources to compel compliance with 
its determinations:  it may issue arrest warrants to bring persons or groups to the ICC in The 
Hague to stand trial for their alleged crimes; it may try alleged offenders; and it may sentence 
those found guilty to prison terms.   
Of course, the ICC cannot effectuate arrests without the assistance of States Parties since 
the institution itself has no international police force.  In addition, even though States Parties 
commit to cooperate in arresting those individuals for whom arrest warrants are issued, the ICC 
has no police force to make states comply.  Thus, while some states have cooperated in bringing 
suspects to The Hague for trial,
82
 at least a couple of African nations have refused to arrest 
President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan for whom an arrest warrant was recently issued.
83
   
Nevertheless, the power delegated to the ICC is still of a legally binding nature.  While a 
suspect may be able to escape arrest by staying in state or hiding (and suspects can always 
escape arrest in similar ways even under domestic criminal law systems where police forces can 
effectuate arrests), those subject to an arrest warrant are not completely free to do as they please.  
The warrant is a legal document backed by the power of the law, and the subject can be arrested 
by any state willing to make the arrest.  Even President Bashir likely feels the threat of the 
warrant for his arrest:  while he has traveled to some friendly countries in Africa, he probably 
will not risk a trip to Europe.  Indeed, the power of the fact of potential arrest warrants was 
recently demonstrated when in June 2010, Darfur suspects appeared in The Hague ―voluntarily‖ 
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 Rome Statute, Art. 17.   
82
 The former Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo – who was the subject of a sealed arrest 
warrant – was arrested during a visit to Belgium.  ―Congo Ex-Official Is Held In Belgium on War Crimes Charges,‖ 
Agence France-Press, May 25, 2008.    
83
 Both Chad and Kenya are ICC States Parties who have recently hosted President Bashir in their countries 
notwithstanding the warrant for his arrest.  According to a September 21, 2010 ICC Press Release, Kenya‘s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs acknowledged Kenya‘s obligation to cooperate with the ICC, but also highlighted its competing 
obligations to the African Union and regional stability and peace in explaining Kenya‘s refusal to arrest President 
Bashir while he was in the country.  ICC Press Release, ―President of the Assembly meets Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Kenya,‖ Sept. 21, 2010.  
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in order to avoid having warrants issued for their arrest.
84
 
Accordingly, because the ICC treaty has relatively strong enforcement mechanisms that 
are legally-binding in nature, I expect state ratification behavior will be influenced by states‘ 
retrospective calculations about their ability to comply with treaty terms.  Principally, 
compliance requires a state and its nationals to commit to having relatively good human rights 
practices.  Where nationals of State Parties do not commit any of the covered crimes, there will 
be no opportunity for the ICC to even potentially obtain jurisdiction over a matter.  Therefore, a 
sufficient condition for ICC ratification is good human rights practices, since states with good 
practices can conclude that ratification will not lead to a costly loss of sovereignty.   
Secondarily, compliance also may require a state to have relatively independent and 
capable domestic law enforcement institutions to prosecute human rights violations – in the 
event that the state‘s government and/or citizens do commit the kinds of mass atrocities that 
would otherwise be within the ICC‘s jurisdictional purview.  Independent judicial institutions 
that follow the rule of law should be able to punish even governments that would otherwise be 
―unwilling‖ to punish themselves or their compatriots who commit human rights violations.  
Capable domestic law enforcement institutions with resources and sufficient expertise should be 
―able‖ to conduct the kind of investigations and prosecutions that will ensure that perpetrators of 
mass atrocities are punished for their conduct.  Of course, because states with good human rights 
practices should not expect to commit the kinds of atrocities covered by the ICC treaty, they can 
still conclude that ICC commitment is relatively costless even if their domestic law enforcement 
institutions are not independent or capable.   
For states with bad human rights practices, however, the cost of compliance calculations 
                                                 
84
 ICC Press Release, ―As Darfur rebel commanders surrender to the Court, ICC Prosecutor ‗welcomes compliance 
with the Court‘s decisions and with Resolution 1593 (2005) of the Security Council,‘‖ June 16, 2010 (addressing the 
arrival of two Darfur rebel commanders to answer charges and face prosecution for their conduct).     
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will be less straightforward.  For these states, because their government or citizens may commit 
the kinds of crimes covered by the ICC treaty, complying with treaty terms necessarily rests on 
whether they are able to take advantage of the treaty‘s complementarity provision.  But, as an 
initial matter, relying solely on the availability of the treaty‘s complementarity provision for 
compliance is risky because pursuant to treaty terms, the ICC prosecutor and court are authorized 
to determine whether any domestic prosecutions are adequate to ward off an ICC investigation.  
In addition, however, the data shows that there are relatively few states with poor practices that 
are also likely to have independent and capable domestic law enforcement institutions (based on 
either their rule of law scores or their democracy ratings).  Therefore, it may be that in most 
cases, states with poorer human rights practices are also states where power is concentrated such 
that the government is able to abuse human rights and also controls the state machinery to such 
an extent that the judiciary is not independent and the rule of law is not fairly applied.  In other 
words, not only may governments with poor practices risk having the ICC conclude that their 
domestic prosecutions are inadequate, but also they may be complicit in committing any human 
rights abuses and, therefore, be ―unwilling‖ to ensure that such abuses are punished.  As such, 
although independent and capable law enforcement institutions should be a sufficient condition 
for states to conclude that ratification of the ICC treaty is relatively costly, I expect that in most 
cases, states with poor human rights practices will either be wary of relying solely on this 
condition, or will be ―unwilling‖ to do so.     
In sum, I suggest that good human rights practices and independent and capable domestic 
law enforcement institutions are each individually sufficient conditions for states to rationally 
commit to the ICC treaty and its relatively strong enforcement mechanisms.  If a state has either 
good human rights practices or independent and capable domestic law enforcement institutions, 
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it should conclude that ratifying the ICC treaty does not pose a significant risk to its sovereignty, 
and the state should commit to the court.  In addition, for a state to conclude that ICC ratification 
is essentially costless because the state can comply with treaty terms, either good human rights 
practices or independent and capable domestic law enforcement institutions are a necessary 
condition to ratification.  However, because the ICC has the ability to determine whether the 
state‘s domestic investigations and prosecutions are adequate to ward off ICC jurisdiction, better 
human rights practices are almost a necessary condition to ratification.     
The table below shows the commitment decisions I expect states to make based the 
theory outlined above. 
Table 2: State Commitment Decisions Expectations 
       Low Likelihood of 
Human Rights 
Violation 
High Likelihood of Human Rights Violation 
Worse Domestic 
Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Commit to ICC 
(since not likely to 
violate treaty terms) 
Least likely to commit to the ICC 
Better Domestic 
Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Most likely to 
commit to the ICC 
Refuse to commit to the ICC (since can‘t control 
ICC determinations about the quality of domestic 
prosecutions) [but also theoretically unlikely 
many states in this category] 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TESTING STATE COMMITMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
Methodology 
I use event history analysis – specifically a Cox proportional-hazards regression model85-
- to analyze the extent to which both constant and time-varying factors influence the probability 
that a state will ratify
86
 the ICC treaty in a given time period.  Because we do know the dates that 
countries have ratified the ICC treaty, I arrange the data quarterly to include that variation in the 
model.  The results will be reported as hazard ratios, which will indicate the proportionate 
influence a given factor has on a state‘s decision to commit to the ICC.  Numbers greater than 
one indicate an increase in the hazard rate of ratification.  Numbers less than one indicate a 
decrease in the hazard rate.     
Dependent Variable 
Ratification data regarding the ICC treaty were coded from information collected by the 
ICC.  The data is assembled at quarterly intervals for more than 190 countries between 1998 and 
2008.  Countries existing in July 1998 when the ICC treaty was adopted and available for 
ratification are ―at risk‖ of ratifying at that time.  Countries established after that time enter the 
risk set upon independence – the time when they are eligible to ratify as a sovereign state.  
Countries at risk are given a value of 0 until they ratify.  At the time of ratification, countries are 
assigned a value of 1.  Countries that did not ratify by the end of 2008, when the observation 
period here ends, are right-censored.  By the end of 2008, some 108 states were States Parties to 
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 For a comprehensive description of event history analysis, see Paul D. Allison, Event History Analysis:  
Regression for Longitudinal Event Data (Sage, 1984); Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Katrin Golsch, and Gotz Rohwer, 
Event History Analysis with Stata (2007).   
86
 I use the term ―ratify‖ to refer to state decisions to commit to the ICC treaty by both ratification and accession 
since both methods equally commit the state to the court.  In addition, most states committed to the ICC by 
ratification, which is the process used for commitment when the state has already previously signed the treaty.     
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the treaty.  Appendix A contains a list of the 108 states that had ratified the ICC treaty by the end 
of 2008, together with their dates of ratification.  Figure 1 shows the pattern of state ratification 
of the ICC treaty over time.   
Figure 1: States Ratifying the Rome Statute over Time (as of 2008) 
 
Independent Variables 
The Main Explanatory Variables -- Level of Human Rights Practices and Level of 
Domestic Law Enforcement Institutions 
 
I use two main measures of a state‘s human rights practices.  First, the Cingranelli-
Richards Human Rights Dataset measures a state‘s physical integrity based on data from U.S. 
State Department and Amnesty International reports.
87
  It conceives of physical integrity as an 
aggregate of four component parts which it assesses in terms of frequency:  tortures, extrajudicial 
killings, political imprisonments, and disappearances.  Each of the component parts receives a 
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 David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, ―The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset Version 
2008:03.12,‖ available at http://www.humanrightsdata.org.   
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score of between 0 and 2, which scores are then aggregated to produce a final score of between 0 
and 8 – with 8 representing the best human rights.  The dataset covers 195 countries from 
between 1981 and 2008.
88
 
Second, genocide – a specific crime over which the ICC has jurisdiction – is measured 
using data on genocide and politicide.
89
  From that data – which exists for the years from 1955 to 
2006 – I create a dichotomous variable, putting states into a genocide category if they had a 
genocidal episode in that period and putting them in a non-genocidal category if they did not.
90
  
To capture whether the state possesses the independent, capable, and developed law 
enforcement institutions necessary to ensure that any violations of the crimes covered by the ICC 
treaty may be prosecuted domestically, I use a rule of law measure from the World Bank‘s 
Worldwide Governance Research Indicators project.
91
  This indicator measures ―the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
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 I considered using the human rights measure from the Political Terror Scale 1976-2008 for this quantitative 
examination of state commitment to the ICC. Mark Gibney, L. Cornett, and R. Wood, ―Political Terror Scale 1976-
2008,‖ available at http://politicalterrorscale.org.  That data is also based on human rights reports issued by Amnesty 
International and the U.S. Department of State.  However, it covers fewer countries:  185 instead of 195.  I thus 
chose to use the Cingranelli-Richards dataset for this study.    
89
 Barbara Harff, ―Annual Data on Cases of Genocide and Politicide, 1955-2006, complied for the United States 
Government‘s State Failure Task Force,‖ available at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide. 
90
 I chose not to include a measure of ―recent civil wars‖ as did Simmons and Danner because, as noted above, I do 
not believe that measure accurately captures the concept of the level of a state‘s human rights practices or the 
likelihood that it will commit a mass atrocity.  Simmons and Danner, ―Credible Commitments and the International 
Criminal Court,‖ 233-34, 237.  First, I am not convinced that 25 battle deaths in a year are sufficient to constitute a 
civil war as most scholars understand it, particularly given that the Correlates of War dataset which is widely used 
classifies civil wars (intra-state wars) as those having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict.  
Furthermore, I suggest that wars which produce so few yearly battle deaths would not accurately measure the 
concept the authors indicated they were capturing by that measure: namely, the states ―at risk for committing mass 
atrocities.‖  Ibid. at 237.   In addition, the Simmons and Danner ―recent civil wars‖ measure does not account for 
whether the deaths were the result of ―criminal‖ action or poor practices on the part of the government or any rebel 
group.  On the other hand, the Cingranelli-Richards data on human rights practices and the genocide data directly 
measure a state‘s tendency to commit the kinds of human rights violations that would subject the state‘s leaders and 
citizens to an ICC prosecution.   
91
 Governance Matters 2009, Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008, available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.  Although the data are available from 1996 to 2008, data were 
reported only biannually until 2002.  Therefore, for the period between 1998 and 2002, I use the data from the 
immediate prior year to extrapolate missing data points. 
53 
 
violence.‖92  I chose to measure the overall ability of the state to comply with the ICC treaty‘s 
terms regarding the complementarity provision using the rule of law measure because I believe it 
is the best available measure that is focused precisely on the state‘s domestic law enforcement 
institutions.  It is true, as discussed below, that the democracy measure should capture some 
aspects relevant to the quality of the state‘s domestic law enforcement institutions – such as the 
independence of the judiciary – because that measure deals in part with constraints on the chief 
executive.  But, the rule of law measure is solely focused on domestic crime and violence and the 
quality of the domestic law enforcement institutions to combat those problems.  Accordingly, the 
rule of law measure should capture the idea of independent courts, thereby addressing the 
complementarity provision‘s ―unwillingness‖ prong.  It should also capture the idea of capable 
courts, thereby addressing the ―inability‖ prong of the complementarity provision.  
Control Variables: The Rationalist View 
To test the idea that states with democratic governments are more likely than those with 
autocratic governments to ratify the ICC, I include a Polity IV democracy measure.
93
  That 
democracy indicator is on a 0 to 10 scale, with scores based on several dimensions of 
democracy:  (1) competitiveness of political participation; (2) openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment; and (3) constraints on the chief executive.  This measure will specifically 
capture the democracy/non-democracy concept since that is precisely what the data addresses.  
But, as noted above, because state ratings also encompass information about the strength of the 
limits on government power to do as it wishes, this variable should include some information 
about the strength and independence of the country‘s judiciary – although not as expressly as 
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 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kray, and Massimo Mastruzzi, ―Governance Matters VI:  Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-2006‖ (The World Bank 2007).   
93
 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, ―Polity IV Project:  Dataset Users‘ Manual‖ (Polity IV Project 2007), 
available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. 
54 
 
does the rule of law measure.   
I use a state‘s gross domestic product (―GDP‖) per capita as a measure of economic 
development to test the hypothesis that more economically-developed states are more likely than 
less-developed countries to ratify international human rights treaties.  GDP per capita is a 
standard control variable in cross-national research used as a proxy for a country‘s general level 
of economic development.
94
  
With respect to a state‘s level of military presence or exposure, I include a variable 
measuring the state‘s military spending.  I use a measure of military spending as a percentage of 
GDP from the World Bank World Development Indicators which is available for all years in this 
study.
95
   Although the human rights data should most directly measure whether the state‘s 
citizens are likely to commit the kinds of crimes covered by the ICC treaty, this military 
expenditure data is designed to capture the idea that states spending relatively more on their 
military are also more likely to have citizens engaged in military operations, thereby potentially 
exposing those citizens to ICC jurisdiction for acts committed during peacekeeping or warfare.
 96
 
To measure the political costs associated with a state‘s domestic legislative treaty 
ratification process, I use data provided by Beth Simmons.
97
  That data codes state ratification 
processes using a four-category scale, designed to capture the level of difficulty in the formal 
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 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 385; Cole, ―Sovereignty Relinquished?;‖ Wotipka and Tsutsui, ―Global 
Human Rights and State Sovereignty.‖ I obtain the measure from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
dataset, and I log the measure to reduce a skewed distribution.  This measure indicates the level of a state‘s wealth 
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 I considered the military expenditure data collected by the U.S. State Department, but that data was only available 
until 2005.  See http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat.  I also considered using data on interstate military disputes 
from the Correlates of War database, but at the time of drafting, that data was only available up to 2001.  See 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/Datasets.htm.  Thus, I chose to use more comprehensive data for this measure of 
military exposure.   
96
 Judith Kelley similarly used a measure of military spending to test the theory that states with relatively less 
military power were less likely to become involved in activities that fall under the ICC‘s jurisdiction, making them 
more likely to ratify the statute.  Kelley, Who Keeps International Commitments and Why?,‖ 579. 
97
 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 383.     
55 
 
domestic ratification process.
98
  The categories are as follows:  (1) treaties may be ratified by an 
individual chief executive or cabinet; (1.5) there is a rule or tradition of informing the legislature 
of signed treaties; (2) treaties may only be ratified upon consent of one legislative body; (3) 
treaties may only be ratified by a supermajority vote in one legislative body or by a majority vote 
in two separate legislative bodies. 
To test the hypothesis that states following a common law tradition are more likely to 
ratify international human rights treaties than those following a civil law tradition, I include data 
on a state‘s legal tradition.99  I measure this concept using a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether or not a state follows a common law legal tradition.   
Finally, I include a control variable to measure the new democracy, ―lock-in‖ theory 
advanced by Andrew Moravcsik.  Using the Polity IV democracy measure, I create a dummy 
variable to account for those states that are new democracies.  I code new democracies as those 
that became democracies – with a score of 7 or above on the Polity IV scale100 – some time 
during the general negotiation phase of the ICC treaty and which have stayed democratic since 
that time.  Because negotiations began in 1994, and because it is consistent with Moravcsik‘s 
argument to believe that a state would still be a transitional democracy if it only became a 
democracy shortly before the creation of the court, I chose 1990 as the cut-off date for new 
democracies. 
 
                                                 
98
 The source and detailed description of this data are available on Simmons‘ website at 
http://scholar.iq.harvard.edu/bsimmons/mobilizing-for-human-rights. 
99
 The data for the variable were obtained from the Global Network Growth Database created by William Easterly 
and Hairong Yu, available at  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20701055~pagePK:
64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#4) .   
100
  Beth Simmons also used 7 as the number above which she considered countries to have transitioned to 
―democracy‖ in her work testing state commitment to and compliance with various international human rights 
treaties.  Mobilizing for Human Rights, 385.    
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Control Variables: The Normative View 
I also include several control variables in the model to account for the theories addressed 
under the normative view of treaty ratification.  First, I include a measure to account for the idea 
that less-developed states may ratify treaties so as to appear to embrace the same norms as their 
more powerful and wealthier neighbors, and to receive the concomitant extra-treaty benefits that 
may accrue to them as a result.  I use net official development assistance and official aid 
(―ODA‖) in constant 2007 U.S. dollars as a share of GDP to measure this concept.101 ODA 
consists of the loans and grants made to developing countries.   
I measure the concept concerning regional influence by looking at regional density of the 
ratification of the various treaties, articles, and optional protocols.  Regional density computes 
ratification by countries in the same region up to the previous year.  I classify countries by region 
using the seven World Bank categories:  Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia/Oceania; Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia; Latin America/Caribbean; Middle East/North Africa; South Asia; and the 
West (Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States).
102
 Figure 2 
shows States Parties to the ICC by region.  Figure 3 shows regional ratification patterns over 
time.  
  
                                                 
101
The data are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators, available at 
http:/devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/.  Simmons used this same measure to capture the idea that states might be 
influenced to ratify human rights treaties because of the hope that by doing so they may obtain more access to aid.  
Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 385.   
102
 See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/0,,pagePK:180619~theSitePK:136917,00.html .  
Appendix C lists the countries in each of the categories.   
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Figure 2: ICC Treaty Ratification by Region (as of October 2010) 
 
 
Figure 3: ICC Ratification by Region over Time 
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Finally, although a precise measure of NGO influence on state decisions to commit to the 
ICC may be impossible, I measure this concept using data on the number of NGOs in each state 
that are members of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (the ―CICC‖).103 The 
CICC is a network of over 2,000 NGOs advocating for state membership in a fair, effective, and 
independent ICC).
104
  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables described above. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Level of Human Rights 8256 4.979 2.29 0 8 
Genocide or Not 10208 .137 .344 0 1 
Level of Domestic Law Enforcement Institutions 9720 -.065 .999 -2.686 2.116 
Level of Democracy 7928 5.298 3.935 0 10 
Level of Military Expenditure 7376 2.382 2.541 0 39.615 
Difficulty of Domestic Treaty Ratification Process 8956 1.700 .654 1 3 
Level of Economic Development 9324 7.669 1.604 4.191 11.263 
Common Law State or Not 9102 .340 .472 0 1 
Transitioning Democracy or Not 8320 .244 .429 0 1 
Level of Aid or Assistance 9340 .086 .151 -.033 2.119 
Regional Ratification 8504 .307 .291 0 .96 
Level of NGO Presence 10208 13.723 33.585 0 305 
 
                                                 
103
 See http://www.iccnow.org/. 
104
  Measuring this concept of NGO influence is difficult in many respects.  First, only qualitative analysis and case 
studies may actually produce evidence of whether states were really influenced by NGOs to join the ICC.  Second, 
the presence of NGOs in states or even state meetings with NGOs does not necessarily mean a state was persuaded 
by NGOs to change its behavior.  In addition, the data I was able to obtain on NGO members in the CICC is not as 
precise as is could be.  The data list the number of CICC-member NGOs as of March 2009.  A more precise measure 
might account for NGO membership by state according to particular time-periods.  However, I was advised by 
CICC personnel that such data were not maintained in that format. 
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Empirical Analyses and Discussion of Results 
As an initial matter, examining the ratification patterns of the various states provides 
preliminary support for the credible threat theory and the idea that states act retrospectively and 
consider the costs of complying with treaty terms before committing to a treaty with relatively 
strong enforcement mechanisms.  There is strong evidence that states with good human rights 
practices are most likely to commit to the ICC, while states with poor practices are reluctant to 
ratify.  Table 4 shows that among states with better human rights ratings (those states with 
average physical integrity rights scores of between 5 and 8 for the period between 1996 and 
2007), some 71% ratified the ICC treaty.  Among states with worse human rights practices (those 
with average scores of below 5), only about 37% ratified the statute.   
Table 4: ICC Treaty Ratification Patterns Based on Likelihood of Human Rights 
Violations 
Better Human Rights Practices Worse Human Rights Practices 
Ratify Not Ratify Not Ratify Ratify 
Albania, Andorra, 
Antigua, Australia, 
Austria, Barbados, 
Belgium, Belize, 
Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, Comoros, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus,  
Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Djibouti, 
Dominica,  
East Timor, Estonia, 
Fiji, Finland, France, 
Gabon, Gambia, 
Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guyana, 
Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, 
Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bhutan, 
Brunei, Cape 
Verde,  
El Salvador, 
Grenada,  
Guinea-Bissau, 
Jamaica, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Maldives, 
Mauritania, 
Micronesia, 
Moldova, 
Monaco, 
Nicaragua, Oman, 
Palau, Qatar,  
Sao Tome and 
Principe,  
Singapore,  
Solomon Islands,  
Algeria, Angola, 
Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Cameroon, 
China, Cuba, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, 
India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Ivory Coast, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kiribati, Laos, 
Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, 
North Korea, 
Pakistan, Papua 
Afghanistan, 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, 
Central African 
Republic,  
Chad, Colombia, 
Congo,  
Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 
Dominican 
Republic,  
Ecuador, Georgia, 
Guinea, Jordan, 
Kenya, Liberia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, 
Paraguay, Peru, 
Senegal,  
South Africa, 
Tajikistan, 
60 
 
Lesotho, 
Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Mali, 
Malawi, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Namibia, 
Nauru, Netherlands,  
New Zealand, Niger, 
Norway, Panama, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Samoa, San 
Marino, Serbia,  
Sierra Leone, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia,  
South Korea, Spain,  
St. Kitts & Nevis, St. 
Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, 
Sweden, Switzerland, 
Trinidad,  
United Kingdom, 
Uruguay  
St. Lucia, 
Swaziland, 
Taiwan, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Ukraine,  
United Arab 
Emirates,  
United States, 
Vanuatu 
 
New Guinea, 
Philippines, Russia, 
Rwanda,  
Saudi Arabia,  
Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Syria, Thailand, 
Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Tanzania, Uganda, 
Venezuela, Zambia 
 
 
Indeed, as seen in Figure 4, the great majority of states with average physical integrity 
rights scores of between 6 and 8 have ratified the Rome Statute.  On the other hand, among states 
with the worst average physical integrity rights scores, the majority have refrained from ratifying 
the treaty.  
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Figure 4: ICC Ratification by Average CIRI Human Rights Ratings105 
(percentage within each rating category) 
 
There is also evidence to suggest that the quality of a state‘s domestic law enforcement 
institutions influences ICC commitment decisions.  Looking at a snapshot in time using average 
rule of law scores, states with the best average rule of law scores (above 1), regularly ratified the 
ICC treaty – with an 85% ratification rate.  States with the weakest domestic law enforcement 
institutions (those with average rule of law scores below -1),
106
 however, were much less likely 
to ratify – only approximately 43%.  Table 5 shows the ratification patterns of states with the 
best and worst domestic law enforcement institutions. 
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 As above, I took the average physical integrity rights rating for each state between 1996 and 2007.   
106
 In their study of ICC commitment, Simmons and Danner similarly categorized states with World Bank Rule of 
Law scores of below -1 as those with the ―weakest rule of law‖ when testing the robustness of their measure of 
―domestic accountability‖ – the idea that states would hold leaders accountable for any atrocities in violation of the 
ICC using their domestic institutions. ―Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court,‖ 246.       
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Table 5:  ICC Treaty Ratification Patterns Based on Level of Domestic Law 
Enforcement Institutions 
Best Domestic Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Worst Domestic Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Ratify Not Ratify Not Ratify Ratify 
Andorra, Australia, 
Austria, Barbados, 
Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands,  
New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, 
Switzerland,  
United Kingdom 
Bahamas, 
Singapore, Tuvalu, 
United States  
Angola, Belarus, 
Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, 
Haiti, Iraq,  
Ivory Coast, Laos, 
Myanmar,  
North Korea, 
Rwanda,  
Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, Sudan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe 
Afghanistan, 
Burundi, Cambodia, 
Central African 
Republic,  
Chad, Comoros, 
Congo,  
Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 
Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria,  
Sierra Leone, 
Tajikistan, 
Venezuela 
 
 
 
In fact, a further examination of the ratification patterns of only those states with poor 
human rights practices provides additional support for the credible threat theory – and evidence 
contrary to the explanatory power of the credible commitment theory.  As is shown in Table 6 
below, among states with poor human rights practices, non-democratic states are not more likely 
than democratic states to commit to the ICC.  In fact, the evidence shows that non-democratic 
states with poor human rights practices are far more likely to avoid the ICC than commit to it.  
About 68% of those states did not ratify the Rome Statute.  By contrast, amongst democratic 
states with poor human rights practices (although there are few of them), about 54 % ratified the 
treaty.  Comparing the ratification patterns of the non-democracies to the democracies shows that 
democracies with poor practices are much more likely than non-democracies with poor practices 
to commit to the ICC since about 54% of the democracies ratified, whereas only about 32% of 
the non-democracies ratified.   
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All of this evidence about the ratification patterns of states with poor human rights 
practices is consistent with the credible threat theory which predicts that because the ICC has 
relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, states will be retrospective in their calculations and 
consider whether their past and present practices might make commitment unduly costly.  
Indeed, non-democratic states with poor practices are particularly likely to avoid committing to 
the ICC – evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the credible commitment theory.  The 
evidence does not suggest that non-democracies with poor practices are joining the ICC so that 
they can tie their hands and commit to their domestic audiences to better those practices in the 
future because of the external enforcement mechanisms a treaty like the ICC can provide.  
Instead, the evidence shows that states without internal enforcement mechanisms and without 
domestic checks on their power are reluctant to commit to the ICC because commitment would 
entail a costly loss of their sovereignty and reduce their power to rule and punish as they wish.  
Democracies with poor practices, on the other hand, have reason to view ICC 
commitment as imposing fewer risks to their sovereignty.  Those states presumably already have 
some domestic checks on their power – perhaps in the form of an independent judiciary that will 
punish perpetrators of mass atrocities, even if those perpetrators happen to be government agents 
or others with whom the government was complicit.  Although those states still run the risk that 
their government or citizens will commit crimes covered by the ICC treaty, they may believe that 
such crimes would be punished domestically in any event – meaning that they would not risk 
losing the case to The Hague.  For these democratic states with poor practices, ICC commitment 
may not reduce government power.  Rather, commitment may potentially increase their power in 
that the ICC provides another back-up forum in which opposition powers can be punished should 
they commit mass atrocities and should domestic law enforcement institutions otherwise fail to 
64 
 
be effective at bringing them to justice.        
Table 6:  ICC Treaty Ratification Patterns for States with Poor Human Rights 
Practices Based on Whether Democracy or Not 
Democracy
107
 Non-Democracy 
Ratify Not Ratify Not Ratify Ratify 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, 
Dominican 
Republic, South 
Korea, Mexico, 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guatemala, India, 
Israel, Thailand, 
Philippines, Turkey 
Algeria, Angola, 
Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Cameroon, 
China, Cuba, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Haiti, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Ivory 
Coast, Kazakhstan, 
Kiribati, North 
Korea, Laos, 
Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, 
Russia, Rwanda, 
Saudi Arabia, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, 
Syria, Togo, 
Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, 
Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe 
Afghanistan, 
Burundi, Cambodia, 
Central African 
Republic, Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 
Ecuador, Georgia, 
Guinea, Jordan, 
Kenya, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Peru, 
Senegal, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, 
Venezuela, Zambia 
 
True, one might expect that if states view the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms as a 
credible threat, no states with poor human rights practices or biased or weak domestic law 
enforcement institutions would risk ratifying the treaty.  But, clearly some have.  One caution is 
                                                 
107
 Again, as did Beth Simmons in her book, Mobilizing for Human Rights, I used 7 as the number above which 
states were classified as democracies. 
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that these results only capture a snapshot in time.  Event history analysis factors in the precise 
timing of state decisions to commit to the ICC as it relates to the time varying and constant 
variables.  Moreover, case study analysis should help in determining what other factors or 
mechanisms may have caused these states to act contrary to theory.     
In this case, the event history analysis provides additional support for the idea that states 
view the ICC treaty‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and make their commitment 
decisions based on retrospective calculations about the costs to them of complying with treaty 
terms.  Table 7 presents results from three multivariate event history models testing the rate of 
becoming party to the ICC treaty.  In Model 1, I report the results of the baseline model for 
ratification which includes the main variables of interest:  level of human rights practices and 
level of domestic law enforcement institutions.  In Model 2, I add the control variables that 
measure other costs of treaty ratification suggested by the various rationalist view theories.  
Finally, Model 3 includes the control variables suggested by the normative view theories.
108
 
Most supportive of the credible threat theory – and the idea that states engage in 
retrospective, rather than prospective calculations when making ratification decisions – is the 
fact that in every model, the variable measuring a state‘s level of human rights practices is a 
highly significant and positive predictor (at the 1% level) of ICC treaty ratification.  States with 
good human rights practices are quite likely to join the ICC: with each unit increase in a state‘s 
human right rating, a state becomes between 30% and 38% more likely to commit (see hazard 
ratio of 1.307 Model 1 and hazard ratio of 1.380 Model 3).
109
   
                                                 
108
 I used the exact method for ties because the data contains tied event times where states do ratify in the same 
quarter.   
109
 Judith Kelley similarly found that a state‘s human rights ratings were a positive and significant predictor of ICC 
ratification.  However, Kelley‘s focus of inquiry was on state decisions to sign bilateral immunity agreements, and 
her ratification model used logistic regression (which is arguably less precise than the event history model which 
takes timing of ratification into consideration and which includes time-varying covariates).  Furthermore, her test of 
ratification behavior was only preliminary to that primary inquiry and included very few independent variables.  
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The other compliance costs predictors on which my theory particularly rests – past 
genocide and the level of a state‘s domestic law enforcement institutions – are not significant in 
any of the models, suggesting that states may not factor in their past genocides specifically or 
their ability to domestically prosecute any violations of the Rome Statute when making ICC 
commitment decisions.  Instead, the evidence indicates that in terms of precise compliance costs, 
states may be most concerned with their general level of human rights practices.  If a state‘s 
practices and policies are such that its government or citizens should not commit mass atrocities, 
then whatever its capacity to prosecute such atrocities domestically, it can still calculate that 
committing to the ICC will carry minimal costs related to noncompliance.
110
  By contrast, where 
the state‘s practices and policies are such that it might expect its government or citizens to 
commit mass atrocities, it may still conclude that commitment is unduly costly even though it 
may believe its domestic law enforcement institutions are sufficiently independent and capable 
of prosecuting any such atrocities.  As discussed above, because the ICC prosecutor and court 
are empowered to determine whether the state is ―willing‖ or ―able‖ to prosecute mass atrocities 
domestically, most states with poor practices may conclude that the complementarity provision 
does not give them enough protection against a costly loss of their sovereign right to mete out 
justice within their own borders. 
                                                                                                                                                             
―Who Keeps International Commitments and Why?,‖ 578-80.  On the other hand, Goodliffe and Hawkins found 
little evidence that a state‘s human rights practices predicted whether the state supported a strong and independent 
ICC based on statements made during Rome Statute negotiations.  Of course, that study did not look at state 
ratification decisions, but instead quantified state positions regarding the court and commitment to it by coding 
statements state representatives had made during various negotiations of the Rome Statute.  ―A Funny Thing 
Happened on the Way to Rome.‖  As noted above, Simmons and Danner included no measure for the level of a 
state‘s human rights practices other than whether the state experienced a recent civil war.  ―Credible Commitments 
and the International Criminal Court.‖  
110
 As a robustness check, I ran the models using data from the Political Terror Scale 1976-2008 instead of the 
human rights measure based on data from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset.  The results still support 
the credible threat theory.  In each of the models, a state‘s level of human rights was a significant and positive 
predictor of ratification at the 5% level.  In each instance, however, there were fewer observations and between 10 
and 27 fewer countries included in the models. As noted above, that scale only collected data for 185 countries, 
whereas the Cingranelli-Richards dataset includes human rights ratings for 195 countries.   
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On the other hand, the democracy variable is a positive and significant predictor of ICC 
ratification in both models in which it was included.  With each unit increase in its democracy 
rating, a state is between 10% and 16% more likely to commit to the ICC (see hazard ratio of 
1.105 Model 2 and hazard ratio of 1.163 Model 3).  Even though democracy is not a primary 
indicator of potential compliance with the precise terms of the treaty, democracies more than 
autocracies tend to have the kinds of policies, laws, practices, and institutions, that favor 
protecting human rights.
111
  Thus, the significance of this variable provides some further support 
for the credible threat theory and the idea that retrospective calculations about the ability to 
comply with treaty terms influence state ratification behavior.   
In addition, however, the positive significance of the democracy variable may provide 
some support for the idea that the complementarity provision and the ability of the state‘s law 
enforcement institutions to conduct independent and capable investigations and prosecutions 
plays a role in the ICC ratification behavior of some states.  One of the democracy variable‘s 
components measures constraints on the chief executive, which should include things like checks 
and balances limiting state power and the independence of the judiciary.  It may be that where 
power is not concentrated and where the state already has limits on its power to do as it pleases, 
it will conclude that commitment to the ICC will not entail a significant loss of sovereignty.  By 
contrast, and contrary to the predictions of the credible commitment theory, where the state is an 
autocracy and has no domestic limits on its power, it will conclude that ICC commitment will 
entail a costly loss of sovereignty and a reduction in its own powers.  And, as shown in Table 6, 
there is support for the idea that even amongst states with poor human rights practices, those that 
are more likely to commit to the ICC are those that are also democracies – states that already 
operate with constraints on their power.   
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 Cole, ―Sovereignty Relinquished?,‖ 475.  
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Indeed, the results of this event history analysis not only provide compelling support for 
the credible threat theory, but they also provide evidence discrediting the explanatory power of 
the credible commitment theory advanced by Simmons and Danner.  The evidence suggests that 
states guard their sovereignty and calculate treaty commitment costs by looking retrospectively 
and seek to determine their ability to comply with treaty terms before committing to an 
international human rights treaty with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms that can be used 
to hold them accountable.  The evidence shows that states with good human rights practices and 
democratic states are more likely to join the ICC.  States with poor human rights practices and 
non-democratic states are less likely to commit to the court.  Therefore, at least where 
enforcement mechanisms are strong, no evidence suggests that states abandon sovereignty 
concerns and commit to an international human rights treaty that can hold them accountable 
where they have otherwise decided not to impose upon themselves any domestic accountability 
mechanisms.  Certainly, as noted above, some states with poor practices have committed to the 
court, but the empirical evidence does not demonstrate a trend towards commitment without an 
ability to presently comply with treaty terms. 
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Table 7: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Explaining Ratification of the ICC 
Treaty 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Level of Human Rights Practices (Physical Integrity) 
1.307*** 
(.000) 
1.323*** 
(.004) 
1.380*** 
(.003) 
Past Genocide or Not 
.651 
(.333) 
.375 
(.107) 
.385 
(.129) 
Quality of Domestic Law Enforcement (ROL World Bank) 
1.249 
(.104) 
1.428 
(.256) 
1.453 
(.266) 
Level of Democracy -- 
1.105** 
(.053) 
1.163** 
(.021) 
Level of Military Expenditure -- 
.789** 
(.031) 
.837 
(.125) 
Difficulty of Domestic Treaty Ratification Process -- 
1.382 
(.148) 
1.391 
(.200) 
Level of Economic Development -- 
.867 
(.380) 
.641 
(.073) 
Common Law State or Not -- 
.935 
(.837) 
.758 
(.468) 
Transitioning Democracy or Not -- -- 
.553 
(.123) 
Level of Aid or Assistance  -- 
.013 
(.097) 
Regional Ratification -- -- 
4.353 
(.103) 
Level of NGO Presence -- -- 
.997 
(.511) 
# of Countries 184 126 123 
# of Ratifications 91 65 62 
# of Observations 4245 2860 2827 
**, ***= 5%, 1% significance 
In addition, the significant and negative effect of a state‘s level of military expenditure on 
ratification in Model 2 lends some additional support to the credible threat theory.  States with 
greater military expenditures were less likely than states with lower expenditures to commit to 
the ICC, suggesting that states with more military exposure view noncompliance with the ICC 
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treaty as more costly than states with less exposure.  Of course, because the United States and 
China have not joined the court, and because both have large military budgets, caution may be 
warranted in interpreting these particular results. 
Arguably, a state‘s level of economic development might also influence its ability to 
comply with a human rights treaty if we assume that countries that are economically developed 
are also those that are more likely to embrace progress and post materialist values – such as the 
need to protect citizens against human rights abuses.  However, the economic development 
variable was not a significant and positive predictor of ICC commitment in either of the models 
in which it was included.  On the other hand, the indicator for that variable is highly correlated 
with the indicator for the state‘s level of domestic law enforcement institutions which may mean 
that the two variables are overlapping in capturing effects.  To ensure that the models were not 
being compromised as a result of these high correlations, I ran Models 2 and 3 without the 
indicator for economic development (the variable that had only been included as a control).  In 
each case, the results for the remaining variables did not differ substantially from the results of 
the models which included the economic development measure.   
Regarding the other theories for which control variables were added in the models, they 
were not supported by the event history analysis.  First, where ICC ratification is concerned, it 
appears that other costs such as domestic ratification difficulties or uncertainty costs based on a 
country‘s legal traditions are less of a concern than the state‘s actual costs of complying with 
treaty terms.  Nor was there any support for the idea that governments in the process of a 
democratic transition ignore compliance costs and the credible threat associated with committing 
to treaties with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms because of the future benefits they 
may gain by locking-in those democratic practices for future governments.  Instead, the event 
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history analysis provides support for the credible threat theory and the idea that states are more 
retrospective in making calculations about the likely consequences of treaty commitment, 
particularly where, as here, the treaty‘s enforcement mechanisms are relatively strong.  
Furthermore, the quantitative evidence does not suggest that state decisions to commit to the ICC 
are generally and significantly driven by normative concerns.  None of the variables included to 
test normative theories was a positive and significant predictor of ICC ratification.  Yet, 
importantly, the addition of all of these control variables to account for other theories did not 
alter the significance of the human rights variable, thus lending additional support for the 
explanatory power of the credible threat theory.
112
 
In sum, both the positive and null results are consistent with the credible threat theory 
which predicts that where an international human rights treaty contains legally-binding 
enforcement mechanisms backed by resources to punish noncompliant behavior, states are 
motivated by rationalist concerns:  states are more likely to commit where retrospective 
calculations about their ability to comply with treaty terms indicates that commitment will pose 
only minimal sovereignty costs.  Where treaties contain weak enforcement mechanisms, even a 
rational state may commit without intending to or being able to comply if it can envision other 
intangible or indirect benefits – such as increased trade – that may flow from commitment.  But, 
with weak enforcement mechanisms, the costs of noncompliance may be easily outweighed by 
such potential benefits.  Where treaty mechanisms are stronger, the calculation is different.  The 
quantitative evidence suggests that on the whole, states making commitment calculations in such 
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 Substituting different measures of military exposure and domestic law enforcement institutions in the final model 
also did not alter the significance of the human rights variable:  it was still a significant and positive predictor of ICC 
ratification at the 1% level.  For the military exposure concept, I used various measures obtained from the U.S. State 
Department data which is reported up to 2005:  (1) military expenditure in constant U.S. dollars; (2) military 
expenditure per capita: and (3) armed forces in thousands.  I used the Political Risk Services Group International 
Country Risk Guide Law and Order measure (on a scale of 1 to 6 and for 161 countries) as a substitute for the World 
Bank Rule of Law measure (which dataset includes more than 200 countries).    
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circumstances are primarily concerned with the consequences of failing to comply with treaty 
terms.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TESTING STATE COMMITMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
 
Chapter Three provided evidence that states view the ICC treaty‘s enforcement 
mechanisms as a credible threat:  states with poor human rights practices were less likely than 
states with better human rights practices to readily and promptly join the court.  In fact, with 
each unit increase in a state‘s human right rating, a state becomes between 30% and 38% more 
likely to join the court.  States that were more democratic were also more likely to commit to the 
ICC.  This chapter will further test the credible threat theory by comparing state decisions to 
commit to the ICC to decisions to commit to the other main international human rights treaties, 
their articles, and optional protocols.   
This chapter is an important test of the implications of the credible threat theory.  Simply 
put, the focus on ICC ratification only allows us to look at one enforcement mechanism which is 
constant for all states.  But, in this case, there are many other international human rights treaties, 
all of which are designed to protect against human rights abuses, but which have a variety of 
different enforcement mechanisms.  Comparing state decisions to commit to these treaties with 
these differing levels of enforcement mechanisms allows for a better test of the credible threat 
theory.  We should see that where enforcement mechanisms are weak, states will more readily 
commit to international human rights treaties even if their domestic human rights practices are 
poor such that they may not be able to or intend to comply with treaty terms.  And, we can 
compare that state behavior to how states act when the enforcement mechanisms are stronger, as 
they are in the ICC treaty.   
As discussed in more detail below, I categorize these treaties according to the level of 
their associated enforcement mechanisms.  If the credible threat theory is correct, I expect states 
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with poor human rights practices will readily commit to treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms, but will be wary of committing to treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms.  
In particular, states with poor records should be less likely than states with good records to join 
the ICC.   
In this chapter, I first describe the various international human rights treaties that will be 
used to empirically test state commitment behavior and explain the system for categorizing those 
treaties according to their levels of enforcement mechanisms.  I then explain the research design 
for the quantitative study.  Finally, I present and discuss the results of the empirical analyses.   
International Human Rights Treaties and their Enforcement Mechanisms 
Motivated by the destruction caused by World War II, the international community 
created a human rights regime designed to protect the basic human rights of all individuals.
113
  
The international treaties at the foundation of this regime are the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (―ICCPR‖) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (―ICESCR‖), both of which were opened for signature and ratification in 1966 and came 
into force in 1976.
114
  Additional international human rights treaties followed, and the regime 
now boasts six primary treaties, to which the great majority of states have committed.  (See 
Table 8 for a list of the six primary international human rights treaties.) 
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Table 8: The Six Primary International Human Rights Treaties 
Treaty Year 
Open 
Rights Protected                   Parties
115
 
International Covenant on  
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
1966 
Life, Liberty, Freedom from 
Torture and Slavery 
166 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
1966 
Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights 
160 
International Convention on the  
Elimination of All Forms of  
Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
1966 
Fundamental and Human Rights 
for Persons of All Races 173 
Convention on the Elimination of  
All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) 
1980 
Fundamental and Human Rights 
for Women 185 
Convention Against Torture and  
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
1984 
Freedom from Torture and 
Other Forms of Punishment 147 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) 
1989 
Fundamental and Human Rights 
for Children 
193 
 
In the international human rights context, treaty enforcement mechanisms are most 
typically under the control of a committee of experts established pursuant to the text of the 
treaty.  Of the various enforcement mechanisms, those which require only that the state self-
report compliance with the treaty‘s mandate are the weakest.  Although exact reporting time 
periods vary, usually states are required to report at some regular interval on the measures they 
have adopted to give effect to the treaty‘s pronouncements.116 Committees reviewing these 
reports can question states about them and also make comments about the state‘s level of treaty 
compliance.  Self-reporting requirements are particularly weak enforcement mechanisms because 
they lack clear and precise obligations, and also, the body to which states have delegated 
authority to consider the reports has no power to absolutely compel reports – or, for that matter, 
better human rights practices.  According to Jack Donnelly, by filing even a pro forma report, the 
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19; and CRC, Art. 44.  
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state will have formally discharged its reporting requirement.  Furthermore, ―[c]ommittees 
cannot always ensure that the required reports are submitted.‖117  Moreover, Donnelly notes that 
many of the reports submitted by states contain little more than extracts of laws or obviously 
false or evasive information about the state‘s compliance records.118  Nevertheless, having 
submitted the report, a state will have discharged its obligations under treaty terms. 
 International human rights treaties – by their articles or optional protocols – do have 
more onerous enforcement mechanisms to which states can also bind themselves.  First, states 
can agree on the committee‘s competence to hear complaints by other states claiming that they 
are not living up to their obligations under the treaty.
119
  On paper, this enforcement mechanism 
appears stronger than the self-reporting requirement since it at least requires state parties to 
submit to a grievance procedure before an independent committee.  Nevertheless, in the present 
system, committees are not empowered to order a remedy for any violations they find:  if the 
matter cannot be resolved via negotiation, the committee is generally limited to summarizing its 
activities in a report.
120
  Moreover, according to the website for the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, as of August 2010, the procedures for interstate complaints 
had never been used.
121
   
In addition, some treaties provide that states can agree on committee competence to 
receive and consider complaints by individuals alleging that their rights under the treaty have 
been violated – if the individuals have, among other things, exhausted available domestic 
remedies.  Several of the main international human rights treaties include articles or optional 
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protocols with this additional enforcement mechanism.
122
  The individual complaints are heard 
by a committee empowered to consider evidence and issue decisions.  In some cases, the 
committee may also invite the state party to submit written responses to the views stated in the 
committee‘s decision and to comment on action taken as a result.123   However, even then, none 
of these optional procedures associated with the six main international human rights treaties 
grants to the committee any powers to issue legally binding decisions.  Rather, committee 
powers are essentially limited to encouraging compliance and issuing reports of its actions.
124
  
The committees have ―no authority to act punitively against the offending state, or impose any 
sanctions.‖125  
Although there is not an enormous difference between the latter two enforcement 
mechanisms in terms of the precision of their requirements or the power of the committees, I 
conclude the individual complaint mechanism may be costlier for states for several reasons.  
States should expect more individual complaints than state complaints because individuals 
within a state are more likely than other states to actually know of the actual state‘s human rights 
practices.  There are also more individuals in a state than there are other states.  In addition, the 
interstate complaint procedure has apparently not been used, a fact which later-ratifying states 
would know when considering the strength of that enforcement mechanism.  By contrast, the 
various committees have considered individual complaints and rendered decisions.  Again, 
however, those decisions are not subject to appeal, and if the committee decides in favor of the 
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individual, it cannot force a remedy:  it is limited to inviting the state party to show how it has 
resolved the issue.   
Under the Optional Protocol to the CAT, states may commit to a seemingly stronger 
enforcement mechanism.  By that Optional Protocol, states bind themselves to recognize the 
competence of a Subcommittee on Prevention to regularly visit any place under its jurisdiction 
and control where persons are held in detention by the government or with its acquiescence 
(Articles 4 and 11).  The visits are undertaken in an effort to strengthen, if necessary, the 
detainees‘ rights to be protected against torture and other cruel and inhuman punishment (Article 
4).  In connection with the visits, parties agree to provide all relevant information to the 
subcommittee, as well as access to private interviews of detainees – without the presence of 
witnesses (Articles 12 and 14).  Pursuant to Article 16, the subcommittee is authorized to publish 
reports of its investigations, together with any comments the state party may wish to include.  In 
the event the state party does not cooperate with the subcommittee and authorize access to 
information and interviews, or refuses to take steps to improve a situation identified by the 
subcommittee, the subcommittee may – after the state party has had an opportunity to make its 
views known – make a public statement concerning the matter or publish a report about it 
(Article 16).   
The committee with oversight of the CAT Optional Protocol, like the other committees, 
is generally limited at the conclusion of its investigation to encouraging compliance and making 
comments or reports.  Nevertheless, I suggest the enforcement mechanism associated with the 
CAT Optional Protocol is stronger than those described above because it requires states to allow 
an independent body onto sovereign territory and grant access to citizenry or other prisoners 
under state control.  While not all states will necessarily comply with that requirement, 
79 
 
sidestepping the requirement is certainly not as easy as filing a pro forma report.  Furthermore, 
neither of the complaint procedures purports to bind the state parties to allowing the committee 
to visit territory and conduct its own investigation of the facts.   
Based on the above, I create five categories of enforcement mechanism which I arrange 
from weakest to strongest as follows:  (1) the state agrees to a reporting requirement; (2) the state 
recognizes committee competence to hear state complaints; (3) the state recognizes committee 
competence to hear individual complaints; (4) the state agrees to permit committee visits to its 
territory to engage in investigations; and (5) the state agrees to authorize an independent body to 
prosecute its government or citizenry for human rights crimes. Table 9 lists the 14 treaties, 
articles, or optional protocols which I include in this study (together with the date they were 
available for ratification), and organizes them by their associated levels of enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Table 9:  14 Human Rights Treaties and Levels of Enforcement Mechanisms 
Level of 
Enforcement 
Description of 
Mechanism 
Human Rights Treaty 
1–weakest State must file reports ICCPR (1966); ICESCR (1966); CERD (1966); 
CEDAW (1980); CAT (1984); CRC (1989) 
2-weak States make complaints 
to committee 
 
Article 41 ICCPR (1966); Article 21 CAT (1984)  
3-moderate Individuals file 
complaints with 
committee 
Optional Protocol ICCPR (1966); Article 14 
CERD (1966); Article 22 CAT (1984); Optional 
Protocol CEDAW (1999)    
4-stronger Committee may visit 
state 
Optional Protocol CAT (2003) 
5-strongest Independent prosecutor 
investigations 
ICC (1998) 
Methodology 
As I did with the models testing state commitment to the ICC, here I also employ the Cox 
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proportional-hazards model to analyze the extent to which both constant and time-varying factors 
influence the probability that a state will ratify a particular international human rights treaty in a 
given time period.  The results will be reported as hazard ratios, which will indicate the 
proportionate influence a given factor has on a state‘s decision to commit to a particular treaty.   
I conduct separate, but parallel, analyses for each of 14 different treaties.  Appendix B 
contains a list of the 14 different treaties and shows the states that are parties to each.   
Dependent Variables 
Ratification data on the 14 different international human rights treaties were coded from 
records maintained by the United Nations.  The data is assembled at yearly intervals for more 
than 190 countries between 1966 and 2008.  Countries existing at the time the treaty was adopted 
and available for ratification are ―at risk‖ of ratifying during that year.  Countries established 
after the treaty was available for ratification enter the risk set upon independence – the time 
when they are eligible to ratify as a sovereign state.  Countries at risk are given a value of 0 until 
such time as they ratify the instrument in question.  At the time of ratification, countries are 
assigned a value of 1.  Countries that did not ratify by 2008, when the observation period here 
ends, are right-censored. 
Independent Variables 
The Main Explanatory Variable: Level of Human Rights Practices 
As with the statistical tests of state commitment to the ICC, my primary focus is on the 
direct costs of complying with treaty terms.  While each treaty does have its own terms and 
particular rights that it is designed to protect, all have in common that they are designed to 
protect against human rights abuses and to provide better treatment for all classes of individuals.  
Thus, in order to consistently test commitment across the various treaties, I use one main 
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explanatory variable to measure the state‘s ability to comply with treaty terms.  In this case, that 
measure is the level of the state‘s human rights practices.  Simply put, since the treaties by their 
terms all require states to adhere to good human rights practices, compliance should be easiest 
and less costly for those states with policies and practices that are consistent with treaty terms.
126
     
Here, I measure a state‘s level of human rights practices using the Political Terror Scale.  
Like the Cingranelli-Richards data on physical integrity rights, the Political Terror Scale is 
obtained from human rights reports issued by Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of 
State.  The reports assign country scores by considering the presence of government practices 
that include murder, torture, forced disappearances, and political imprisonment.  The scale 
ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning torture and political imprisonments are rare and the country 
generally protects human rights.  When possible, I average the two scores reported.
127
  Data on 
these human rights practices are available beginning in 1976 and are reported from each year 
thereafter until 2008.  Similar to Cole,
128
 for the period between 1966 and 1976 (a time period 
relevant to the examination of several of the treaties), I extrapolate missing data points using a 
state‘s median score over the period from 1976-1984 if available.  Again, because each of the 
treaties being tested is designed to generally protect human rights and promote better human 
rights practices, the data should adequately measure a state‘s tendency to have in place policies 
and practices that would enable it to comply with these treaties.   
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I considered using the Cingranelli-Richards data for these quantitative tests since I used 
that data to test ICC ratification decisions.  But, that data is reported beginning only in 1981, 
which makes it not as comprehensive for these purposes as the data from the Political Terror 
Scale which begins reporting human rights ratings in 1976.  In this case, data beginning in 1976 
is preferable since a number of the treaties in this study were available for ratification beginning 
in 1966 – an issue that did not arise when testing only state commitment to the ICC.  In addition, 
and probably for the same reasons of data availability, the other studies which compare 
ratification decisions across international human rights treaties beginning in 1966 also use the 
Political Terror Scale to measure a state‘s level of human rights.  Specifically, the Cole study and 
the study by Wotipka and Tsutsui both used the Political Terror Scale data to measure whether 
rights-violating or rights-protecting countries were more likely to commit to international human 
rights treaties.
129
 Accordingly, using that scale here will also better facilitate comparison to the 
results of those other studies.   
Control Variables:  The Rationalist View 
Although my main explanatory variable measures a state‘s level of human rights 
practices, I also include in these models most of the control variables – and the same measures – 
which were included in the models testing commitment to the ICC treaty.  In particular, I include 
the following measures: 
To test the idea that states with democratic governments are more likely than those with 
autocratic governments to ratify international human rights treaties, I use the Polity IV 
democracy measure, which is reported on a scale from 0 to 10.
130
  I use the log of GDP per capita 
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as a measure to test the hypothesis that more economically-developed states are more likely than 
less-developed countries to ratify international human rights treaties.  
To measure the political costs associated with a state‘s domestic legislative treaty 
ratification process, I use the data provided by Beth Simmons which codes state ratification 
difficulty according to a four-category scale.  To test the hypothesis that states following a 
common law tradition are more likely to ratify international human rights treaties than those 
following a civil law tradition, I include a dichotomous variable for whether or not the state 
follows a common law legal tradition.
131
  Finally, I use a dummy variable based on the Polity IV 
democracy measure to test the new democracy, ―lock-in‖ theory advanced by Andrew 
Moravcsik.  I code states as a 1 and as new democracies in a given year if they transitioned from 
anywhere below a 7 on the Polity IV scale to a 7 or above.  If states were consistently above 7 
for the Post-World War II period, I consider them to be stable democracies and code them 0.  If 
states are consistently below a 7, I consider them non-democracies and also code them 0. 
Control Variables:  The Normative View 
I include two control variables in the model to account for the theories addressed under 
the normative view of treaty ratification.  First, I include a measure to account for the idea that 
less-developed states may ratify treaties so as to appear to embrace the same norms as their more 
powerful and wealthier neighbors, and to receive the concomitant extra-treaty benefits that may 
accrue to them as a result.  I use net ODA in constant 2007 U.S. dollars as a share of GDP to 
measure this concept.
132
   
 I measure the concept concerning regional influence by looking at regional density of the 
ratification of the various treaties, articles, and optional protocols.  Regional density computes 
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ratification by countries in the same region up to the previous year.  I classify countries by region 
using the seven World Bank categories described above. 
Table 10 provides the summary statistics for the independent variables described above 
that will be used to test commitment to all 14 international institutions.   
Table 10: Summary Statistics for Common Independent Variables 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Level of Human Rights 6597 2.39 1.09 1 5 
Level of Democracy 6498 4 4.18 0 10 
Level of Economic Development 7015 7.52 1.56 4.13 11.26 
Difficulty of Domestic Treaty Ratification Process 4834 1.57 .65 1 3 
Common Law State or Not 8481 .34 .47 0 1 
Transitioning Democracy or Not 6794 .17 .38 0 1 
Level of Aid or Assistance 7059 .09 .16 -.03 2.68 
 
Empirical Analyses and Discussion of Results 
As an initial matter, an examination of state ratification patterns provides preliminary 
support for the idea that states view strong enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat.  As 
Table 11 demonstrates, states with worse human rights practices are almost just as likely as states 
with better human rights practices to ratify international human rights treaties with the weakest 
enforcement mechanisms.  However, where enforcement mechanisms are stronger, states with 
worse human rights practices are much more likely to avoid commitment.   
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Table 11: Ratification of the 14 Different Treaties Based on Human Rights 
Ratings133 
Treaty 
Total 
Number 
Ratified
134
 
Number Ratified 
with Better 
Human Rights 
Number Ratified 
with Worse  
Human Rights 
ICCPR 157 83 74 
ICESCR 154 80 74 
CERD 162 86 76 
CEDAW 171 95 76 
CAT 139 73 66 
CRC 174 95 79 
ICCPR Art. 41 47 31 16 
CAT Art. 21 56 39 17 
ICCPR Optional 96 60 36 
CERD Art. 14 47 31 16 
CAT Art. 22 60 37 23 
CEDAW Optional 89 57 32 
CAT Optional 41 29 12 
ICC 98 66 32 
 
In fact, in every case where enforcement mechanisms go beyond self-reporting, states with worse 
human rights practices tend to account for only about 30% of the ratifying population.  The 
figure below illustrates these ratification patterns.   
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2.5 and below during the relevant time periods during which the various treaties could be ratified as having better 
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134
 I obtained the total number of ratifying states from the data which ends in 2008.  For each treaty, the total 
possible number of states that could have ratified was 178 since those were the states for which human rights data 
was available.   
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Figure 5:  Ratification of the 14 Different Treaties Based on Average Human 
Rights Ratings 
 
Examining the ratification patterns of states with the poorest human rights ratings
135
 
provides additional support for the credible threat theory.  Table 12 shows the ratification 
behavior of these states in connection with the six main international human rights treaties and 
the ICC treaty.  The evidence indicates that states with poorer human rights practices readily and 
regularly commit to international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement 
mechanisms.  However, states with poor practices less readily commit to the ICC.    
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Table 12:  Poorest Human Rights Countries and Ratifications 
Country 
Rat 
ICC 
RatICCPR RatICESCR RatCERD RatCedaw RatCAT RatCRC 
Afghanistan 2003 1983 1983 1983 2003 1987 1994 
Albania 2003 1991 1991 1994 1994 1994 1992 
Algeria -- 1989 1989 1972 1996 1989 1993 
Andorra 2001 2006 -- 2006 1997 2006 1996 
Bangladesh 2010 2000 1998 1979 1984 1998 1990 
Brazil 2002 1992 1992 1968 1984 1989 1990 
Burundi 2004 1990 1990 1977 1992 1993 1990 
Cambodia 2002 1992 1992 1983 1992 1992 1992 
Cameroon -- 1984 1984 1970 1994 1986 1993 
Central Afr. 
Rep. 
2001 1981 1981 1971 1991 -- 1992 
Chad 2006 1995 1995 1977 1995 1995 1990 
China -- -- 2001 1981 1980 1988 1992 
Colombia 2002 1969 1969 1981 1982 1987 1991 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
2004 1983 1983 1988 1982 2003 1993 
DRC 
(Kinshasa) 
2002 1976 1976 1976 1986 1996 1990 
Cuba -- -- -- 1972 1980 1995 1991 
Egypt -- 1982 1982 1967 1981 1986 1990 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
-- 1987 1987 2002 1984 2002 1992 
Eritrea -- 2002 2001 2001 1995 -- 1994 
Ethiopia -- 1993 1993 1976 1981 1994 1991 
Georgia 2003 1994 1994 1999 1994 1994 1994 
Guatemala -- 1992 1988 1983 1982 1990 1990 
Guinea 2003 1978 1978 1977 1982 1989 1990 
Haiti -- 1991 -- 1972 1981 -- 1995 
Honduras 2002 1997 1981 2002 1983 1996 1990 
India -- 1979 1979 1968 1993 -- 1992 
Indonesia -- 2006 2006 1999 1984 1998 1990 
Iran  -- 1975 1975 1968 -- -- 1994 
Iraq -- 1971 1971 1970 1986 -- 1994 
Israel -- 1991 1991 1979 1991 1991 1991 
Kenya 2005 1972 1972 2001 1984 1997 1990 
North Korea -- 1981 1981 -- 2001 -- 1990 
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Lebanon -- 1972 1972 1971 1997 2000 1991 
Liberia 2004 2004 2004 1976 1984 2004 1993 
Libya -- 1970 1970 1968 1989 1989 1993 
Morocco -- 1979 1979 1970 1993 1993 1993 
Mozambique -- 1993 -- 1983 1997 1999 1994 
Mexico 2005 1981 1981 1975 1981 1986 1990 
Myanmar -- -- -- -- 1997 -- 1991 
Nigeria 2001 1993 1993 1967 1985 2001 1991 
Pakistan -- -- 2009 1966 1996 -- 1990 
Papua New 
Guinea 
-- 2008 2008 1982 1995 -- 1993 
Paraguay 2001 1992 1992 2003 1987 1990 1990 
Peru 2001 1978 1978 1971 1982 1988 1990 
Philippines -- 1986 1974 1967 1981 1986 1990 
Russia -- 1973 1973 1969 1981 1987 1990 
Rwanda -- 1975 1975 1975 1981 2008 1991 
Saudi Arabia -- -- -- 1997 2000 1997 1996 
Sierra Leone 2000 1996 1996 1967 1988 2001 1990 
Somalia -- 1990 1990 1975 -- 1990 -- 
South Africa 2000 1998 -- 1998 1995 1998 1995 
Sri Lanka -- 1980 1980 1982 1981 1994 1991 
Sudan -- 1986 1986 1977 -- -- 1990 
Syria -- 1969 1969 1969 2003 2004 1993 
Tajikistan 2000 1999 1991 1995 1993 1995 1993 
Thailand -- 1996 1999 2003 1985 2007 1992 
Togo -- 1984 1984 1972 1983 1987 1990 
Tunisia -- 1969 1969 1967 1985 1988 1992 
Turkey -- 2003 2003 2002 1985 1988 1995 
Uganda 2002 1995 1987 1980 1985 1986 1990 
Ukraine -- 1973 1973 1969 1981 1987 1991 
Uzbekistan -- 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 
Venezuela 2000 1978 1978 1967 1983 1991 1990 
Yemen -- 1987 1987 1972 1984 1991 1991 
Zambia 2002 1984 1984 1972 1985 1998 1991 
Zimbabwe -- 1991 1991 1991 1991 -- 1990 
 
Specifically, of the 66 countries with the poorest human rights ratings, 65 (all except 
Myanmar) ratified at least four of the six main international human rights treaties.  All but 18 
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ratified all six treaties.  By contrast, 39 of the 66 countries with the poorest ratings did not ratify 
the ICC treaty.  Amongst the 39 countries that did not ratify the ICC treaty, some 24 had 
nevertheless ratified all six main international human rights treaties.
136
     
The results of event history analysis provide additional support for the idea that states 
view strong enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and more readily commit to those 
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms only where they have concluded that they can 
comply with treaty terms – such that, commitment costs and the risks to state sovereignty are 
minimal.  Tables 13 and 14 present the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates from event 
history analysis for ratification of the various international human rights treaties.  The separate, 
but parallel, analyses for the 14 different international human rights treaties are shown based on 
their associated level of enforcement mechanism: from weakest to strongest.  The results are 
reported as hazard ratios, which indicate the particular factor‘s proportionate influence on the 
decision to ratify.  Numbers greater than one indicate an increase in the hazard rate of 
ratification.  Numbers less than one indicate a decrease in the hazard rate.  
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consistently averaged above 2.8 during all relevant time periods, 29 of 43 did not ratify the ICC.  However, all but 
Myanmar ratified at least four of the six main international human rights treaties.  And, 17 of the 29 that did not 
ratify the ICC treaty nevertheless ratified all six of the main treaties. 
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Table 13: Weakest Enforcement Mechanisms 
Level 1 Mechanism: Level 2 Mechanism:  
State Reporting 
State Complaints Against Other 
States 
Independent 
Variable 
ICCPR ICESCR CERD 
CEDA
W 
CAT CRC 
Independent 
Variable 
Article 
41 
ICCPR 
Article 
21 CAT 
Level of 
Human 
Rights 
1.024 
(.888) 
.903 
(.587) 
.827 
(.390) 
1.066 
(.687) 
.917 
(.509) 
.961 
(.751) 
Level of 
Human 
Rights 
1.042 
(.898) 
1.008 
(.968) 
Level of 
Democracy 
1.20*** 
(.000) 
1.20*** 
(.000) 
1.030 
(.586) 
 
1.107** 
(.013) 
1.043 
(.246) 
1.109** 
(.014) 
Level of 
Democracy 
1.155 
(.115) 
1.170** 
(.026) 
Level of 
Economic 
Development 
.737** 
(.026) 
.680*** 
(.006) 
.938 
(.677) 
.773 
(.056) 
1.119 
(.350) 
.620*** 
(.001) 
Level of 
Economic 
Development 
1.245 
(.448) 
1.585 
(.055) 
Difficulty of 
Ratification 
Process 
.792 
(.313) 
.489*** 
(.004) 
.547** 
(.032) 
.837 
(.418) 
 
.849 
(.386) 
.702 
(.095) 
Difficulty of 
Ratification 
Process 
.653 
(.321) 
.734 
(.350) 
Common 
Law or Not 
.603 
(.110) 
.287*** 
(.000) 
.576 
(.109) 
.412*** 
(.003) 
.340*** 
(.000) 
.438*** 
(.006) 
Common 
Law or Not 
1.632 
(.410) 
.473 
(.105) 
Transitioning 
Democracy or 
Not 
.389 
(.046) 
.296** 
(.016) 
1.079 
(.885) 
.892 
(.785) 
.986 
(.967) 
.917 
(.813) 
Transitioning 
Democracy or 
Not 
.707 
(.599) 
1.220 
(.670) 
Level of Aid 
.132 
(.210) 
.042 
(.056) 
.178 
(.336) 
.023** 
(.020) 
.096 
(.130) 
.405 
(.334) Level of Aid 
.789 
(.953) 
.120 
(-.637) 
Regional 
Ratifications 
13.0*** 
(.000) 
7.93*** 
(.003) 
5.682** 
(.040) 
1.28 
(.750) 
6.35*** 
(.002) 
.647 
(.636) 
Regional 
Ratifications 
14.775 
(.062) 
8.368** 
(.028) 
# of 
Countries 
74 73 57 69 107 82 
# of 
Countries 
121 129 
# of 
Ratifications 
57 55 51 65 80 81 
# of 
Ratifications 
18 34 
# of 
Observations 
1051 1056 610 491 1003 213 
# of 
Observations 
2594 1910 
**significant at .05; ***significant at .01 
 
Where enforcement mechanisms are weakest and require only self-reporting, the 
empirical results show no statistically significant correlation between a state‘s level of human 
rights practices and state ratification behavior.  This finding is consistent with Wade Cole‘s 
regarding state commitment to the ICCPR and ICESCR – the two main international human 
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rights treaties he examined in his study testing commitment.
137
  Thus, the rationalist view and the 
idea that states will calculate their ability to comply with treaty terms and the potential costs of 
noncompliance receives little support in predicting state commitment to these six main treaties.  
Indeed, the primary explanatory variable – a state‘s level of human rights practices – is not 
significant in the tests for any of those treaties.   
Instead, state ratification behavior concerning these six main international human rights 
treaties appears somewhat indiscriminate inasmuch as the results indicate no factor is 
consistently correlated with ratification.  Of the factors that are significant predictors of 
ratification behavior for more than one of the six main treaties, the hazard ratios for the 
democracy, difficulty of ratification process, common law, and regional indicators are in the 
predicted direction.  Democracies are more likely than autocracies to quickly ratify each of the 
ICCPR, ICESR, CEDAW, and CRC.  States with more difficult ratification procedures were less 
likely to ratify the ICESCR and CERD.  Common law states were less likely to commit to the 
ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC.  Regional ratification patterns positively influence 
ratification of the ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, and CAT.  But, while these factors did influence 
commitment in some cases, their influence was not in any way uniform across these treaties with 
the same enforcement mechanism.  Only ratification of the ICESCR is significantly influenced 
by all four of these factors.   
The remaining factor which is statistically significant for more than one of the main 
treaties is predictive in the direction opposite from that hypothesized based on theory and prior 
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 Cole, ―Sovereignty Relinquished?,‖ 483.  On the other hand, Wotipka and Tsutsui found that state‘s human rights 
practices were significantly and negatively related to their tendency to ratify the six main human rights treaties.  
―Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty,‖ 746-47.  However, those scholars did not separately test 
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human rights treaties in a given year between 1965 and 2001.      
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literature.  In particular, more economically developed states are less likely to ratify the ICCPR, 
the ICESCR, and the CRC.  In sum, ratification of the main treaties does not seem to be 
influenced by any one factor, and the main compliance cost variable is not a significant predictor 
of ratification behavior in these cases where enforcement mechanisms are weakest.   
The results of the tests of the treaties grouped in Enforcement Level 2 (interstate 
complaints) also lend support to the credible threat theory.  Better human rights practices did not 
significantly and positively predict state ratification of either Article 41 of the ICCPR or Article 
21 of the CAT.  In those models, only democracy and regional ratifications are significant, and 
then only in with respect to ratification of CAT Article 21.  Otherwise, none of the other 
indicators are significant predictors of ratification behavior suggesting that state decisions to 
ratify may not be based on a rational cost/benefit analysis.  This is not a totally surprising result 
given that the interstate complaint enforcement mechanism appears relatively weak both on 
paper and in practice.  The treaty terms make clear that committee power will be limited to trying 
to negotiate a resolution.  In practice, the articles are not invoked.  In addition, 26 of the 48 states 
that have ratified Article 41 of the ICCPR, for example, did not do so until 1990 or after (even 
though they could ratify beginning in 1966) – by which time states likely realized the provision 
for interstate complaints was not being invoked.
138
  Thus, consistent with the findings of other 
studies, it appears that states may be ratifying some human rights treaties – those with weak 
enforcement mechanisms – only as window dressing and without concerns for their ability to 
comply with treaty terms.
139
   
In short, there is scant evidence that the costs of noncompliance drive state decisions to 
commit to international human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms.  The measure 
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 Thirty-four of the 60 states that ratified CAT Article 21 similarly did not do so until 1990 or after. 
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 Hathaway, ―The Cost of Commitment;‖ Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, ―Human Rights in a Globalizing World.‖ 
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for human rights practices was not significant in any of the models testing state ratification of 
treaties categorized as having Level 1 and Level 2 enforcement mechanisms.  Furthermore, the 
evidence showed that democracies were more likely to ratify only some of the eight treaties 
grouped in Levels 1 and 2.  Moreover, other factors also influenced treaty ratification in some 
cases, and in some cases, those factors predicted ratification in ways that were contrary to theory.    
Conversely, where the enforcement mechanisms are strongest, the empirical evidence 
suggests states do consider compliance costs and their level of human rights practices when 
making commitment decisions.  As shown in Table 14, a state‘s level of human rights practices 
is a highly significant predictor of ICC ratification, and states with the worst human rights 
practices are much less likely to join the ICC.  The hazard ratio of .523 indicates that states are 
about 50% more likely to join the ICC with each unit increase in their human rights practices 
(the scale ranges from 1 to 5 with 5 being the worst practices).
140
  The democracy indicator of 
compliance is also significant for ICC treaty ratification.  With each unit increase in its 
democracy rating, a state is about 20% more likely to ratify the ICC.  These findings all support 
the credible threat theory:  where enforcement mechanisms are strongest, states most able to 
comply with the ICC treaty requirements are also the most likely to ratify.  Those less able to 
comply are less likely to ratify.    
Again, these findings regarding ICC commitment lend support to the credible threat 
theory, but at the same time discredit the explanatory power of the credible commitment theory 
advanced by Simmons and Danner.  In the case of the ICC, where enforcement mechanisms are 
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 As a robustness check, I also ran the Level 5 and Level 1 ratification models using the Cingranelli-Richards 
measure for human rights practices.  The results similarly showed that states with better human rights practices were 
significantly more likely than states with poor practices to commit to the ICC (Level 5).  In the models testing 
ratification of the human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms (Level 1), this measure of a 
state‘s human rights practices (like the Political Terror scale measure) was not a significant predictor of state 
commitment.   
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strong, the evidence does not suggest that non-democratic states or states with poor practices are 
more likely to bind themselves to a treaty with which they cannot, or will not comply, so as to 
demonstrate a commitment to their domestic audience to end any cycle of civil violence.
141
  
Indeed, as noted above, one might question why an autocratic state which has declined to impose 
upon itself domestic accountability mechanisms would willingly impose upon itself an 
international accountability mechanism that could result in government leaders being tried in The 
Hague.  Instead, the evidence suggests that consistent with the credible threat theory, states with 
poor human rights practices and non-democracies – the very states that are likely to conclude 
that compliance with the ICC may be difficult and, hence, costly to their sovereignty – will be 
wary of joining the court and will avoid its strong enforcement mechanisms.  And, one should 
expect that ICC commitment would be most costly for this category of states since commitment 
would entail a reduction of their power to rule domestically as they see fit – even if that means 
using violence and refusing to prosecute themselves or their compatriots who commit violent 
acts. 
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Table 14: Stronger Enforcement Mechanisms 
Level 3 Mechanism: 
Individual Complaints 
Level 4 Mechanism: 
Committee Visits 
Level 5 
Mechanism: 
Independent 
Prosecutor 
Independent 
Variable 
ICCPR Opt 
Protocol 
Article 14 
CERD 
Article 22 
CAT 
CEDAW Opt 
Protocol 
Independent 
Variable 
CAT 
Opt 
ICC 
Level of 
Human Rights 
.630** 
(.012) 
.813 
(.451) 
1.129 
(.538) 
.832 
(.256) 
Level of 
Human 
Rights 
.732 
(.224) 
 
.523*** 
(.000) 
Level of 
Democracy 
1.212*** 
(.001) 
1.156 
(.130) 
1.137 
(.061) 
1.198*** 
(.000) 
Level of 
Democracy 
1.215 
(.093) 
 
1.230*** 
(.000) 
Level of 
Economic 
Development 
.622*** 
(.002) 
.826 
(.560) 
1.335 
(-.211) 
.815 
(.188) 
Level of 
Economic 
Development 
.691 
(.213) 
 
.743** 
(.047) 
Difficulty of 
Ratification 
Process 
.943 
(.817) 
1.191 
(.572) 
.683 
(.202) 
1.064 
(.757) 
Difficulty of 
Ratification 
Process 
.832 
(.592) 
 
1.127 
(-.565) 
Common Law 
or Not 
.325*** 
(.002) 
.236** 
(.027) 
.217*** 
(.004) 
.554 
(.070) 
Common 
Law or Not 
1.71 
(1.000) 
 
.939 
(.845) 
Transitioning 
Democracy or 
Not 
1.113 
(.776) 
.885 
(.819) 
1.225 
(.650) 
.890 
(.697) 
Transitioning 
Democracy or 
Not 
1.443 
(.536) 
 
.673 
(.223) 
Level of Aid 
.056 
(.109) 
1.62 
(.076) 
.001 
(.187) 
.007** 
(.040) 
Level of Aid 
.008 
(.234) 
 
.134 
(.269) 
Regional 
Ratifications 
1.010 
(.888) 
 17.867** 
(.014) 
9.400** 
(.018) 
2.828 
(.178) 
Regional 
Ratifications 
7.349 
(.492) 
7.389** 
(.019) 
# of Countries 102 131 129 138 # of Countries 135 135 
# of 
Ratifications 
50 27 35 72 
# of 
Ratifications 
30 74 
# of 
Observations 
1862 2766 1922 846 
# of 
Observations 
600 848 
**significant at .05; ***significant at .01 
 
Where enforcement mechanisms are in the middle range, however, results are mixed and 
provide only minimal support for the credible threat theory.  Supportive of the theory are the 
findings regarding commitment to the ICCPR Optional Protocol.  Consistent with Cole‘s 
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findings,
142
 a state‘s level of human rights practices do significantly and positively predict 
ratification of the ICCPR Optional Protocol.  In addition, another indicator of potential 
compliance – namely, a state‘s level of democracy – was also a significant and positive predictor 
of state ratification of the ICCPR Optional Protocol (since the hazard ratio of below one 
indicates that states with the poorest practices are less likely to join the court).  On the other 
hand, human rights ratings did not predict ratification of the other three treaties allowing 
individual complaints.  Instead, the only compliance measure that significantly predicted 
ratification of these three treaties was the democracy measure.  But, that measure only predicted 
ratification of the CEDAW Optional Protocol. 
One interesting finding regarding treaties with this level of enforcement mechanisms 
allowing for individual complaints (Level 3) is that normative concerns may influence 
commitment.  Regional ratification rates positively and significantly influenced ratification of 
CERD Article 14 and CAT Article 22.  Thus, states may have joined these treaties because they 
wanted to appear legitimate (and perhaps reap potential extra-treaty benefits) by embracing the 
norms favored by their neighbors.   
On the other hand, another interpretation of these null results is that states do not view the 
individual complaint procedure as a strong enforcement mechanism.  If the individual complaint 
mechanism poses no credible threat, then states can commit without having to concern 
themselves with their ability to comply – meaning that the state‘s level of human rights practices 
need not be figured into the ratification calculation.  After all, the committees to whom these 
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 Cole tested the influence of enforcement mechanisms on ratification decisions, but only as to the ICCPR, the 
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individual complaints are referred do not have the ability to issue legally binding decisions.  
Their powers are limited to persuading states to adopt their views and recommended remedies.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that at least with regard to the CERD and the CEDAW, the 
individual complaint procedure mechanism is of little significance in practice.  Jack Donnelly 
characterizes the procedure for considering individual complaints under the CERD as ―largely 
moribund.‖  The CEDAW committee has only issued a handful of decisions under the individual 
complaint procedure since it was empowered to consider such complaints in 2000.
143
   
The null findings regarding the CAT Optional Protocol may be similarly explained.  
Compliance costs may not influence ratification of the CAT Optional Protocol simply because 
states do not view the treaty‘s enforcement mechanism as a credible threat.  Like the other 
committees, the committee overseeing that treaty is not empowered to act punitively or impose 
any sanctions for noncompliance.  Furthermore, as Henry Steiner notes regarding the Human 
Rights Committee, it is unlikely to pose a great threat to states as it thus far is able to consider 
only a small number of communications,
144
 most of its decisions receive little publicity or 
attention, and the suggested remedies – compensation, release of a prisoner, or changes to 
legislation – do not likely threaten state interests sufficiently.145  Those same issues presumably 
prevail in connection with committees for each of the main international human rights treaties 
and affect how states view the enforcement mechanisms associated with treaty ratification. 
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 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 87.  According to the CEDAW website, the Committee had only issued 
seven decisions as of October 2010.  See  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw-one.htm. 
144
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES 
 
The quantitative chapters produced evidence supportive of the explanatory power of the 
credible threat theory.  The results of the empirical analyses showed that in the case of the ICC – 
a treaty with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms – states are more likely to commit where 
retrospective calculations about their ability to comply with treaty terms indicates that 
commitment will impose only minimal sovereignty costs.  Results showed that states with better 
human rights practices were significantly more likely than states with worse practices to readily 
ratify the ICC treaty.  However, that same phenomenon was absent where the treaties at issue 
contained weaker enforcement mechanisms.  The results of the event history analysis conducted 
in Chapter Four demonstrated that where enforcement mechanisms were weak, the level of a 
state‘s human rights practices – the main indicator of its likely ability to comply with the norms 
advanced by an international human rights treaty – did not significantly influence ratification 
behavior.  Rather, the results were generally consistent with other previous research which has 
found that states with poor human rights practices are just as likely as states with good practices 
to ratify international human rights treaties – the likely reason being that because enforcement 
mechanisms are weak, states can commit without any concomitant risks that they will be 
punished for noncompliant behavior.  Therefore, they can ratify treaties designed to promote and 
protect human rights without any intention of complying because the potential intangible and 
indirect benefits of appearing to be a legitimate state that embraces human rights norms 
outweighs the costs associated with failing to comply with treaty terms.  
The Goals of the Qualitative Analyses 
While the quantitative analyses provided important tests of the explanatory power of the 
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credible threat theory and produced useful information regarding the reasons why states on the 
whole committed or refused to commit to the ICC, qualitative case study analysis better enables 
researchers to trace the processes through which states make those ratification decisions.  As 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett note, case studies permit a researcher to closely examine 
the role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases and also allow an examination of 
causal complexity.
146
  In this particular instance, case study analysis will enable further 
exploration of states‘ ratification behavior – the complexity of which cannot be explored through 
quantitative analysis alone.  Simply put, the qualitative analyses can move beyond the 
quantitative analyses which relied only on the treaty text and periodic data about states‘ domestic 
behavior and institutions to examine ICC ratification behavior.  The case studies are not so 
constrained, and by closely tracing state ratification behavior over many years, those studies will 
allow us to examine additional state behavior relevant to a state‘s decision about whether and 
when to commit to the ICC treaty.    
Here, because the ratification decision is necessarily dynamic and complex, I specifically 
explore several observable implications of the credible threat theory in an effort to further test 
the theory‘s explanatory power.  First, one observable implication of the credible threat theory is 
that a state‘s perspective regarding ratification of the ICC may change over time as its own 
domestic behavior and institutions change.  More specifically, if states are concerned with the 
compliance costs associated with the Rome Statute‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, 
states should be more likely to ratify if and when their domestic human rights behavior becomes 
good and/or their domestic law enforcement institutions become more independent and capable 
of prosecuting any mass atrocities should they occur. The corollary is, over time, that if there are 
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negative changes in either the state‘s human rights practices or the independence and capability 
of its law enforcement institutions, the state will avoid or renege on ICC commitment.   
Second, although the results of the empirical analyses indicated that cost of compliance 
calculations did influence ICC ratification behavior, the qualitative analyses will permit a more 
complete exploration of those calculations and any trade-offs states make when considering 
commitment.  The case study analysis also allows for a comparison between the credible threat 
theory and the other rationalist and normative theories which predict that states‘ ratification 
behavior will be influenced by other costs unrelated to treaty terms and/or by potential intangible 
or indirect benefits.  If the credible treat theory is correct, we should see that states‘ calculations 
about their ability to comply with ICC treaty terms play the most significant role in their 
ratification behavior – even if they are also influenced by other costs or potential indirect 
benefits.   
Finally, if states view the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat, states 
should be concerned with their ability to comply with the ICC treaty‘s terms both before and 
after ratification.  Even a state with good human rights practices should want to insure that those 
practices remain good after ratification so that the state and its citizens do not become the subject 
of an ICC investigation and prosecution.  Similarly, those same states should also want to ensure 
that their institutions and laws are sufficient to prosecute any crimes that may come within the 
ICC‘s jurisdiction to further protect against a costly loss of sovereignty – even if those states 
generally expect their leaders and citizens will not commit the kinds of mass atrocities covered 
by the Rome Statute.  In short, if the credible threat theory is correct, we should see continued 
efforts by states to remain in compliance with the terms of the Rome Statute.   
Qualitative case study analyses can ascertain the general pattern uncovered by the 
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quantitative analysis, but they also allow for a test and exploration of these additional 
implications.  Below, I explain how Germany, Trinidad and Tobago, Rwanda, and Kenya were 
selected for case study analysis. 
The Logic of Case Selection 
Case selection of the countries for in-depth study was driven by theory, and therefore, by 
the values on the main explanatory variables of interest – a state‘s level of human rights practices 
and the level and quality of its domestic law enforcement institutions.  In addition, because the 
credible threat theory predicts differing ICC ratification behavior depending on whether the state 
had better or worse human rights practices, states with both high and low physical integrity rights 
ratings were included.  Furthermore, because, as the evidence from earlier chapters 
demonstrated, states with poor human rights practices have joined the ICC notwithstanding that 
ratification is inconsistent with the credible threat theory, the case studies include a state that 
acted contrary to theoretical predictions.  Table 15 lists the states that were selected. 
Table 15:  States Selected for Case Studies Based on ICC State Commitment 
Decisions Expectations 
       Low Likelihood of 
Human Rights 
Violation 
High Likelihood of Human Rights Violation 
Worse Domestic 
Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Trinidad and Tobago: 
Consistent with 
prediction, ratified ICC 
treaty 
Rwanda:  Consistent with prediction, did not 
ratify ICC treaty 
Kenya:  Contrary to prediction, did ratify ICC 
treaty 
Better Domestic 
Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Germany:  Consistent 
with prediction, ratified 
ICC treaty 
Refuse to commit to the ICC (since can‘t 
control ICC determinations about the quality 
of domestic prosecutions) [but theoretically 
unlikely many states in this category] 
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I discuss below how each of these countries was chosen from amongst the others within 
these several categories:  (1) states with very good human rights practices and domestic law 
enforcement institutions; (2) states with very good human rights practices, but worse domestic 
law enforcement institutions; and (3) states with very bad human rights practices and domestic 
law enforcement institutions.   
States with Very Good Human Rights Practices and Domestic Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
 
 The table below lists states which the data indicated had both very good human rights 
practices and very good domestic law enforcement institutions and from which I selected 
Germany for an in-depth case study.  
Table 16:  States with Very Good Human Rights Practices and Domestic Law 
Enforcement Institutions147 
 
Ratified Not Ratified 
Andorra (2001) 
Australia (2002) 
Austria (2000) 
Barbados (2002) 
Belgium (2000) 
Canada (2000) 
Denmark (2001) 
Finland (2000) 
France (2000) 
Germany (2000) 
Iceland (2000) 
Ireland (2002) 
Japan (2007) 
Liechtenstein (2001) 
Luxembourg (2000) 
Malta (2002) 
Netherlands (2001) 
New Zealand (2000) 
Norway (2000) 
Spain (2000)
148
 
Sweden (2001) 
Switzerland (2001) 
United Kingdom 
(2001) 
 
Bahamas 
Singapore          
Tuvalu 
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This category includes only those states with average physical integrity rights ratings of 
greater than 6 and average rule of law ratings of greater than 1 – therefore, states with the very 
best practices and institutions.
149
  Examining the ratification behavior of a state with high levels 
on both of the main explanatory variables is crucial to testing the credible threat theory and to 
understanding more precisely why and how states that are more likely able to comply with the 
ICC treaty proceed to ratification.  In addition, conducting case study analysis on a state within 
this category is also crucial for understanding the import of the ICC‘s enforcement mechanism 
and whether states actually view it as a credible threat.   
I selected Germany for case study analysis from amongst the 23 states with the best 
human rights practices and best domestic law enforcement practices for several reasons related to 
improving the ability to test the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  Indeed, as 
George and Bennett explain, choosing cases based on some preliminary knowledge about them 
can be both necessary and beneficial since it allows selecting cases with a view towards making 
the process tracing of a theory more severe.
150
  Here, I chose to study a European country since 
so many of the States Parties to the ICC are European.
151
  In addition, I concluded that focusing 
on a richer and powerful state would be useful since it would assist in ruling out other theories 
about normative and other pressures that might help explain the ratification behavior of smaller 
and weaker states that depend on others for trade, aid, or military support.  Not only does ruling 
out those ―pressure‖ explanations help isolate the credible threat theory, but focusing on more 
powerful and richer states provides a tougher test of the credible threat theory since those states 
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should be better able to make their own ratification decisions without interference.   
Finally, as compared to the other richer and more powerful states within Europe – such as 
France and the United Kingdom – Germany should again provide the tougher test of the credible 
threat theory since it has a genocidal past and also a history of poor human rights practices and a 
lack of respect for the rule of law.  Because of that past and the fact that Germany did not 
embrace the Nuremburg trials and the resulting infringement on its sovereignty, one could 
reasonably wonder whether Germany would choose to join an organization like the ICC with its 
relatively strong enforcement mechanisms.  True, some might argue that Germany is an easy 
case since it would necessarily feel a need to join the ICC so as to signal to the world and to the 
rest of Europe that it was putting its past behind it and was committed to being a state that 
protected against human rights abuses.  But, Germany did not just commit to the court, and it 
certainly did not do so because of any implied or express pressure from others.  Germany 
arguably went well beyond what it might have been required to do in order to show it was 
committed to changing its ways – particularly given that it is a rich and powerful state that does 
not have to depend on other states for its existence and survival. 
In terms of the observable implications outlined in the introductory section above, if the 
credible threat theory is correct, we should see evidence that Germany committed to the court at 
a time when costs of compliance and threats to its sovereignty would be minimal.  In addition, 
we should see evidence that cost calculations played a primary role in Germany‘s ratification 
behavior – even if, for example, there is other evidence that Germany also believed that it could 
obtain some uncertain and indirect benefits from committing to the court.  Finally, if Germany 
does view the ICC treaty‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat, we should see 
continued efforts by Germany to comply with the court even after ratification and even if at the 
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time of ratification its human rights practices were sufficiently good to likely insure that it would 
not be the subject of an ICC investigation and prosecution.    
States with Very Good Human Rights Practices, but Worse Domestic Law 
Enforcement Institutions 
 
The table below lists states which the data indicated had very good human rights 
practices, but worse domestic law enforcement institutions and from which I selected Trinidad 
and Tobago for an in-depth case study.  
Table 17:  Very Good Human Rights Practices, but Worse Domestic Law 
Enforcement Institutions152 
Ratified Not Ratified 
Antigua (2001) 
Belize (2000) 
Benin (2002) 
Bosnia (2002) 
Botswana (2000) 
Comoros (2006) 
Costa Rica (2001) 
Croatia (2001) 
Cyprus (2002) 
Czech Republic (2009) 
Djibouti (2002) 
Dominica (2001) 
Estonia (2002) 
Fiji (1999) 
Gabon (2000) 
Greece (2002) 
Hungary (2001) 
Italy (1999) 
Latvia (2002) 
Lesotho (2000) 
Lithuania (2003) 
Mali (2000) 
Marshall Islands (2000) 
Mauritius (2002) 
Montenegro (2006) 
Nauru (2001) 
Panama (2002) 
Poland (2001) 
Samoa (2002) 
San Marino (1999) 
Serbia (2001) 
Slovak Republic 
(2002) 
Slovenia (2001) 
St. Lucia (2010) 
St. Vincent (2002) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (1999) 
Uruguay (2002) 
 
Brunei 
Cape Verde 
Grenada 
Monaco 
Oman Solomon 
Islands 
Palau 
Qatar  
Sao Tome 
Taiwan 
Tonga Micronesia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Vanuatu 
                                                 
152
 The states included in this table all had average physical integrity rights ratings of greater than 6 and rule of law 
ratings of between 1 and -1.   
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As above, I restricted this category to states with average physical integrity rights ratings of 
greater than 6 so as to capture those states with the best human rights practices.  In order to 
further test the credible threat theory and the potential independent influence of the state‘s level 
of domestic law enforcement institutions on ratification behavior, however, this category of 
states includes those with lower rule of law ratings – between 1 and -1.  Case study analysis of 
Trinidad and Tobago‘s pre- and post-ratification behavior should provide insights into why a 
state with relatively good human rights practices, but relatively average, weak, or incapable 
domestic law enforcement institutions, nevertheless joins the ICC.  This case study is particularly 
relevant given that the empirical results showed it was only a state‘s human rights ratings – and 
not its rule of law ratings – that were a significant and positive predictor of ratification.  Thus, 
even though there are two prongs to ICC compliance (and which allow a state to avoid a loss of 
sovereignty to the ICC), where the state does not expect its citizens will not perpetrate mass 
atrocities, it may still view compliance costs as minimal and nevertheless commit to the court.  
I chose Trinidad and Tobago to study from amongst the other 37 states that acted as 
predicted by the credible threat theory and ratified the ICC for several reasons.
153
  First, I 
excluded from consideration the various weaker and/or poorer Western or Eastern European 
states because the European Union strongly supported the court and because such states would 
likely have felt pressure to join as a result.  Thus, I wanted to eliminate this confounding 
explanation for state ratification behavior.  Nevertheless, by choosing Trinidad and Tobago for 
case study analysis, I still preserved the opportunity to examine and compare the explanatory 
power of normative and other theories with the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  
Trinidad and Tobago is a small and relatively weak state, thus its ratification behavior can be 
                                                 
153
 It bears noting that about 11 of the states among those 37 did not have data for all years on my main explanatory 
variables and were otherwise small states for which not all data on all variables was reported.  I accordingly decided 
to eliminate them as choices. 
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tested against theories about pressure.  In addition, however, Trinidad and Tobago did play a role 
in the creation of the court and ratified the ICC treaty very promptly.  Therefore, studying its 
ICC ratification behavior provides a tough test of the credible threat theory since it allows for a 
comparison against the explanatory power of normative theories.  In short, as I selected 
Germany, I selected Trinidad and Tobago for case study analysis because the small amount of 
preliminary information available indicated that the country would provide a good and tough test 
of the credible threat theory.   
In terms of observable implications, if the credible threat theory is correct, as in the case 
of Germany, we should see evidence that Trinidad and Tobago committed to the court at a time 
when costs of compliance and threats to its sovereignty would be minimal.  In addition, we 
should see evidence that cost calculations played a primary role in Trinidad and Tobago‘s 
ratification decision.  Indeed, because Trinidad and Tobago is a smaller and weaker state, the 
case study analysis will offer an opportunity to expressly compare the explanatory power of the 
credible threat theory to theories about normative pressure.  If the credible threat theory is 
correct, Trinidad and Tobago‘s ratification decision should be premised on compliance cost 
calculations, even if there is also evidence of normative pressures.  Finally, as with Germany, we 
should see continued efforts by Trinidad and Tobago to comply with the court even after 
ratification – which evidence would lend additional support to the idea that the country views the 
ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and wants to comply with treaty terms in 
order to avoid a costly loss of sovereignty.   
States with Very Bad Human Rights Practices and Domestic Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
 
Because the ratification behavior of states with bad human rights practices is of particular 
interest given the credible threat theory which predicts that such states will be wary of 
108 
 
committing to the ICC and its relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, within this category of 
states, I chose to conduct two case studies.  From amongst the states listed in Table 18 which all 
have very bad human rights practices and domestic law enforcement institutions, I chose to study 
Rwanda because its decision to refuse to ratify the Rome Statute is consistent with the credible 
threat theory.  But, so as to further explore the explanatory power of the credible threat theory – 
and to further explore the potential explanatory power of the credible commitment theory – I also 
chose Kenya as a case to study because its decision to ratify the ICC treaty in 2005 demonstrates 
behavior seemingly inconsistent with that predicted by credible threat theory. 
Table 18:  Very Bad Human Rights Practices and Domestic Law Enforcement 
Institutions154 
Ratified  Not Ratified 
Burundi (2004) 
Democratic Republic of Congo (2002) 
Afghanistan (2003) 
Nigeria (2001) 
Chad (2006) 
Kenya (2005) 
Liberia (2004) 
North Korea 
Iraq 
Sudan 
Burma 
Angola 
Ivory Coast 
Uzbekistan 
Cameroon 
Rwanda 
Yemen 
 
I restricted this category to states with average physical integrity rights ratings of lower 
than 3 –states which the credible threat theory predicts would be least likely to ratify the ICC 
treaty.  Examining the ratification behavior of a state with low levels on both of the main 
explanatory variables is critical to testing the explanatory power of the credible threat theory and 
to understanding more precisely the behavior of states that are likely least able to comply with 
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 The states included in this table all had average physical integrity rights ratings of less than 3 and rule of law 
ratings of below -1. 
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ICC treaty terms.  Indeed, examining the ratification behavior of a state like Kenya is particularly 
important to understanding the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  For example, the 
Kenya case study can shed light on how states with poor practices view the ICC‘s enforcement 
mechanisms, whether their decision to commit is premised on some ability or intention to better 
their practices, and whether the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms are able to influence state 
behavior post-commitment.   
As to the reasons for choosing Rwanda and Kenya for case study analysis, several 
considerations were paramount.  First, choosing two countries from the same region seemed 
warranted so as to eliminate a difference in region or culture from the explanations about the 
differing commitment behavior.  It also made sense to choose states from Africa since African 
states are a large part of the ICC‘s constituency.  Second, both Rwanda and Kenya have similar 
average physical integrity rights and rule of law ratings.  Both countries have average physical 
integrity rights ratings of about 2.7 and average rule of law ratings of about -1.  Finally, as to 
Rwanda in particular, it has a recent genocidal history which allows for a nice juxtaposition 
against the German case study – although, of course, the Rwandan genocide occurred much more 
recently than did the German genocide.    
In terms of observable implications, because both states have poor human rights practices 
and poor domestic law enforcement institutions, we should see evidence that the states refrain 
from ratifying the ICC treaty because costs of complying with treaty terms are significant and 
will pose risks to state sovereignty.  We should also see evidence that the states place 
considerations about the costs of compliance above any considerations about potential intangible 
or indirect benefits that might be obtained from joining the court – inasmuch as a failure to 
comply could prove costly from a sovereignty standpoint.  Furthermore, in terms of comparing 
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the explanatory power of the credible threat theory to that of the credible commitment theory, we 
should see that these states do not commit to the ICC, or if they do commit, that they do not 
commit in order to tie their hands and demonstrate to their domestic audience that they will not 
resort to violence and will also end the cycle of impunity.   
Of course, Kenya was chosen for study precisely because it acted contrary to the 
predictions of the credible threat theory and ratified the Rome Statute in 2005 even though at that 
time, it still had bad human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement institutions.  
But, again, the case study allows us to closely examine Kenya‘s behavior both before and after 
ratification in an effort to determine the country‘s reasons for ratification.  Thus, we can look 
before and after ratification for any evidence that Kenya was concerned with the costs of 
complying with the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms.  In addition, because 
Kenya did commit to the Rome Statute in 2005, we can look for evidence consistent with the 
credible commitment theory.  If the credible commitment theory is correct, we should see 
evidence that after 2005, Kenya embraced the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms 
and used them to tie its leaders‘ hands.  For example, we should see an absence of government-
instigated violence.  Or, if there is government-instigated violence post-ratification, we should 
see evidence that the government is using the ICC‘s strong enforcement mechanisms as a tool for 
aiding the government in ending any prior cycle of impunity.  On the other hand, if the credible 
threat theory is correct, post-ratification, we should see evidence that the Kenyan government is 
making efforts to ensure that it can comply with the ICC treaty so as to avoid a costly loss of 
sovereignty.  In the event of noncompliance, however, unlike the credible commitment theory 
which predicts that the state will embrace the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms, the credible threat theory predicts that the state will prefer to avoid restraints on its 
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sovereign power to do as it pleases and seek to avoid any costly commitments.   
The Uniqueness of the United States Regarding the ICC 
 Of course, time and space only permit a limited number of case studies.  But, because the 
notable absence of the United States amongst the list of ICC States Parties may cause some 
readers to be concerned that it provides a tough test of the credible threat theory that is being 
ignored, I here address my decision not to select it for case study analysis.  Although the specific 
reasons for its exclusion are addressed below, as an initial matter, I suggest that the United States 
would not necessarily serve as a good case study because its behavior may not be very helpful 
for understanding the behavior of other countries vis-à-vis ICC ratification.  After all, the United 
States‘ unique situation as a superpower means that it is different from every other state in terms 
of the power it wields.  And, by virtue of that power, the United States tends to also behave 
somewhat uniquely in terms of the commitment decisions it makes to international human rights 
treaties.   
More specifically, the United States was not chosen for case study analysis here because 
as can be seen from a review of the tables above, the United States‘ values on the two main 
explanatory variables do not put it into any of the categories most relevant to testing the 
explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  And, while one might expect that the United 
States would be listed as a state with the best human rights practices and best domestic law 
enforcement institutions, its recent ratings on the physical integrity rights scale have been 
somewhat poor.  The average physical integrity rights rating for the United States is below 6, and 
in the years 2004 through 2006, it scored only 4 on that scale.  Therefore, although the United 
States‘ human rights practices may not be bad on the whole, the fact that it has scored poor 
human rights ratings actually makes its failure to commit to the ICC somewhat consistent with 
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the credible threat theory.  Indeed, consistent with the United States‘ role as a superpower, the 
United States has a large military presence internationally.  And, as is well-known, its soldiers 
have been accused of committing acts that some suggest constitute torture.  Accordingly, the 
United States may have reasons to conclude that the costs of committing to the ICC and its 
relatively strong enforcement mechanisms pose a significant risk to its sovereignty that it is 
unwilling to accept.   
Of course, the United States does have very good independent and capable domestic law 
enforcement institutions with which it could punish offenders – a fact which should lessen any of 
its concerns about compliance costs and risks to its sovereignty should it join the court.  But, 
under the ICC‘s system of complementarity, the ICC prosecutor and court make the final 
determination about whether a state‘s domestic processes have been sufficient for it to avoid ICC 
jurisdiction over the matter.  Thus, if the United States concludes that particular conduct does not 
warrant prosecution, it could still risk its citizens being prosecuted by the ICC.  And, the United 
States is not just any state.  It has argued that its status as a superpower, and the fact that it has 
taken military actions abroad with which other states have not agreed, put it in a situation where 
it could be subjected to ―unfounded charges‖ and ―politicized prosecutions.‖155 As Ruth 
Wedgewood states, ―The worry of the United States is that in an unpopular conflict, there is a 
real chance that an adversary or critic will choose to misuse the ICC to make its point.‖  As she 
further notes, ―The role of the United States in balance of power structures in Asia and Europe, 
and in support of transcontinental peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, together with 
the deployment of 200,000 American troops abroad, may leave the United States in a unique 
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 Statement by President Clinton:  Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000), available 
at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/library/hot_releases/December_31_2000.html.  For a good discussion of the 
similar objections about a politicized court that the United States raised in connection with the International Court of 
Justice, see Struett, The Politics of Constructing an International Criminal Court, 68. 
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position in regard to the Court.‖156  
Second, even if the United States‘ values on the main exploratory values had been high 
enough to make it a good atheoretical test of the credible threat theory since it did not ratify the 
Rome Statute, it still would be a poor choice for a case study since its behavior vis-à-vis 
international human rights treaties is rather unusual for a state with relatively good human rights 
practices.  Specifically, because the United States behaves rather uniquely with respect to its 
ratification behavior (and because, as noted above, it is rather unique in its military situation), it 
would not make a good case study with outcomes that could be generalized at all beyond the one 
case.  As shown in Table 19 below, the United States has not even ratified all of the main 
international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms.  Not only is this 
behavior somewhat singular amongst countries with good human rights practices, it is unique 
even amongst states with bad human rights practices.  For example, 160 states have ratified the 
ICESCR; 185 have ratified the CEDAW; and 193 have ratified the CRC.  In addition, even as to 
the three other main treaties which it did ratify, the United States only did so recently.  
Furthermore, while it is true that the United States did ratify the two treaties which allow for 
state complaints, again, it did not do so promptly – and perhaps only after it had learned that the 
mechanism was not being used.
157
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 Ruth Wedgewood, ―The International Criminal Court:  An American View,‖ 102-02. 
157
 In fact, the United States did not even ratify the Genocide Convention until 1986, and its reservations seek to 
eliminate the possibility that United States citizens would be tried before an international court.  Struett, The Politics 
of Constructing the International Criminal Court, 69.   
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Table 19:  Commitment to the Six Primary International Human Rights 
Treaties 
Treaty Enforcement Mechanism Date Open Ratification Date 
ICCPR Reports 1966 1992 
ICESCR Reports 1966 -- 
CERD Reports 1966 1994 
CEDAW Reports 1980 -- 
CAT Reports 1984 1994 
CRC Reports 1989 -- 
ICCPR Art. 41 State Complaints 1966 1992 
CAT Art. 21 State Complaints 1984 1994 
ICCPR Opt. Individual Complaints 1966 -- 
CERD 14 Individual Complaints 1966 -- 
CAT 22 Individual Complaints 1984 -- 
CEDAW Opt. Individual Complaints 1999 -- 
CAT Opt. Committee Visits 2003 -- 
 
That the United States did not ratify the totality of these international human rights 
treaties, however, does not mean that it does not support human rights or is not committed to the 
idea of bringing international criminals to justice.  After all, it champions global human rights, 
and it provides peacekeepers and conducts military interventions to aid in situations where 
human rights are being abused.  It also took the lead in Nuremburg and has supported the various 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals.  Furthermore, although its human rights ratings of late 
have not been the highest – likely because of actions committed by military personnel – the 
United States is not a country one would expect to experience a genocidal episode or other types 
of government-sponsored mass atrocities.  Moreover, its domestic law enforcement institutions 
are of very high quality.  Therefore, even though some of its human rights practices may at times 
be questionable or not what one would expect of a leader, the United States is not one of the 
states that the international community might most need to have bound to ICC treaty terms since 
the treaty is focused on punishing and deterring those most responsible for perpetrating the very 
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gravest atrocities.  
Rather, what the evidence shows is that the United States guards its sovereignty very 
closely and also prefers to have some control over the international institutions in which it 
participates.  Its conduct in connection with the ICC negotiations is only further proof of this 
point.  The United States participated in the negotiations leading to the creation of the ICC, but it 
supported a court more like the one envisioned in the 1994 ILC draft where states – and 
particularly, powerful states – had more control over what cases would come under the court‘s 
jurisdiction.  Under the proposals supported by the United States, the Security Council would 
have veto power over the commencement of ICC investigations, which given the United States‘ 
role as a permanent member meant that it would have had some control over the ICC docket.
158
 
In addition, under the United States‘ proposals, the prosecutor would not have had any powers to 
mount investigations on his own authority.
159
  When the remaining states instead decided to 
create a strong and independent court, the United States declined to vote for the adoption of the 
Rome Statute.
160
   
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, as the figures below further demonstrate, the four cases selected for study 
demonstrate variance on the dependent variable of ICC commitment and also on the main 
independent variables of interest: a state‘s level of human rights practices and its level of 
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 Megan A. Fairlie, ―The United States and the International Criminal Court Post-Bush:  A Beautiful Courtship but 
an Unlikely Marriage,‖ forthcoming Berkeley Journal of International Law (2011): 8.   
159
 Ibid.   
160
 In fact, David Scheffer, the United States ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues who also served as the head 
of the American delegation at the Rome Conference explained the United States‘ failure to vote for adoption of the 
statute as follows:  ―There were a few very fundamental issues which either have to be accommodated within the 
treaty text or they present very severe difficulties for the United States government. . . . accommodations were not 
achieved in the negotiations, and therefore we were not in a position to support the text as it came out of Rome.‖On 
the Record Briefing at Foreign Press Center, Federal Document Clearing House, July 31, 1998, available at 1998 
WL 431804.   
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domestic law enforcement institutions.  In addition, the cases for individual study both fit and do 
not fit my theoretical expectations.   
Figure 6:  Case Study States Human Rights Ratings by Year 
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Figure 7:  Case Study States’ Rule of Law Ratings from 1996 to 2008161 
 
In-depth examination of these diverse cases should add depth and understanding to the empirical 
findings:  we can now test the explanatory power of the credible threat theory in a range of 
contexts, test observable implications of that theory, and also compare the explanatory power of 
that theory to others, including the credible commitment theory.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
GERMANY: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVERT 
 
This chapter examines Germany‘s decision to ratify the ICC in historical and political 
context.  Germany was an early leader in the push for a strong and independent permanent 
international criminal court aimed at ending impunity for mass atrocities.  It was deeply involved 
in negotiations culminating in the adoption of the ICC treaty, and it presented and argued for 
proposals that would give the prosecutor and the court significant powers to investigate and 
prosecute mass atrocities.  Furthermore, after negotiations, Germany promptly committed to the 
ICC.  It signed the treaty creating the court on December 10, 1998, approximately five months 
after the Rome Statute was available for signature.  Thereafter, on December 11, 2000, which it 
emphasized was also the 52
nd
 anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Germany became the twenty-fifth state to ratify the ICC treaty.  In the press release announcing 
Germany‘s decision to join the court, Hans-Peter Kaul, the German representative (and now an 
ICC judge), noted that all members of the German parliament had unanimously voted for 
ratification.  He further stated that Germany was in the process of amending its own constitution 
(the ―Basic Law‖) in order to allow for the surrender of German nationals to the ICC.162   
Of course, because Germany presently enjoys high human rights ratings and strong 
domestic law enforcement institutions, its decision to readily ratify the Rome Statute is in many 
ways not surprising.  In addition, because Germany has good human rights ratings and no recent 
history of government-sponsored violence, this case study does not present questions about 
whether Germany committed to the ICC in order to credibly commit to its domestic audience to 
act non-violently and enforce the rule of law.  From the mid-1990s to the present (in all but one 
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  UN Press Release, ―South Africa, Germany Announce Ratification Of Statute To Establish International 
Criminal Court,‖ Nov. 27, 2000.  UN Press Releases are available at http://www.un.org/News/Press, accessed 
September 2010.    
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year), Germany has scored a seven or eight on the physical integrity rights scale – which ranges 
from 0 to 8 and is based on Amnesty International and United States State Department reports.  
Its rule of law ratings (used as a proxy for the strength of a state‘s domestic law enforcement 
institutions and its ability to prosecute any mass atrocities) are also consistently among the best.  
For the period from 1995 to 2008, Germany has received a score of approximately 1.7 – where 
the very highest score in the sample provided is about 2.1.  Finally, in terms of its democracy 
rating, Germany has scored 10 out of a possible 10 points from 1995 forward.  Thus, the data 
suggest that Germany should suffer minimal compliance costs by joining the court – even if the 
enforcement mechanisms contained in the ICC treaty are as strong in practice as they appear to 
be on paper.  
Nevertheless, as the case study shows, that Germany would be a leader in pushing for a 
strong and independent ICC and promptly commit to an international court that could infringe on 
Germany‘s sovereignty was anything but a foregone conclusion.  Germany was responsible for 
one of the most horrendous genocides in recent history.  In addition, for decades thereafter, 
Germany denounced the international community‘s efforts to hold it and its soldiers accountable 
for the atrocities they had committed.  Indeed, when Germany had poor human rights practices, it 
was very hostile to the idea of punishment and a role for the world community in implementing 
that punishment, and it avoided international human rights treaties with stronger enforcement 
mechanisms.    
But, in about the 1990s, with generational change, Germany‘s attitudes towards human 
rights began to improve, as did its respect for the rule of law.  And, those changes had 
implications regarding Germany‘s behavior in committing to international human rights treaties 
– implications which also provide support for the power of the credible threat theory to explain 
120 
 
Germany‘s decision to promptly commit to the ICC.  Specifically, it was only after Germany‘s 
human rights practices and the quality of its domestic law enforcement institutions improved that 
Germany showed an interest in committing to international human rights treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms.  Similarly, Germany only committed to the Rome Statute and its 
strong enforcement mechanisms after ensuring that it would be able to comply with treaty terms 
and would not suffer a loss of sovereignty by having its citizens prosecuted in The Hague.  In 
fact, Germany‘s concern for compliance was so strong that it amended its constitution and laws 
to ensure they were consistent with the Rome Statute requirements.   
This chapter is organized as follows.  I begin by discussing Germany‘s human rights 
practices in the historical context of World War I and World War II, including the efforts made 
at those times to hold Germans accountable for committing war crimes and other crimes against 
humanity.  I then examine the evolution of Germany‘s behavior and attitudes relating to its 
respect for the protection of human rights from the post-World War II period until reunification 
in the 1990s.  Next, I trace Germany‘s role in the creation of a permanent international criminal 
court.  I follow by looking at Germany‘s decision to join the court and the actions it has taken to 
comply with the court before and after ratification.  I particularly focus on the domestic laws 
Germany has enacted to implement the provisions of the Rome Statute and to allow German 
cooperation with the court.  I conclude that while Germany‘s process in becoming a state with 
good human rights practices and good institutions is certainly unique, the credible threat theory 
and a rational concern for compliance with treaty terms best explains Germany‘s commitment to 
the ICC.       
Background:  The Shameful Past 
It is a significant understatement to say that Germany has not always demonstrated good 
121 
 
human rights practices or supported the idea that abusers of human rights must be brought to 
justice.  On the contrary, beginning with World War I and continuing through the end of World 
War II, Germany, its leaders, and its citizens committed mass atrocities of the most heinous 
nature.  Furthermore, efforts by the world community – particularly by the Allied governments 
that finally managed to defeat Germany in those wars – to convince Germany that those who 
committed the atrocities must be punished were generally ignored.  Not only did Germany resist 
trials of its nationals for crimes committed during the world wars, but also, it and its people 
denied that trials commenced by the victors were proper, fair, or warranted.  Rather, Germany 
held fast to the idea that it had the sovereign right to conduct its internal domestic affairs as it 
saw fit, even if the manner in which it conducted those affairs included exterminating whole 
populations of its citizenry.   
Germany’s Human Rights Violations during World War I and the Failed Attempts to 
Hold Violators Accountable  
 
The conclusion of World War I marked the first effort of the world community to hold 
Germans accountable for mass atrocities.  From the very beginning of that war, the Allies (Great 
Britain, France, and Russia) were upset by the cruel and inhumane way Germans conducted 
themselves.  Between August and October 1914, German soldiers massacred some 6,500 French 
and Belgian citizens and destroyed more than twenty thousand buildings.  Germans also deported 
French and Belgian citizens to forced labor camps.
163
  Furthermore, German submarines attacked 
and sank neutral merchant ships and hospital ships.  German troops also sank the RMS Lusitania, 
a passenger ship passing off the coast of Ireland, killing 1,198 people, including over 100 
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 Reginbogin, ―Confronting ‗Crimes Against Humanity‘ from Leipzig to the Nuremberg Trials,‖ 119.  
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Americans.
164
  France accused the Germans of mistreating – including killing – prisoners of war 
and of raping and pillaging in the French villages its soldiers occupied.
165
  Great Britain was 
particularly angered when Germans executed a British nurse for sheltering Allied soldiers in 
Belgium.
166
  
Given these acts by Germany and its soldiers, as early as 1915, Great Britain made 
holding the Germans accountable for war crimes part of its stated goals in the event that the 
Allies were victorious.
167
  At the conclusion of the war, and by the Treaty of Versailles, Great 
Britain embarked on that goal.  Among other things, the treaty provided for the creation of a 
multinational special tribunal to try Germany‘s head of state, Kaiser Wilhelm II, for committing 
―a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.‖168  In addition, by 
Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany purportedly also recognized the 
Allies‘ right to try its citizens for war crimes and agreed to surrender to them all accused persons 
to military tribunals of one or more of the Allied powers.
169
   
Implementing these provisions allowing for the trial of the German Kaiser and German 
soldiers, however, was anything but a success.  Not only was there a lack of international 
cooperation and political will to try offenders, but also Germany guarded its sovereignty, and 
moreover, demonstrated by its conduct after the war that it did not believe the acts of its leaders 
or soldiers amounted to war crimes deserving of punishment.  Germany believed it was being 
singled out unfairly for punishment based on acts that were similar to those that others had 
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committed during the course of the war.
170
   
Not only were the Allies unable to prosecute the German Kaiser, but the efforts to try 
Germany‘s soldiers were also a great failure.  The trial of Kaiser Wilhelm never happened 
because he sought and found asylum in the Netherlands, which thereafter refused to extradite 
him to stand trial.  Nor did the Allies ever obtain the surrender of any German military personnel 
for war crimes trials.  Although the Allies managed to trim the list of suspects they wished to try 
to about 890, even that list was met with shock and claims that the German people would not 
stand for having so many men turned over to the Allies for trial.  Thereafter, the Allies began to 
retreat from their demands, and they eventually accepted a German compromise proposal which 
would allow the Germans themselves to try the accused before the German Supreme Court in 
Leipzig.
171
   But, of the initial 45 accused selected for trial in Leipzig in 1921, only 12 somewhat 
low-level perpetrators were tried, and six were acquitted.
172
  Furthermore, those who were 
convicted received relatively light sentences -- usually of some months in jail.
173
  Finally, by 
1922, the Allies were so discouraged by the conduct of the Leipzig trials – believing them to be 
parody of justice
174
-- that they essentially abandoned pressing forward on Article 228.
175
   
Moreover, although the Germans conducted a number of other trials in Leipzig between 
1921 and 1927 of persons accused of having committed various forms of war crimes, those trials 
too were primarily seen as nothing but a parody of justice as they did little or nothing to convince 
the German people that Germans had, in fact, committed war crimes.  Professor Herbert 
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Reginbogin explains that although some 1,700 different forms of trials were held dealing with 
murder, mistreatment of prisoners of war, submarine and air warfare, most resulted in acquittals.  
In fact, the judges typically found that the accused could not have been acting criminally 
inasmuch as their acts were taken in pursuit of a military goal, rather than with a single purpose 
to harm innocent others.
176
  It is true that in one case – the Llandovery Castle case – a court did 
reject a defense of superior orders and that acts taken in conjunction with war could not also be 
criminal in nature.
177
 On the whole, however, the Leipzig trials served to demonstrate that 
Germany did not accept the idea that its soldiers had committed ―war crimes‖ deserving of 
punishment.
178
  
Germany’s Human Rights Violations during World War II and the Nuremberg Trials 
Notwithstanding the Allies‘ efforts to convince Germany and Germans that they had 
committed human rights atrocities, the World War I experience did nothing to change either 
Germany‘s human rights practices or its belief that the world community should not be able to 
hold it accountable for committing crimes against international law.  Instead, Germany‘s 
practices only worsened during World War II.  During World War II, German soldiers waged 
war on civil populations, destroyed much of Europe, and massacred prisoners of war.  
Furthermore, the war served as a cover for the Nazi plan to exterminate Europe‘s Jewish 
population (as well as its gypsy and gay population) – committing what British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill later called ―‘probably the greatest and most horrible single crime ever 
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committed in the whole history of the world.‘‖179   
On the other hand, the world community did learn from the Leipzig trials that if states 
and their citizens were going to be held accountable for international crimes, the world 
community would have to take an active role in holding them accountable – rather than relying 
on the state itself to prosecute offenders.  Although the Allies had considered holding the worst 
offenders accountable simply by executing them, they eventually agreed that even the top Nazi 
war criminals should be tried and given the benefits of American due process.
180
 After much 
negotiation, and after Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, the Allies established the 
Nuremberg tribunal ―‘for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of 
the European Axis.‘‖ The Tribunal had jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.  The statute creating the Tribunal provided that heads of state were not 
immune from criminal liability.  It also added that ―superior orders‖ would not be available as a 
complete defense, though that defense could be considered in mitigating punishment.  Four 
judges – one from each of the four major victorious Allied powers – were appointed to preside 
over the trials.
181
   
The Nuremberg trials against twenty-two indicted defendants commenced on November 
20, 1945.
182
  Although the defendants all challenged the jurisdictional foundation for the court 
and argued that no international treaty or other document criminalized any of the acts these Nazi 
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leaders were accused of committing, the trials proceeded.
183
 Judgment was rendered on October 
1, 1946.  Twelve defendants received the death sentence; three were acquitted; and the remaining 
defendants were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment.
184
   
As to the crimes against peace, the Tribunal concluded the defendants had waged a war 
of aggression which had been a crime under international criminal law since the 1928 Kellogg-
Briand Pact (a multilateral treaty between, among others, the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, renouncing aggressive war).  Regarding the war crimes 
charges, the Tribunal found the defendants guilty of violating the laws and customs of war, 
which it concluded were well-established laws and customs recognized by several treaties and by 
customary law.  The defendants were also convicted of having committed crimes against 
humanity, which included inhumane acts against civilian populations and persecutions based on 
racial grounds – the major crime in this case being the systematic and planned extermination of 
Jews in Europe.  However, the Tribunal found that acts committed prior to the outbreak of World 
War II in 1939 were not within its jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the crimes committed against the 
Jewish people were only considered in connection with the ―crimes against humanity‖ verdict to 
the extent those acts occurred during the war.
185
  
After World War II:  Germany and the Protection of Human Rights 
Given Germany‘s past human rights abuses, and its refusal to believe that the conduct of 
its citizens was deserving of either international or domestic condemnation, one necessarily 
wonders how and why Germany became the country it is at present:  a democracy with very high 
human rights ratings and high-quality domestic legal institutions that enforce the rule of law.  
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Based on the evidence presented above, there can be no doubt that by the end of World War II, 
Germany had no respect for human rights or the idea of international criminal law.  After all, 
even after the Allies condemned it for its behavior during the course of World War I, Germany 
and its citizens went on to commit even more heinous crimes during the course of World War II.  
And, as noted above, those who were tried at Nuremberg challenged those trials and complained 
that they signified nothing more than ―victor‘s justice.‖   
This section examines the time period following the Nuremberg trials up to the early 
1990s when Germany again became a unified state.  In the early periods after the Nuremberg 
trials, the evidence shows that the country and its citizens very much defended their own 
atrocious human rights practices and were hostile to efforts to deem those practices as 
―criminal,‖ – particularly by an international body composed only of victor states whose citizens 
had also committed bad behavior (although not as heinous as exterminating whole populations of 
people).  However, as younger generations who were made aware of Germany‘s shameful past, 
but who had taken no part in it, rose to positions of influence and power, Germany‘s laws and 
practices, and its attitude toward allowing impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities, began to 
change.  Indeed, beginning in the 1960s, there is evidence of a younger generation of prosecutors 
and judges who were committed to punishing criminals.   
By the early 1990s, Germany and its people even more readily embraced the idea of 
punishing criminals.  Following the fall of the Berlin wall, Germany made sure that it had the 
laws and institutions to allow it to hold accountable the Russians who had committed human 
rights abuses against Germans in East Germany.  In sum, over the decades following World War 
II, and coinciding with a generational shift in power, Germany evolved into a country that 
demonstrated a more positive position towards protecting against human rights abuses and 
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towards ensuring that abusers were brought to justice.  That change in position obtains further 
support from the data.  From the early 1980s (when the data is first available), Germany has 
received human rights ratings of between 6 and 8.   
Consistent with the credible threat theory, it was in the 1990s and the decade following 
that Germany also evidenced a greater willingness to commit to international human rights 
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms.  Simply put, when Germany‘s human rights 
practices and domestic law enforcement institutions were weak (or inclined to protect human 
rights abusers), the government committed only to international human rights treaties with the 
weakest state reporting enforcement mechanisms.  Because the treaties contained weak 
enforcement mechanisms, Germany could commit without fearing a great loss of sovereignty 
even though it may not have been able or intend to comply with treaty terms.  However, when its 
human rights practices improved, and after it had in place measures to decrease the likelihood of 
future human rights violations and had bolstered its domestic institutional capacity to deal with 
abusers, Germany‘s behavior changed.  It joined international human rights treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms:  but it did so only when it had taken steps to ensure that it would 
better be able to comply with treaty terms and thus avoid a costly loss of sovereignty.   
In this section, I examine the evolution in the German attitude towards human rights 
practices and international criminal law beginning with the Nuremberg trials up until the time of 
German reunification.  I thereafter discuss this evolution in the context of Germany‘s post-World 
War II behavior as it related to the newly established international human rights regime.   
The Reaction to the Nuremberg Trials 
In the immediate aftermath of the Nuremberg trials, every indication is that Germans as a 
whole were unconvinced that the genocide and other atrocities committed by their people were 
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deserving of international punishment.  They were generally resentful of the Nuremberg trials 
and the follow-up trials that were conducted in the occupied zones charging German soldiers 
with international crimes.  At least one scholar argues that this reaction was in part based on 
pride:  Germans could not recognize the validity of the judgments because they were an affront 
to German dignity.
 186
  The fact that the Allies prosecuted Germans for some acts which occurred 
solely within Germany was a particularly sore point:  at least some Germans viewed charging the 
defendants with criminal acts on this basis as a unique invasion of their sovereign rights to 
conduct their domestic affairs as they saw fit.  Hitler‘s deputy Goring, in fact, declared at the 
Nuremberg trials: ―‘But that was our right!  We were a sovereign State and that was strictly our 
business.‘‖187 
Germans raised other arguments about the unjustness of the punishments imposed by the 
Nuremberg trials as well.  First, they argued that Germans were improperly prosecuted for 
crimes that were not in fact crimes under international or domestic law at the time they were 
committed.  Second, they argued that the justice dispensed at Nuremberg and thereafter was 
―victor‘s justice,‖ – and thus a form of injustice – in that it focused only on German wrongdoing 
while ignoring crimes committed by the Allies.
188
  
Although these arguments about the unjustness of the Nuremberg trials certainly do not 
excuse German atrocities or make them any less deserving of international approbation, it is 
worth noting that some scholars have also criticized the Nuremberg trials for those same reasons.  
There is significant debate about whether by charging and convicting Germans of crimes against 
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humanity, the IMT applied law retroactively, thereby violating the principle against 
criminalizing actions that were not criminal when they were committed.
189
  Those charges were 
premised on the acts of genocide committed by the Germans against German and other Jews.  
However, it was not until 1948 that genocide would be clearly defined by treaty as an 
international crime.
190
  Therefore, some argue that Germans were convicted of a crime that was 
not actually an international crime at the time it was committed.  On the other hand, others 
defend the Allied decision to prosecute the German genocidal acts as crimes against humanity, 
noting that in the absence of the Nuremberg trials, and given Germany‘s refusal to accept the 
responsibility for prosecuting its own at the conclusion of World War I, the acts would have 
likely gone unpunished.
191
 Moreover, although some of the acts with which the defendants were 
charged may not have been specifically criminalized, the Nuremberg trials proceeded on the 
theory that the acts were so heinous that the defendants could not claim they did not know they 
were committing crimes in the opinion of the world community.  
For the purposes of this study, however, the point is not whether the Nuremberg trials 
properly applied international law, but rather how Germany perceived its own conduct during 
World War II.  I submit that the fact that Germans were focused on arguments against the 
invalidity of the Nuremberg trials shows a failure to acknowledge their own culpability.  The 
State Department of the United States came to a similar conclusion in a 1953:   
‗The German position on the trials of war criminals is a problem which has 
continued to trouble us ever since the trials were held.  The Germans have failed 
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to accept the principles on which the trials were based and do not believe that 
those convicted were guilty.  Their attitude is very much sentimental and cannot 
be influenced by arguments or an objective statement of the facts.  They adhere to 
the view that the majority of the war criminals were soldiers who were punished 
for doing what all soldiers do in war, or indeed were ordered to do.‘192 
 
Indeed, the German government later negotiated its non-recognition of the judgments in the 
various Nuremberg follow-up trials in the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out 
of the War and the Occupation, further evidencing that Germany‘s refusal to view its soldiers‘ 
actions as illegal under international law.
193
 Later, Germany went even further when it sought the 
pardon of persons who had been convicted in the follow-up trials conducted by the occupying 
powers.  Many of those prisoners were released – apparently in exchange for Germany‘s promise 
to agree to take the side against the rising threat of communism.
194
 
German Confrontation of its Nazi Past:  An Evolution  
 On the other hand, not all Germans turned a blind eye to the atrocities committed by 
Germans during World War II.  Beginning in the late 1950s, and continuing into the 1990s 
following reunification, the German government and its people took steps to ensure not only that 
perpetrators of mass atrocities or other human rights abuses would be punished for their conduct, 
but also that Germany had the kinds of laws and institutions that would make punishing such 
perpetrators possible.  For example, in 1958, the government established the Central 
Investigative Agency for Nazi Crimes which was tasked with carrying out investigations of 
crimes against humanity Germans allegedly committed outside Germany.
195
 As a result, over the 
next two decades some 6,000 Nazi defendants were brought to trial.  Although in most cases the 
defendants were charged with and convicted of murder, rather than crimes against humanity, the 
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government nevertheless indicated an unwillingness to allow these Nazi criminals to escape 
justice.  Indeed, at the time of these trials, the German Penal Code did not codify as criminal 
―crimes against humanity.‖   
It was during these two decades of prosecutions of Nazi defendants that the younger 
generations of Germans became a force for change:  eager young prosecutors committed to 
prosecuting criminals did battle against an older, largely former Nazi judiciary willing to turn a 
blind eye to Nazi injustices.
196
  And, they faced many challenges in the course of this battle.  
First, and foremost, as Professor Rebecca Wittmann notes, prosecutors could only proceed using 
the state‘s domestic murder charge, a fact which hampered their ability to obtain convictions.  
Because of the way that charge was drafted, the older judges had significant flexibility in 
determining that certain elements of the crime were not met.  For example, for a murder 
conviction, the prosecution had to show that the defendant acted with individual initiative and 
knowledge of the illegality of the act being committed.  Accordingly, although the prosecutors 
were successful in convicting many of the guilty, many defendants were also successful in 
obtaining acquittals by claiming they were simply doing their jobs (such that they could not have 
acted with individual initiative, for example).
 197
    
To further illustrate the difficulties faced by the young German prosecutors in bringing 
Nazi perpetrators of atrocities to justice, Professor Wittmann references a 1963 trial brought on 
behalf of the government by prosecutor Fritz Bauer against 20 high ranking Auschwitz 
perpetrators.  The trial – called the Auschwitz Trial – lasted two years and involved hundreds of 
witnesses and tens of thousands of documents demonstrating the horrors that were committed at 
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the concentration camp.  Bauer was successful in obtaining convictions against the defendants, 
but only some of those defendants were convicted of crimes for which the sentence was life 
imprisonment.  Specifically, the presiding judge found that only those defendants who murdered 
without official orders were guilty enough to deserve life sentences.  As to those who ―followed 
orders,‖ they were convicted of lesser crimes than murder since their crimes were crimes of 
complicity.
198
 
Nevertheless, and although there were difficulties, between the 1960s and the 1980s, the 
facts show that Germany‘s attitude toward the protection of human rights and impunity began to 
change.  The German government established an agency to investigate some Nazi atrocities and 
it provided resources to bring some 6,000 Nazi defendants to trial.  Furthermore, although the 
young prosecutors were not always successful in convicting those defendants, the fact that they 
did battle with the old guard shows that attitudes were changing and that the government and 
some of the German populace did not believe that persons who had committed mass atrocities 
should escape justice.   
In the 1990s, that new generation of Germans demonstrated an even greater respect for 
human rights and international criminal law – perhaps in part because Germans themselves 
suffered human rights abuses in East Germany when it was under Russian rule.
199
  Following the 
fall of the Berlin wall, West German courts were called upon to judge the criminality of various 
acts that had occurred in East Germany – such as fatal shootings at the Berlin Wall or alleged 
miscarriages of justice which occurred during political trials under Communism.  During the 
trials, West German judges were presented with many of the same defenses the defendants had 
raised at the Nuremberg trials – most particularly, the defense of superior orders and the 
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principle of non-retroactivity of the criminal law.  In the 1990s, however, West German judges 
rejected such defenses, concluding that inhumane laws permitting state-sponsored crime would 
have to yield to justice and a respect for human rights.
200
    
It was also in the 1990s that the government finally and more fully made attempts to 
remedy the injustices that had been done within Germany and against Germans using state laws 
under Nazism.  True, the government did act to repeal the most heinous of the Nazi laws 
immediately after World War II.  Thus, the laws allowing for persecution on racial and religious 
grounds, allowing for arbitrary death sentences, and the like, were all taken off the books.  But, 
at that time, German was under the influence of the Allied powers which were engaged in their 
―denazification‖ which included dismantling the Nazi regime – including its discriminatory laws 
against the Jewish people.  It was not until much later, however, that Germany finally voided the 
judgments that were entered during the period of Nazi rule by which persons were convicted for 
their race or status or because they acted against the regime.  For example, only in 1998 did the 
state dismiss the criminal judgments carried out during the Nazi period by the Nazi SS courts.
201
   
Of course, none of the above evidence demonstrates that there was an exact point at 
which German attitudes towards human rights and their Nazi past changed, or that the change 
was an unequivocal one or without inconsistencies.  However, I do suggest that the evidence 
shows that with a generational shift, and also because of learning based on experiences in East 
Germany under Russian rule, German behavior and attitudes towards protecting individuals 
against human rights abuses changed for the better.  In short, it was younger Germans who had 
not participated in World War II and who had not been indoctrinated into Nazi ideology that 
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seemed most eager to confront Germany‘s past atrocities and ensure that the record was at least 
cleansed in part by bringing the worst criminals to justice.  Moreover, as discussed below, only 
after this shift in behavior and attitude, and after Germany had shown that it had the laws and 
institutions that would enable it to protect against human rights abuses, did  Germany commit 
more fully to the international human rights regime and its optional, and stronger, enforcement 
mechanisms.  
Germany and the International Human Rights Regime:  International Commitment 
Follows Domestic Reforms 
 
 The shift in German behavior and attitudes regarding protecting against human rights 
abuses did not manifest itself only in Germany‘s domestic actions and policies.  Rather, as is 
shown below, following those reforms to its domestic actions and policies, Germany also began 
committing to international human rights institutions.  Specifically, in the early post-World War 
II period, Germany committed only to international human rights treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms – meaning it could commit without fearing a costly loss of sovereignty if it failed to 
comply.  By the 1990s, however, when its behavior and attitudes had evolved towards protecting 
against human rights abuses, and when it had in place domestic institutions to punish any 
abusers, Germany began committing to international human rights treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms.  Although many of the optional articles or protocols allowing for state 
or individual complaints were available for ratification in the late 1960s or early 1980s, Germany 
did not ratify them until 1993 at the very earliest.  Table 20 below lists all of the treaties 
examined in Chapter Four and the years they were available for ratification, together with the 
year they were ratified by Germany.   
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Table 20:  Commitment to the Six Primary International Human Rights 
Treaties 
Treaty Enforcement Mechanism Date Open Ratification Date 
ICCPR Reports 1966 1973 
ICESCR Reports 1966 1973 
CERD Reports 1966 1969 
CEDAW Reports 1980 1985 
CAT Reports 1984 1990 
CRC Reports 1989 1992 
ICCPR Art. 41 State Complaints 1966 2001 
CAT Art. 21 State Complaints 1984 2001 
ICCPR Opt. Individual Complaints 1966 1993 
CERD 14 Individual Complaints 1966 2001 
CAT 22 Individual Complaints 1984 2001 
CEDAW Opt. Individual Complaints 1999 2002 
CAT Opt. Committee Visits 2003 2008 
 
Consistent with the credible threat theory, the evidence suggests that Germany may have 
promptly ratified several treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms simply because ratification 
would not impose significant compliance costs – not because the country was actually and 
sincerely committing itself to respecting and protecting universal human rights.  Germany 
committed to the Genocide Convention in 1954, and it joined the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the 
CERD (which covers racial discrimination) in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  But, during these 
decades, much of the country appeared to be holding fast to the idea that the international 
community had no right to hold Germany accountable for human rights abuses committed during 
the two world wars.  In addition, during these decades, the German judiciary seemed determined 
to excuse the conduct of those who committed mass atrocities during World War II on the 
grounds, among others, that those soldiers had simply been following superior orders.  However, 
because the treaties only required states to report their compliance to a committee with non-
binding powers, Germany could commit without worrying that compliance costs would ever be 
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great enough to result in a significant loss of its sovereignty.  As discussed in previous chapters, 
where international human rights treaties have weak or non-existent enforcement mechanisms, 
scholars and others have observed a tendency of many states to commit as window dressing only, 
rather than because they want to be bound by international human rights norms.  
The fact that in all instances Germany was slow to ratify any of the treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms provides further evidence that Germany has a tendency to act 
rationally and consider compliance costs when making its decisions about whether to commit to 
international human rights treaties.  Germany only ratified the treaties containing procedures for 
state complaints, individual complaints, or committee visits beginning in 1993.  In most cases, it 
did not ratify those treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms until after 2000.  
Accordingly, while Germany initially ratified only weak treaties, it increasingly ratified more 
constraining treaties, but only after its behavior and attitudes towards protecting human rights 
abuses changed.  However, because Germany put measures in place to deal with the likelihood 
of future human rights violations and improved the ability of its legal institutions to deal with 
those issues, the costs of complying with those international human rights treaties decreased – 
even though the treaties themselves contained stronger enforcement mechanisms.  Indeed, the 
data collected by Amnesty International and the State Department indicate that by the time 
Germany ratified these treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms, its human rights 
practices were among the very best.  Since 1990, Germany has consistently scored 7 or 8 out of a 
possible 8 on the physical integrity rights scale (except for one year where it received a 6).
202
   
Strong Leadership in Negotiations and Support for a Strong Court 
In addition to increasingly binding itself to international human rights treaties 
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with stronger enforcement mechanisms beginning in the 1990s, beginning in about that 
same time period, Germany played a significant leadership role in the creation of the 
ICC.  From the start of negotiations, Germany was a member of the like-minded group of 
states that supported a strong and independent prosecutor and court.  In fact, it was 
among the very few states that argued for universal jurisdiction over the core treaty 
crimes – a position which shows just how far Germany had evolved from its post-World 
War II position, wherein it argued that the Allies had no right to invade its sovereignty 
and punish its citizens for committing war crimes or crimes against humanity.  After the 
Rome Statute was adopted, William Pace, the Convenor of the NGO Coalition for an 
International Criminal Court commented on Germany‘s leadership role:  He stated:   
No country can be prouder than Germany of their participation and support for the 
ICC!  No country knows better than Germany the need for the ICC.  The German 
refusal to accepting what they called an ―alibi court,‖ and their resistance to the 
highly publicized United States threats to the German leaders during the Rome 
Conference deserves great appreciation by the world community.
203
  
  
Given its past, it seems surprising that Germany would take a leadership role in creating 
and supporting an international criminal court with strong enforcement powers.  However, the 
past is the past.  By the time the ICC was becoming a reality, Germany had the kind of human 
rights practices and institutions that would make compliance with treaty terms relatively costless 
even in the case of a human rights treaty with the very strongest enforcement mechanisms.  And, 
by its active role in negotiations, it demonstrated its awareness of the strength of the ICC‘s 
enforcement mechanisms.  Furthermore, not only did it already have good practices at the time 
the ICC was being created, but also after its creation, Germany took additional steps to make 
compliance even less costly:  it enacted domestic laws enabling it to prosecute any acts contrary 
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to the Rome Statute, thereby ensuring that its citizens would not have to be hauled to The Hague 
for prosecution.  Thus, Germany‘s decision to push for a strong and independent ICC and to 
commit to the ICC is rational because its compliance costs, and its risks to sovereignty, are 
minimal even though the court‘s enforcement mechanisms are relatively strong. 
However, and while I do argue that compliance costs and the credible threat theory best 
explain Germany‘s decision to ratify the ICC, there may be other factors that contribute to 
explaining Germany‘s leadership role in pushing for such a strong and independent court.  First, 
because of its past experience with Nuremberg, it makes sense that Germany would want to 
ensure that any international criminal court was not created with the same perceived flaws.  
Germany‘s negotiating positions show that it wanted a court that would fairly dispense justice to 
any and all who committed mass atrocities, rather than a court that dispensed justice for political 
reasons or only to those who were the losers in battle.  By participating in a the creation of a 
court that clearly defined the crimes over which it would have jurisdiction, Germany was 
ensuring that that states and individuals were clearly warned that their conduct violated 
international law before the international community could play a role in prosecuting them.   
Finally, although the evidence is consistent with the idea that Germany would not have 
ratified the ICC treaty but for a rational calculation that ratification would impose few 
compliance costs, individuals – particularly Hans-Peter Kaul – were instrumental in developing 
Germany‘s positions vis-à-vis the court and in arguing for its importance.  Of course, in the 
absence of these individuals, other German leaders may have filled the void.  However, as can be 
seen below, Hans-Peter Kaul and a few others played a decisive role in the causal chain that led 
to Germany‘s ratification of the Rome Statute and may have caused Germany to play a larger 
role in the creation of the court than it otherwise would have.  They also may have made the 
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country‘s commitment to the ICC more prompt or stronger than it otherwise would have been.  
Therefore, although the evidence still shows Germany ratified the treaty rationally knowing that 
it could and would comply with treaty terms, case study analysis has identified some individual 
drivers that contributed to determining Germany‘s behavior in ICC negotiations and thereafter.   
Below, I examine Germany‘s role in the creation of the ICC by looking at the 
specific proposals it made, and the positions it took, regarding the terms and content of 
the ICC treaty beginning from the adoption of the 1994 International Law Commission 
Draft Statute, up to and including the negotiations during the Rome Conference.  I focus 
primarily on a core set of issues which tended to produce great debate amongst the 
various state delegations inasmuch as they were relevant to the potential strength and 
independence of the prosecutor and the court.  Those issues include (1) the court‘s 
exercise of jurisdiction, including the role of the Security Council in referring cases; (2) 
the powers of the prosecutor to commence cases; and (3) the nature of state cooperation 
regarding the surrender of nationals to the ICC.  
Germany’s Initial Position on the ICC  
Official records of the various negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Rome 
Statute indicate that Germany supported the idea of an international criminal court, and more 
specifically, a powerful and independent prosecutor and court.
204
  Among other things, Germany 
stated in its comments in connection with the ILC 1994 Draft: 
Germany is one of the countries that for years have been advocating stronger 
jurisdiction in international relations.  In the various multilateral organizations, 
especially the United Nations, Germany has regularly explained why it considers 
the creation of an international criminal court necessary.  The unbearably large 
number of regional conflicts which lead to massive violations of human rights and 
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humanitarian international law shows the urgency of practical steps to establish a 
universal system of criminal jurisdiction.  Developments of recent years justify 
the hope that this goal can now be attained.
205
   
 
Furthermore, although comments were very general at this early stage of the proceedings 
since the exact nature and scope of the court had yet to be determined, Germany did 
express an interest in a treaty-based court with sufficient ―legitimacy and universality‖ to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction.  In addition, Germany argued that even if the court did 
have a link to the United Nations, such link should not be allowed to ―impair its 
independence and integrity.‖  It also proposed that the ―court‘s jurisdiction should be as 
comprehensive as possible.‖  Finally, it supported allowing the Security Council to ―be in 
a position to submit specific cases to the court.‖ 206  
The Issue of the Court’s Jurisdiction 
Germany continued to argue for a strong and independent court over the next several 
years when the proceedings moved from more general discussions to purposeful engagement 
with statutory language and the drafting of legal text.  First, regarding the highly-contentious 
issue of jurisdiction, and unlike many other states, Germany consistently proposed the court be 
given broad inherent jurisdiction over the core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes.  Early ILC drafts reflected state sovereignty concerns and allowed states to limit or 
extend their acceptance of the ICC‘s jurisdiction over particular crimes and/or for particular time 
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periods – an ―opt-in‖ regime.207 A French proposal to the Preparatory Committee in August 1996 
called for a jurisdictional regime whereby all states affected by a case would have to give their 
consent in order for the ICC to proceed (for example, the state of the territory where the crime 
was committed, the state of the nationality of the victim, and the state of the nationality of the 
victim).
208
  The United States pushed for a regime whereby the court‘s jurisdiction would be 
triggered by a Security Council referral (which would thereby put a lot of the power in the hands 
of the powerful countries who are permanent members of the Council).  Germany, however, 
submitted a proposal – and continued to push for a proposal – which envisioned a much broader 
role for the court.  Its February 1996 proposal read:  ―A State which becomes a party to the 
Statute thereby accepts the inherent jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the [core] crimes . . 
..‖209    
Germany continued to argue for universal jurisdiction before and during the Rome 
Conference.  In March 1998, it submitted to the Preparatory Committee an informal discussion 
paper where it again proposed that state parties automatically accept the jurisdiction of the court 
with respect to the core crimes.
210
  Germany explained the reason for its proposal as follows:   
Under current international law, all States may exercise universal criminal 
jurisdiction concerning the acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, regardless of the nationality of the offender, the nationality of the victims, 
and the place where the crime was committed.  . . . Given this background, there 
is no reason why the ICC – established on the basis of a Treaty concluded by the 
largest possible number of States – should not be in the very same position to 
exercise universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in the same manner as the Contracting Parties themselves.  By ratifying the 
Statute of the ICC, the States Parties accept in an official and formal manner that 
the ICC can also exercise criminal jurisdiction with regard to these core crimes.  
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This means that, like the Contracting States, the ICC should be competent to 
prosecute persons which have committed one of these core crimes, regardless of 
whether the territorial State, the custodial State or any other State has accepted 
jurisdiction of the Court.
211
  
 
The German proposal was generally supported by NGOs and many of the like-minded 
states – of which Germany was a leader212 and member, and which advocated for a strong and 
independent ICC.
213
  And, Germany‘s Minister of Justice reiterated Germany‘s support for an 
ICC with universal jurisdiction during the Rome Conference when he stated:  ―Germany is 
committed to the creation of a Court with automatic universal jurisdiction over the core crimes, 
including war crimes in internal conflicts . . ..‖214  However, in Rome, it ultimately became clear 
that enough states rejected the doctrine of universality, with the United States being a strong and 
vocal opponent against the idea.  Therefore, the German proposal was dropped from the 
Discussion Paper of July 6, 1998, eliminating it from consideration as an option.
215
  On July 17, 
1998, the final proposal on which states were permitted to vote included what is presently Article 
12 of the Rome Statute.  Article 12 provides that states accept the ICC‘s jurisdiction over the 
core crimes upon becoming parties, but that the court‘s exercise of jurisdiction over a case 
requires that either the state in which the acts occurred or the state whose national committed the 
crimes are parties to the ICC treaty.  In addition, based on a French proposal, pursuant to Article 
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124 of the Rome Statute, states may opt out of the court‘s jurisdiction for war crimes for a period 
of seven years.   
Although Germany did vote for the adoption of the Rome Statute complete with Article 
12, its representatives maintain that Germany would have preferred that states had backed its 
universal jurisdiction proposal.
216
 On the other hand, Hans-Peter Kaul also notes that without 
compromise, it would have been impossible to obtain broad state support for the creation of an 
international criminal court.
217
  Moreover, he suggests that the scope of the court‘s jurisdiction 
would have been even more limited had it not been for Germany‘s last minute efforts.  
Specifically, because of Germany, the jurisdictional regime did not have more opt-outs beyond 
that for war crimes for a seven-year period inasmuch as the French proposal had originally also 
applied to crimes against humanity.
218
  
The Role of the ICC Prosecutor 
Another extremely contentious issue during negotiations concerned the role and 
independence of the prosecutor, particularly as regards whether he would have power to initiate 
investigations on his own motion (proprio motu).
219
  In fact, the idea that the prosecutor would 
have such powers was initially considered so radical that the 1994 ILC Draft Statute contained 
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no provision for such powers.  By that draft, cases could only be commenced based on referrals 
from a State Party or the Security Council.  The pros and cons of allowing the prosecutor proprio 
motu powers, however, were debated during the Ad Hoc Committee meetings in 1995 and during 
the 1996 Preparatory Committee.  Eventually, states clearly divided into two camps.  By 1997, 
the like-minded states were strongly behind the idea of proprio motu powers.  They argued that 
these powers were essential to a strong and independent court which otherwise could face a 
situation where significant and important matters were not referred for political or diplomatic 
reasons.  Opponents, on the other hand, argued that an independent prosecutor might be tempted 
to initiate cases frivolously or for political reasons.
220
  Germany was a member of the like-
minded states and favored a strong an independent prosecutor. 
However, because there was strong opposition to the idea of a prosecutor with proprio 
motu powers, in 1998, it became clear that some compromises were again necessary if the like-
minded states were to have any hope of garnering support for their proposal.  Germany and 
Argentina proposed the compromise solution which eventually became Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute.
221
   To assuage critics who were concerned that an independent prosecutor would be 
tempted to mount frivolous or politically-motivated investigations, Germany and Argentina 
suggested some limited controls on the prosecutor‘s powers to mount investigations.  
Specifically, although the prosecutor would initially be able to conduct a preliminary 
investigation (based on information received by states, organizations, or other reliable sources), 
it would only be able to proceed further upon confirmation by the Court.  The proposal was well-
received because it reduced the power held in the hands of one individual, while at the same time 
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preserving an alternative whereby investigations could be mounted without state or Security 
Council support.
222
   
The Issue of State Surrender of Nationals to the ICC 
 Finally, another great debate – and one relevant to the court‘s power to effectively 
operate – centered on state obligations to cooperate in surrendering their nationals to the ICC.223   
In fact, Article 87(2) (b) of the 1998 Preparatory Committee Draft Statute originally allowed a 
State Party to deny a request for surrender if ―the person is a national of the requested State.‖224  
During Rome Conference negotiations, it became clear that a number of countries would not 
accept deleting this exception to the requirement to cooperate with the court because their 
constitutions expressly prohibited the extradition of their nationals.  China, Israel, Japan, 
Mexico, the United States, and a number of Arab states were among those that held fast to the 
idea that cooperation with the court should not include the obligation to surrender nationals to 
the ICC.
225
 Although Germany at the time had a constitutional prohibition on the extradition of 
its nationals, like other like-minded states, it nevertheless took the position that the prohibition 
would be inapplicable in the context of handing persons over to the ICC.
226
     
Not only did Germany support cooperation even where it would involve surrendering 
nationals, but also the German delegates played a role in persuading other states to adopt their 
view.
227
  Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress argued that the ordinary ―horizontal‖ approach to 
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cooperation, whereby states guarded their sovereignty in response to extradition requests from 
other states, is inappropriate ―in the context of an international judicial body responsible for 
judging international core crimes.‖228  They noted that the relationship between nations and the 
ICC was a vertical one where one could appropriately view the court‘s complementary 
jurisdiction as something of an extension of national jurisdictions.  Furthermore, they suggested 
that the goal of prosecuting international crimes was one that serves the international community 
as a whole, such that individual states should be supportive of the goal, rather than seek to 
subvert it by protecting their nationals against surrender to the court.
229
 In addition, from a 
practical standpoint, refusing to extradite nationals to the ICC would make for an essentially 
unworkable ICC.
230
   
Despite the efforts of Germany and others, however, the issue of whether states would be 
required to surrender their nationals to the court remained unresolved until the very conclusion of 
the Rome Conference.  In the end, however, states were persuaded that surrendering a national to 
the ICC was fundamentally distinguishable from interstate extradition, and also that the 
complementarity regime afforded some protection against surrender since the state could 
prosecute its nationals in its own domestic courts.  Thus, the Rome Statute states adopted 
envisions a powerful court to which states have obligated themselves to surrender their own 
nationals in the event they are unwilling or unable to prosecute them domestically.
231
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Germany’s Record on ICC Commitment and Compliance 
Germany‘s behavior after the Rome Conference is also consistent with that predicted by 
the credible threat theory in that it has acted as one would expect of a state with regular and high 
human rights and rule of law ratings, but also a state that believed in – and continues to believe 
in – the strength of the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms.  Germany readily signed and ratified the 
treaty creating the court.  In addition, it quickly amended its national laws to enable it to comply 
with the terms of the treaty and cooperate with the court.   
Signing and Ratification 
Germany went on record and signaled its intention to rapidly sign the Rome Statute 
during a United Nations General Assembly meeting on October 22, 1998.  The German 
representative, Mr. Westdickenberg, praised the creation of the ICC and its potential to deter 
individuals from committing atrocities by enforcing accountability where national courts were 
unwilling or unable to act.  He further acknowledged the impressive number of states that had 
already signed the ICC treaty, and indicated that Germany also planned to sign by the end of the 
year.
232
  Germany later honored that promise on December 10, 1998.   
Germany then began the work of passing a bill to permit it to ratify the Rome Statute.  At 
the first reading of the bill on ratification on February 24, 2000, the German Foreign Minister J. 
Fischer emphasized Germany‘s preference for a strong and workable court.  He stated: 
‗[A]nother goal in this framework must be to ensure that those States skeptical of 
the Court do not water down the compromise agreed in Rome.  Germany had 
hoped that Rome would come up with a more robust arrangement on the 
competence of the Court.  This aspect must not be weakened further.   
The integrity of the Rome Statute must be preserved so that the Court‘s 
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jurisdiction is not diluted.‘233  
 
Germany demonstrated its continued support for the court when on October 27, 2000 at the third 
reading of the ratification bill, Germany‘s legislature unanimously approved ratifying the Rome 
Statute.  At the invitation of Hans-Peter Kaul, Whitney R. Harris, a member of the United States 
prosecuting team at the IMT at Nuremberg, attended that reading.  He confirms that after 
extensive discussion, the bill was approved without a single dissenting vote, a fact which he 
suggests shows Germany‘s ―approval of the principles of the Nuremberg Trial.‖234  Thereafter, 
on December 11, 2000, Germany became the twenty-fifth state to join the court.   
Several issues concerning Germany‘s prompt commitment to the ICC and strong 
domestic legislative support for the court are worth noting as they relate to conclusions about 
why Germany ratified the Rome Statute.  First, the evidence fairly conclusively shows that 
theories about normative pressure do not explain Germany‘s commitment decision.  It was a 
leader, and not a follower, in negotiations regarding the creation of the court.  It was a leader 
even regionally amongst the European nations which were counted among the like-minded 
contingent.  For example, as discussed above, it did not back French proposals to weaken the 
jurisdiction of the court or side with France and Great Britain when they initially supported a 
larger role for the Security Council in determining which cases could be brought before the ICC.  
Furthermore, while NGOs tended to favor the same positions as those advocated by Germany 
and the like-minded states, there is no evidence that Germany adopted any of its negotiating 
positions or decided to commit to the court only because of NGO pressures.  Moreover, this is 
not a situation where Germany took positions or ratified the court in order to please other nations 
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that might be able to provide it with benefits.  In fact, it repeatedly stood up to the United States, 
a powerful country which it now counts amongst its greatest allies and supporters. 
Second, Germany was among the very first states to ratify the Rome Statute, even though 
its domestic ratification process is also very difficult since it requires legislative approval before 
the state can ratify an international treaty.  Recall that theory predicts that states with more 
difficult ratification processes will be less likely or slower to ratify international treaties.  But, 
Germany‘s legislature swiftly and unanimously ratified the ICC treaty.  Thus, even though Hans-
Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, among others, played great leadership roles during ICC 
negotiations, and even though they may have acted to persuade others within Germany to accept 
the idea of the ICC, the record shows that Germany‘s entire government was behind ICC 
ratification.  And, by the statement made during the first reading of the bill to the legislature, all 
in the government must have been made aware that the enforcement mechanisms associated with 
the court were relatively strong – albeit not as strong as Germany would have preferred.  
Accordingly, this is not a case where rational concerns fell by the wayside because of the 
interests of a few individuals.  Rather, and as the evidence discussing Germany‘s ICC domestic 
implementing legislation shows, Germany rationally considered ICC ratification and acted 
rationally to ensure that it could immediately comply with treaty terms, thereby further 
minimizing compliance costs. 
National Implementing Legislation 
At around the time of ratification and shortly thereafter, Germany amended its national 
laws to allow it (1) to prosecute domestically the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction and 
(2) to cooperate with the court in a number of respects, including in surrendering its own 
nationals.  In June 2002, the German legislature passed the Code of Crimes against International 
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Law (―CCAIL‖).  235  Although it does not always use the exact same wording as that used in the 
Rome Statute, the CCAIL essentially incorporates into German law the substantive criminal law 
prescriptions of the Rome Statute, thereby providing Germany with the legal framework to 
insure that the crimes covered by the ICC treaty can be punished domestically should they 
occur.
236
  Thus, it provides for universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide.
237
  Germany viewed these changes to its substantive laws as necessary because 
prior to the enactment of the CCAIL, Germany had never before codified war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.  Although it had codified the crime of genocide after it ratified the Genocide 
Convention, by the CCAIL, Germany updated terminology regarding that crime to make it 
consistent with the Rome Statute.
238
  Like the Rome Statute, the CCAIL provides no statute of 
limitations for the covered crimes.
239
   
On the other hand, the CCAIL does not contain special provisions incorporating the 
―general principles‖ contained in Articles 22 to 33 of the Rome Statute.  Those provisions relate 
to, for example, criminal participation and attempt, the irrelevance of official capacity, and the 
necessary mental state of the perpetrator.  Those matters are covered by general German criminal 
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law, the theory being that the CCAIL only needed to specifically track the Rome Statute where 
the norms or provisions of that Statute differed significantly from German criminal law.  As 
Professors Werle and Jessberger explain, whether those norms and provisions differ significantly 
can be a matter of debate.
240
  Nevertheless, Germany has enacted a code of international criminal 
laws which incorporates the crimes of the Rome Statute, thereby enabling Germany to prosecute 
mass atrocities should it need to do so in order to avoid a loss of its sovereignty to the ICC.
241
  
Moreover, given that Germany‘s human rights ratings are, and have been, quite high for the last 
two decades, the likelihood that Germany‘s government or citizens will commit such mass 
atrocities is probably quite low.    
It is worth noting that compliance with the Rome Statute does not by its terms 
specifically require states to incorporate prohibitions against war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or genocide into domestic legislation.  However, because the ICC treaty is based on a 
system of complementarity whereby the preference is for national prosecutions, and the ICC 
exists as a court of last resort, states are essentially encouraged to ensure that their domestic laws 
allow them to prosecute mass atrocities domestically.  Therefore, while failing to implement 
domestic legislation criminalizing the crimes covered by the ICC treaty will not necessarily 
result in a conclusion that the state is unable to prosecute, states that fail to implement such 
legislation may face a greater risk to their sovereignty since the ICC may conclude in a particular 
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situation that they are unwilling or unable to prosecute a crime domestically.
242
  With that said, 
of course, there are different ways for states to ensure that they can prosecute mass atrocities 
domestically, and whether they need to fully amend their criminal code will depend on the state 
of existing national law.  For example, in some cases, implementation has involved only the need 
to extend domestic jurisdiction to cover crimes committed outside state territory.
243
    
Germany, however, chose to fully incorporate the ICC crimes into its domestic legislation 
by way of a separate code which addressed only international crimes.  Hans-Peter Kaul 
explained this choice during an event hosted by the CICC during a Preparatory Commission 
meeting at United Nations headquarters in April 2002.
244
  He noted that prior to enactment of the 
CCAIL, Germany would not have been able to punish war crimes or crimes against humanity per 
se.  Germany would have had to proceed, instead, by charging, for example, the crime of murder 
or inflicting grave bodily harm.  In addition, the state wanted to clarify that universal jurisdiction 
covered these mass atrocities by including that provision in a new draft code for international 
crimes since Germany‘s judiciary had previously interpreted universal jurisdiction in its criminal 
code for genocide restrictively.  Furthermore, Kaul explained that Germany had to reformulate 
these crimes in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a crime must have been clearly 
determined and specifically prohibited at the time the act was committed.
245
     
 Germany also amended its constitution and laws in order to allow it to cooperate with the 
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ICC.  First, on December 4, 2000, Germany amended its constitution (Basic Law 16) to allow 
German nationals to be surrendered to the ICC.
246
  Contemporaneously with the passage of the 
CCAIL, Germany also passed the Law on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court 
(―ICC Cooperation Act‖).247  That Act governs, among other things, Germany‘s obligations to 
cooperate with the ICC in surrendering suspects.
248
  It addresses other aspects of cooperation as 
well, such as enforcing any orders of forfeiture issued by the ICC.
249
  Furthermore, for example, 
it states that Germany may waive any claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred by 
cooperation with the ICC.
250
  
 As with Germany‘s ratification decision, these acts, too, demonstrate Germany‘s 
commitment to the ICC and its intention to comply with treaty terms.  They also evidence a 
country that is determined to ensure that the compliance costs associated with complying with 
ICC treaty terms are minimized.  Moreover, it is again worth noting that the constitutional 
amendment and the enactment of comprehensive legislation incorporating the substantive crimes 
covered by the ICC treaty into its domestic laws required the government as a whole to act – not 
just a few individuals.  While those individuals may have been drivers in persuading Germany to 
support a strong and independent ICC, those individuals did not, and could not, make Germany‘s 
commitment decision.  That decision was made by the government as a whole, and the evidence 
shows that rational concerns for compliance and avoiding costly losses of sovereignty were of 
critical importance.   
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Germany’s Leadership Role in Advancing Commitment and Compliance Post-
Ratification 
 
 Germany has continued as a leader in advancing commitment to, and compliance with, 
the ICC treaty post-ratification.  For example, the website for Germany‘s Federal Foreign Office 
describes Germany‘s role in supporting the ICC and in implementing conforming domestic 
legislation, and states that ―the German Government will continue to do its utmost to ensure that 
the ICC can work as effectively as possible and that it receives broad support from the 
international community.‖251 And, since ratification, Germany‘s spokespeople have called on 
other states to join the court.  In its ratification press release, Hans-Peter Kaul ―reiterated his 
country‘s firm hope that States that had not done so would sign and ratify the Rome Statute as 
early as possible.‖  He particularly beseeched the United States to promptly join the court.252  
Kaul has continued to appeal to the United States, arguing that the court needs American support 
politically, morally, and materially.
253
   
 In addition, Germany has been a leader in calling for states to abide by their treaty 
obligations.  More generally, Hans-Peter Kaul has argued that states should support the 
overarching goals of the ICC treaty and prosecute any core crimes in their domestic courts so as 
to minimize the burden on the ICC.  At the same time, he encouraged states to promote the 
universal character of the ICC and to persuade other states to join.
254
   
Finally, Germany voiced strong opposition to the bilateral immunity agreements the 
United States was asking states to sign, which agreements required them to refuse (even if they 
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were a member of the ICC) to surrender American government or military personnel to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.
255
 Although numerous states ultimately signed such agreements, 
Germany did go on record opposing them on the grounds that they appeared to undermine the 
court and state obligations to the court. 
As with the evidence discussed in the prior section, these facts also support the idea that 
Germany did not commit to the court because of normative pressures.  Instead, it continues to 
take an active and vocal leadership role in advocating the benefits of the court to others, even 
those that, like the United States, have been vocally opposed to the court.  Indeed, during 
negotiations, and in connection with the bilateral immunity agreements, Germany repeatedly 
stood up to the United States.  
Germany and the ICC:  Assessing the Explanatory Power of the Credible Threat 
Theory   
 
Based on the evidence outlined above, Germany‘s behavior in ratifying the Rome Statute 
is consistent with the credible threat theory and the argument that states that are more able to 
comply with treaty terms are also more likely to commit to treaties with strong enforcement 
mechanisms.  In quickly committing to the ICC, Germany acted as one would expect for a state 
with consistently good human rights and rule of law ratings.  Its ratings on both variables suggest 
that its costs of complying with the treaty will be minimal and that it will face little risk that its 
citizens will be hauled before the ICC in The Hague to be prosecuted for having committed mass 
atrocities.  Thus, even if the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms are as strong as they appear on 
paper, and even though they are relatively strong compared to the enforcement mechanisms 
associated with previous human rights treaties, Germany‘s costs of compliance are minimal.  
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Moreover, Germany has gone further to minimize that risk – and also acted in a way that 
suggests it does believe the ICC has the powers it appears to have on paper to haul perpetrators 
of mass atrocities before the ICC where the responsible state fails to act domestically – by 
passing the CCAIL.  Germany has ensured that it has the national legal framework to allow it to 
domestically prosecute any mass atrocities in the event they occur.    
Germany‘s behavior in connection with the creation of and commitment to the ICC is, of 
course, striking given Germany‘s history of human rights abuses and its earlier refusal to accept 
that the international community should be able to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses 
accountable for their actions.  Following both of the World Wars, Germany clung fiercely to 
ideas of sovereignty and the right of a state to do as it pleased both without and within its 
territory.  It passed discriminatory laws, it committed mass atrocities against its own people, and 
when confronted, it and its citizens appeared to take the position that the acts committed should 
not be subject to criminal sanction – particularly by the world community.  Germany and its 
citizens particularly refused to accept the idea that its actions could violate international law 
where it had acted only against its own citizens – as where it carried out its policy to exterminate 
Jews within Germany.   
But, those times have passed.  This case study has shown that beginning in the 1960s, a 
new generation of younger Germans began playing a greater role in shaping state policy.  This 
generation believed in protecting against human rights abuses and ending impunity for those that 
committed mass atrocities.  The state provided resources to make the investigation of Nazi 
atrocities possible, and the new generation of prosecutors and judges actually had some success 
in holding Nazi perpetrators accountable for their actions.  In the 1990s, with German 
reunification, Germany had even more reason to ensure that human rights abusers did not go 
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unpunished since it was German people who had suffered at the hands of Russians while under 
occupation.  Thus, while German judges had previously accepted defenses of superior orders and 
non-retroactivity of criminal law, among others, in the 1990s, they instead found themselves 
concluding that state-sponsored crime would have to yield to justice and a respect for human 
rights.  That the human rights ratings assigned to Germany by outside entities were also very 
high during the 1990s provides additional evidence that Germany had evolved into a state that 
respected and protected human rights.   
Accordingly, an exogenous change in Germany‘s own practices and policies caused it to 
be the kind of state that would support a strong and independent ICC to which it promptly 
committed.  Because by the time it participated in ICC negotiations and thereafter, Germany had 
good human rights practices and good domestic law enforcement institutions, Germany acted 
consistent with the credible threat theory and ratified the ICC treaty.  Indeed, I argue that 
although compliance costs related to ICC treaty terms and the credible threat theory may not 
completely explain all aspects of Germany‘s behavior in committing to the Rome Statute, it 
better explains Germany‘s swift commitment to the ICC than do the other relevant theories.  
First, this is not a case where the credible commitment theory is even relevant, since at the time 
of ratification, Germany possessed – and it continues to possess – good human rights ratings.  
Second, normative theories similarly fail to explain Germany‘s ICC ratification behavior.  For 
example, there is no evidence to suggest that Germany committed because of normative 
pressures.  Instead, it was a leader, both internationally and regionally, in pushing for a strong 
and independent court and in encouraging others to commit to the court and abide by their 
obligations to comply with treaty terms.  In addition, Germany willingly and vocally battled 
other powerful countries in pushing for its idea of a strong and independent court.   
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Furthermore, by committing to the court so promptly, Germany acted contrary to the 
predictions of some of the other rationalist view theories.  For example, unlike other powerful 
nations with large military presences like the United States and China, Germany ratified the ICC 
treaty.  And, by its negotiating presence and the fact that it passed domestic legislation codifying 
into its national laws the crimes covered by the ICC treaty, Germany obviously knew that the 
treaty covers war crimes.  But, because its domestic human rights practices are good and because 
it has the domestic institutions and laws to enable it to prosecute any war crimes domestically, 
Germany could still act rationally in concluding the costs of ICC commitment would be minimal 
from a sovereignty standpoint.  In addition, as discussed above, Germany promptly ratified the 
ICC treaty despite its difficult domestic ratification processes – and it did so by a unanimous vote 
of the legislature.  Not only does this show that Germany‘s support for the court expands well 
beyond the individuals who were engaged in ICC negotiations, but also it shows that the German 
government as a whole was well-aware of the commitment it was making by joining the court.     
Finally, while Germany‘s past and a desire to ensure that its state and citizens never again 
commit the atrocities they did during the Nazi era may explain some of Germany‘s motivation 
for joining the ICC, theories about locking in state behavior for newly democratizing countries or 
for states that have recently experienced civil wars cannot explain Germany‘s decision to ratify 
the ICC treaty.  First, German was not a newly democratizing nation at the time it ratified the 
treaty.  Nor had it very recently experienced civil wars or a situation where its government was 
inclined to respond violently in response to challenges to its power.  Moreover, the evidence 
does not suggest Germany would have joined the court if its practices were not consistent with 
permitting immediate compliance with treaty terms.  After all, even though its human rights and 
rule of law ratings were very high, Germany still acted swiftly to pass domestic legislation 
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criminalizing the exact conduct covered by the ICC treaty.  It did so absent a requirement for 
implementing legislation and even though some states have concluded such legislation is not 
necessary.   
Nevertheless, while Germany‘s behavior in ratifying the ICC treaty is consistent with the 
credible threat theory, case study analysis has identified other factors that – although consistent 
with the theory – also help in understanding Germany‘s behavior.  In many ways Germany, by 
its actions in supporting a strong and independent court during negotiations and after ratification, 
has taken on a role that is beyond even what one might expect of a state with good human rights 
ratings and good domestic legal institutions.  As to this point, the evidence does suggest that 
individuals – and in, particular Hans-Peter Kaul – may have played a role.  Kaul was a leader in 
Germany‘s delegation in ICC negotiations from the very beginning.  And, he is a person who 
shares his views about the importance of the ICC to the world community through his speaking 
engagements and written works.  In fact, Claus Kress has credited Kaul as being instrumental in 
shaping Germany‘s new approach towards international criminal law.256  However, while the 
presence of Kaul may explain Germany‘s impetus to press for a court that was strong and 
independent or to support such a strong court, the evidence still shows that Germany committed 
to the ICC rationally and with knowledge that for it, ratification would pose few risks to its 
sovereignty.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO:  COMPLIANCE BEFORE NORMS 
 
As noted above, because of a request by Trinidad and Tobago on the floor of the United 
Nations in 1989, the ILC commenced drafting a statute for the establishment of an international 
criminal court.
257
  By that request, then-Prime Minster Arthur N.R. Robinson proposed creating 
an international criminal court to address the growing problem of drug trafficking and to 
facilitate the prosecution of those involved in narcotics trafficking across national frontiers and 
other transnational criminal activities.
258
  Trinidad and Tobago continued to push for a court that 
would include narcotics trafficking within its jurisdiction throughout the years of negotiations 
leading up to the establishment of the court.
 259
  It also focused its efforts on convincing other 
states that capital punishment should be included among the penalties that could be imposed 
upon persons convicted of crimes covered by the Rome Statute.
 260
  In the end, however, both 
proposals were rejected:  the ICC does not have jurisdiction over narcotics trafficking crimes, 
and the highest penalty the court can impose is life imprisonment.  In fact, because the Rome 
Statute was adopted without the inclusion of the death penalty, and because the death penalty 
was extremely popular domestically, Trinidad and Tobago regretted that it ―had to abstain in the 
vote for the adoption of the Statute‖ at the conclusion of the Rome Conference.261    
Yet, despite the fact that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over narcotics trafficking 
crimes and has no ability to impose the death penalty, Trinidad and Tobago promptly committed 
to the court.  It signed the Rome Statute on March 23, 1999.  It also became the second state to 
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ratify the treaty (after Senegal) on April 6, 1999.  Furthermore, by its post-ratification conduct, 
the country has acted as a strong supporter of the court.  It has issued statements encouraging 
other states to join and also to comply with treaty terms.  Moreover, further demonstrating its 
support for the court, and unlike some other States Parties, it refused to sign a bilateral immunity 
agreement with the United States even though by doing so, it lost important benefits.
 262
   
But, why would Trinidad and Tobago so promptly commit to the ICC given that the court 
that was created was not the one it envisioned – and needed – when it proposed an international 
criminal court in 1989?  Why would it thereafter show support for the court?  Of course, there is 
evidence that Trinidad and Tobago is normatively aligned with the court in that it appears to 
believe in international justice and seems to want to end impunity for those who commit 
international crimes.  However, the very fact that Trinidad and Tobago so promptly and heartily 
committed to a court that did not fit its wants or needs suggests that something beyond normative 
concerns was motivating the country‘s behavior.   
I suggest that although there are likely additional factors that led to Trinidad and 
Tobago‘s decision to ratify the Rome Statute, case study analysis supports the explanatory power 
of the credible threat theory.  In short, the evidence shows that Trinidad and Tobago acted 
rationally and considered the relative strength of the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms and its 
ability to comply with treaty terms in making its commitment decision.  Statements by Trinidad 
and Tobago‘s own representatives show that the country guards its sovereignty, but that it 
committed to the court and continues to support it because it knows the court poses no real threat 
to its material interests.  During debates in the Senate about a bill which was proposed to give 
effect to Trinidad and Tobago‘s obligations under the ICC treaty (the International Criminal 
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Court Bill), one Senator explained:   
The Bill does not infringe our sovereignty.  The International Criminal Court will 
only become involved when our courts fail to bring to effective justice those 
individuals who have committed crimes that fall under the purview of the 
International Criminal Court.  The statute would have the effect of putting 
pressure on our local jurisdiction to prosecute those brutal offenders, since our 
failure to do so will involve automatic involvement of the International Criminal 
Court in our jurisdiction.
 263
 
 
In addition, the idea that Trinidad and Tobago only would have committed to the ICC 
after concluding that commitment would not be against its material interests is supported by an 
examination of the country‘s behavior in connection with other human rights treaties.  That 
evidence shows that Trinidad and Tobago carefully guards its sovereignty and does not commit 
to treaties that run counter to its domestic interests or with which it has no intention of 
complying.  At present, for example, the country is only a party to the international human rights 
treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms that require self-reporting.  In fact, it has not 
committed to the CAT – a treaty which by its terms has not specifically exempted imposition of 
the death penalty from the definition of ―torture.‖  And although Trinidad and Tobago was 
briefly a member of the ICCPR Optional Protocol allowing for individual complaints, it 
withdrew from that treaty after a unique set of circumstances created a situation whereby 
committee and court actions began affecting the country‘s domestic death penalty policies in a 
way that it probably could not have anticipated when it joined.   
In this case, the evidence shows that Trinidad and Tobago should not find compliance 
with the ICC treaty‘s terms difficult – meaning that it could commit to the treaty without fearing 
a significant loss of its sovereignty.  First, the ICC treaty does not forbid states from imposing 
the death penalty domestically, and the country otherwise enjoys human rights ratings that 
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suggest its citizens will not commit the kinds of serious crimes that would be within the ICC‘s 
jurisdiction.  Thus, as with Germany, this is not a case where the credible commitment theory 
could explain Trinidad and Tobago‘s ratification behavior inasmuch as it is a state with a recent 
history of good human rights practices and an absence of government-sponsored violence.  For 
example, during the period between 1981 and 2008, Trinidad and Tobago has scored between 5 
and 8 on the physical integrity rights scale.  Also, since its independence from Great Britain in 
1962, Trinidad and Tobago has been a liberal democracy, scoring between 8 and 10 on the 
democracy scale which ranges from 0 to 10.  It has received a 10 on that scale since 1997.   
Second, since its human rights practices are good, Trinidad and Tobago should still be 
able to comply with the ICC treaty even though its rule of law ratings are not strong
264
 and 
reports indicate the country‘s police and judiciary are underfunded and do not operate 
efficiently.
265
  Moreover, by passing the International Criminal Court Bill referenced above, the 
country has since improved its domestic law enforcement capabilities as they relate to ICC 
compliance:  Trinidad and Tobago now has laws enabling it to prosecute the same crimes 
covered by the ICC domestically.  In short, even though the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms are 
relatively strong, since it should not expect that its government or citizens will commit mass 
atrocities, commitment to the ICC imposes relatively minimal sovereignty costs on Trinidad and 
Tobago.  
This chapter proceeds by tracing Trinidad and Tobago‘s participation in the creation of 
the ICC, which participation culminates with its decision to promptly commit to the court.  I then 
look at Trinidad and Tobago‘s behavior in connection with other international human rights 
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treaties in an effort to generate a more complete picture of what factors influence its commitment 
decisions.  Finally, in the conclusion to this chapter, I assess the credible threat theory and other 
competing theories in light of Trinidad and Tobago‘s behavior up to and following ratification of 
the Rome Statute and explore how and whether each is able to explain that behavior.  Although 
the conclusions regarding the explanatory power of the credible threat theory to explain Trinidad 
and Tobago‘s decision to join the ICC are necessarily provisional, those conclusions are 
strengthened by the fact that the alternative explanations for state commitment to the ICC are 
less consistent with the data and the historical record.   
The Proposal to Establish an International Criminal Court that Could Meet 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Domestic Needs 
  
The Impetus:  The Narcotics Trafficking Problem in Trinidad and Tobago   
Trinidad and Tobago‘s then-Prime Minister Arthur N.R. Robinson proposed establishing 
an international court to deal with the problems associated with international narcotics trafficking 
that were plaguing the small nation of Trinidad and Tobago (a nation of some 1.3 million 
citizens), as well as other countries in the Caribbean.
266
  Trinidad and Tobago lies just seven 
miles off the coast of Venezuela, and according to International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Reports (―INCSR‖) issued by the United States Department of State, even today it serves as a 
convenient transshipment point for cocaine, marijuana, and heroin.
267
  Although those reports are 
not available for the period preceding 1996, reports issued towards the end of 1990s shed some 
light on the nature of the narcotics trafficking situation in Trinidad and Tobago during the time 
period leading up to the creation of the court.  For example, the 1997 INCSR for Trinidad and 
Tobago notes that the country was increasingly being targeted as a transit point for cocaine 
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destined for the United States and Europe because of the relative ease with which maritime and 
air traffic was able to enter the country with illicit cargo undetected – due in part to the country‘s 
lack of money and equipment to aid in that detection.  Many small boats were able to travel 
between Venezuela and Trinidad without inspection because Trinidad did not have a supply of 
serviceable coast guard boats.  Low-flying aircraft could also enter at will because at the time, 
Trinidad and Tobago did not have radar capability to detect them.  Smugglers also believed that 
it would be easier to conceal their illicit drugs given the large volume of cargo and human traffic 
that emanated from Trinidad and Tobago.  Furthermore, they perceived that law enforcement 
would less vigorously scrutinize cargo originating from Trinidad and Tobago as opposed to a 
country that was known for producing illicit drugs.  In terms of quantities, the Report estimates 
that up to 2000 kilograms of cocaine passed through Trinidad and Tobago every month.    
Aside from the inability to detect and/or seize more than a small part of the narcotics 
traveling through the country, Trinidad and Tobago has also had difficulty dealing with other 
crimes that occur as a result of narcotics trafficking activities.  Most significantly, the growing 
drug trade resulted in an increase in drug-related murders – of competing drug traffickers and of 
the witnesses who would testify against drug traffickers.
268
  For example, Trinidad and Tobago‘s 
Attorney General Ramesh Maharaj reported that protecting witnesses had become one of its 
biggest problems in going after drug cartels.  He explained that in response to the country‘s 
crackdown on drug trafficking, some 14 or 15 key witnesses had been murdered in the five years 
preceding 1999.
269
 Indeed, frustrated with the growing level of violent drug-related crimes, in 
1999, and despite the appeals of human rights groups, Trinidad and Tobago broke a five-year 
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hiatus on implementing the death sentences of the prisoners held on its death row when it hanged 
nine members of Trinidad‘s notorious Dole Chadee gang.270  Apparently the star witness in the 
case against Chadee and his men (whose murder for which they were hanged) was found shot, 
hacked, and burned to death as soon as he left protective custody.  The government only 
managed to convict the gang because the witness had previously recounted his testimony in a 
sworn affidavit.
271
  The hangings were met with approval by the majority of this nation which 
opinion polls showed Trinidadians strongly supported as a deterrent to violent crime.
272
   
Trinidad’s Support for a Court with Jurisdiction over Narcotics Trafficking Offenses 
and with Authority to Impose the Death Penalty 
 
Although official records show that Trinidad and Tobago generally sided with the like-
minded group of states in backing a strong and independent court,
273
 in terms of its specific 
proposals, it was particularly interested in a court that would have jurisdiction over narcotics 
trafficking offenses and also the authority to impose the death penalty upon persons convicted of 
the crimes covered by the Rome Statute.  For example, on June 16, 1998 during the Rome 
Conference, Trinidad and Tobago‘s Attorney General Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj made a plea 
for including ―illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs across national frontiers and other transnational 
criminal activities‖ within the court‘s jurisdiction.  He reasoned: 
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The court‘s jurisdiction should be extended to internal armed conflicts.  The illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs is having devastating effects in the Caribbean region.  
Drug traffickers‘ actions ought to be regarded as a most serious crime of 
international concern.
274
 
 
On the 14
th
 of July, at the very conclusion of the Rome Conference, Trinidad again made 
its plea to include narcotics trafficking within the court‘s jurisdiction, this time by a 
formal proposal which it submitted together with Barbados, Dominica, India, Jamaica, 
Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
275
  
During negotiations, Trinidad and Tobago also focused its efforts on convincing other 
states that capital punishment should be included among the penalties that could be imposed 
upon persons convicted of crimes covered by the Rome Statute.  Joined by several other 
Caribbean and Arab governments, Trinidad and Tobago, in fact, insisted on publicly debating the 
idea despite knowing that the majority of states opposed the inclusion of the death penalty.
276
  
Thus, on July 2, 1998, the country argued on behalf of 14 Caribbean states to include the penalty 
within the statute.  It also emphasized that it would continue to apply the death penalty under its 
own domestic law whether or not the penalty was included within the ICC treaty.
277
   
Ultimately, however, Trinidad and Tobago‘s proposals concerning both narcotics 
trafficking and the death penalty were rejected.  As to the proposal to include narcotics 
trafficking within the crimes covered by the Rome Statute, most governments believed 
that the ICC‘s jurisdiction should be limited to the three core crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.  They argued, among other things, that limiting the 
number of crimes over which the court had jurisdiction would simplify negotiations and 
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lead to more broad-based support for the court.
278
 Some also argued that the crime of 
narcotics trafficking was best handled by national courts.
279
  By way of compromise, the 
parties agreed on a resolution to consider at a future Review Conference ―the crimes of 
terrorism and drug crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their 
inclusion in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.‖280   
Trinidad and Tobago was granted no such compromise with respect to the death penalty 
issue, and it was that issue that apparently created questions about whether it would vote for the 
establishment of the ICC – even though it had proposed the idea of an international criminal 
court.  Although Trinidad and Tobago had made clear during the debates that it would continue 
to apply the death penalty under its own domestic laws regardless of whether that penalty was 
included within the Rome Statute, it still faced the problem of a domestic population, more than 
70% of whom supported capital punishment.  By joining the ICC, it did not want to create the 
impression that it was opposed to the imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes.  In fact, 
the death penalty remained so politically popular domestically that even as the debate about the 
death penalty proceeded during ICC negotiations, the government of Trinidad and Tobago was 
expediting procedures to execute several convicted murderers.
281
   
Ultimately, the question about whether Trinidad and Tobago would vote for the 
establishment of the court was answered in the negative:  at the conclusion of the Rome 
Conference, it abstained in the vote for the adoption of the statute and referenced the failure of 
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the treaty to include the death penalty as punishment among the reasons for its abstention.
282
   
Ratification of the ICC Treaty 
 Yet, as noted above, Trinidad and Tobago acted rather promptly to sign and ratify the 
Rome Statute, notwithstanding that the ICC that was created was not the international criminal 
court that Trinidad and Tobago needed or wanted.  The country perceived itself as plagued by a 
narcotics trafficking problem that was imposed upon it by others.  Because of its location near 
narcotics-producing states and its location near narcotics-consuming states, Trinidad and Tobago 
found its tiny nation overwhelmed by the problems associated with being a narcotics-trafficking 
transfer state.  Because it was a small state without significant resources, it asked for the 
assistance of the international community to help it prosecute – and thereby deter – these 
international narcotics traffickers who were plaguing its small island community.  But, even 
though the international community rejected Trinidad and Tobago‘s plea to establish an 
international court to handle narcotics trafficking crimes, and even though the international 
community rejected its argument that the potential penalties imposed for serious international 
crimes must include the death penalty, Trinidad and Tobago committed to the ICC.      
Research does not reveal any unequivocal answer as to how or why Trinidad and Tobago 
came to quickly ratify the Rome Statute despite the fact that the court did not include narcotics 
trafficking as a covered offense or the death penalty as an available sentence.  But, the evidence 
does suggest a couple of explanations – all of which are consistent with the credible threat theory 
and the idea that Trinidad and Tobago‘s commitment to the ICC would not impose significant 
sovereignty costs.  Although it has been plagued by drug problems, Trinidad and Tobago should 
not expect its citizens to commit the kinds of mass atrocities that are within the jurisdiction of the 
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ICC.  Rather, the state has relatively good human rights practices, and there is no evidence that 
its government is other than sincere in wishing to eradicate the problems posed by narcotics 
trafficking – through judicial, rather than extra-judicial, processes.  Accordingly, while several 
additional factors may have contributed to Trinidad and Tobago‘s decision to commit to the ICC, 
none of these additional factors or explanations lessen or detract from the explanatory power of 
the credible threat theory since the evidence still shows that based on retrospective calculations, 
commitment was both rational and relatively costless.   
First, there is evidence that Trinidad and Tobago is not only normatively aligned with the 
court (as one might expect, given that it is a state with relatively good human rights practices), 
but also there is evidence that it believed it would have additional opportunities to try to shape 
the court according to its wishes.  Statements by its leaders suggest that Trinidad and Tobago 
supports the idea of international justice and the idea of ending impunity for those who commit 
serious international crimes.
283
 Also, of course, by the compromise position adopted at the 
conclusion of the Rome Conference, Trinidad and Tobago was assured that it would be able to 
again raise the issue of including narcotics trafficking within the jurisdiction of the court.  
Trinidad and Tobago also suggested by a statement on October 21, 1998 – speaking on behalf of 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) – that it might be able to revisit the issue of the death 
penalty at a later date.
 284
 Consequently, even though it is unlikely that Trinidad and Tobago 
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would be able to convince other countries to allow the ICC to impose the death penalty, it could 
still rationally believe – especially given the compromise position on narcotics trafficking – that 
it would have additional opportunities to shape the court according to its wishes.      
Second, Trinidad and Tobago‘s swift ratification of the Rome Statute was also likely 
influenced by the fact that it – and Arthur N.R. Robinson in particular – was responsible for 
bringing the idea of an international criminal court to the forefront of international discussions in 
1989.  Indeed, there is contemporary evidence that the Caribbean community was particularly 
proud of the role then-President Robinson played in creating the court.  For example, by a 
Declaration dated March 18, 1999, the Caribbean states pledged their commitment to ensure the 
integrity of the Rome Statute and their commitment to pursue the process of ratification within 
the shortest possible time.  The first acknowledgement in that Declaration specifically noted the 
role played by President Robinson in creating the court.
285
 In addition, Robinson himself seemed 
proud of the role he played in prompting the international community to move towards the 
creation of an international criminal court.  In May 1998 before the Rome Conference, he stated 
that he considered this process of working towards the establishment of a strong, independent, 
and impartial International Criminal Court ―to be perhaps the most important‖ in which he had or 
shall ever be engaged in the course of his lifetime.
286
  Accordingly, even though the court was 
not designed precisely as Trinidad and Tobago had wished, because commitment would not 
otherwise be costly given the country‘s relatively good human rights practices, Trinidad and 
Tobago would have no reason to abandon a project it could claim to have had a role in creating.   
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 Furthermore, although Trinidad and Tobago could have faced domestic opposition to 
joining a court that did not support the death penalty, it was able to minimize those costs.  As 
noted above, Trinidad and Tobago suggested that it would continue to argue to include the death 
penalty among the punishments that could be imposed by the ICC.  Since it made this argument 
on behalf of CARICOM, the government may also have made such an argument to its domestic 
audience.  More significantly, however, the treaty ratification process allowed Trinidad and 
Tobago to minimize domestic ratification costs.  Treaty ratification in Trinidad and Tobago 
requires no approval by the legislature.  In addition, at the time of signing and ratification – 
March 23 and April 6, 1999, respectively – Arthur N.R. Robinson was the President of the 
Republic.  Therefore, although research did not reveal any documents stating as much, it may 
have been that President Robinson was instrumental in getting Trinidad and Tobago to promptly 
commit to the ICC.  Indeed, a search of Trinidad and Tobago‘s parliament website did not reveal 
any Senate or House debates on the decision to commit to the court in the time period from the 
conclusion of the Rome Conference up until April 1999.  Therefore, even though Trinidad and 
Tobago‘s public may not have wanted the country to commit to a court that could not impose the 
death penalty, domestic ratification costs were minimized by the ease of the country‘s ratification 
process.   
 Each of these explanations – while contributing to an understanding of why Trinidad and 
Tobago promptly joined the ICC despite the fact that the court as created was not the one it 
needed or wanted – is consistent with, and supportive of, the credible threat theory.  Specifically, 
even though the ICC treaty contains relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, Trinidad and 
Tobago could expect that its sovereignty costs in joining the court would be minimal.  Its human 
rights ratings are relatively good, and there is no evidence to suggest that the government 
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engages in or condones excessive violence:  in fact, it supported the death penalty precisely 
because it wanted to deter the violent crimes that were occurring as a result of the narcotics-
trafficking offenses that were plaguing the country.  In addition, Trinidad and Tobago has never 
experienced a genocidal episode or a violent civil war, facts which further suggest it faces little 
risk that its citizens will be the subject of an ICC investigation.  Moreover, unlike the United 
States, for example, Trinidad and Tobago does not have the kind of international military 
presence that could cause it to worry that its soldiers would be accused of committing war 
crimes.  In terms of military expenditures, Trinidad and Tobago ranks in the bottom 10% of 
states, and a review of UN Peacekeeping records for December of every year between 2000 and 
2009 shows that Trinidad and Tobago has not contributed any forces to such operations.   
Therefore, although other facts – such as the ease of domestic treaty ratification processes 
– may have contributed to Trinidad and Tobago‘s ability to swiftly ratify the Rome Statute – case 
study analysis supports the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  The evidence shows 
that Trinidad and Tobago would not suffer significant sovereignty costs by committing to the 
ICC treaty:  it stated as much in the debates concerning the potential passage of the International 
Criminal Court Bill.  That statement is particularly enlightening as to how Trinidad and Tobago 
viewed commitment to the ICC.  Initially, Senator Parvatee Anmolsingh-Mahabir highlighted the 
normative significance of the ICC, arguing that he fully supports the bill and that the country 
must not be diverted in its ―determination to prosecute and bring to justice those individuals who 
hide under the cover of a new state immunity to commit political crimes and atrocities of 
genocide, of crimes against humanity and war crimes.‖  He further stated that ―[w]e cannot be 
made to subscribe to the outdated and immoral aspects of ‗victor justice.‘‖  However, although 
the senator nodded his head to the normative importance of the ICC, his argument ultimately 
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rests on the fact that commitment to the ICC does not impose sovereignty costs.  He specifically 
stated: ―The Bill does not infringe on our sovereignty.  The International Criminal Court will 
only become involved when our courts fail to bring to effective justice those individuals who 
have committed crimes that fall under the purview of the International Criminal Court.‖287  Thus, 
the senator made clear that the costs of joining the ICC are not significant, and they are made 
even less significant by the fact that the country did pass the International Criminal Court Bill, 
thereby enabling national courts to prosecute any of the crimes covered by the ICC in the 
unlikely event that Trinidad and Tobago‘s citizens ever committed such offenses.   
Commitment to the International Human Rights Regime:   A Focus on 
Compliance Costs 
 
In addition, the idea that Trinidad and Tobago only would have committed to the ICC 
after concluding that commitment would not impose significant sovereignty costs or otherwise 
be against its material interests is supported by an examination of the country‘s behavior in 
connection with other human rights treaties.  That evidence also shows that Trinidad and Tobago 
carefully guards its sovereignty and is extremely calculating and strategic in making its decisions 
about whether to join human rights treaties.  As can be seen from Table 21, at present, Trinidad 
and Tobago is not party to any of the treaties that impose additional enforcement mechanisms on 
states parties beyond reporting.  In fact, it is not a party to the main Convention against Torture 
which only requires state reports.  Thus, even where the enforcement mechanisms are weak – as 
with the CAT treaty – Trinidad and Tobago does not join treaties with which it does not intend 
to, or cannot, comply.  Although Trinidad and Tobago has good human rights practices, it does 
impose corporal punishment, and it permits imposition of the death penalty as punishment for 
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certain crimes.  For these reasons, and as discussed in more detail below, joining the CAT could 
impose significant sovereignty costs by affecting Trinidad and Tobago‘s ability to impose these 
punishments domestically.   
Furthermore, although Trinidad and Tobago did join the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1980, it ultimately denounced it on March 
27, 2000 because of issues regarding how the Human Rights Committee‘s review of death row 
petitions was affecting the country‘s imposition of the death penalty domestically.  The country 
similarly denounced the American Convention on Human Rights (―American Convention‖)288 
because of the manner and timing of reviews of individual death row petitions by the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission (―IAHRC‖) and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (―IACtHR‖).  In both instances, Trinidad and Tobago denounced treaties imposing 
additional enforcement mechanisms – but only after events later showed that compliance with 
those treaties would impose significant sovereignty costs that it had not contemplated when it 
initially joined those institutions.  That compliance costs were the reason Trinidad and Tobago 
denounced those treaties is evidenced from its own statements.  It went on record stating that it 
would not be party to a regime with policies with which it had no intention of complying.
289
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Table 21:  Commitment to the Six Primary International Human Rights 
Treaties 
Treaty Enforcement Mechanism Date Open Ratification Date 
ICCPR Reports 1966 1978 
ICESCR Reports 1966 1978 
CERD Reports 1966 1973 
CEDAW Reports 1980 1990 
CAT Reports 1984 -- 
CRC Reports 1989 1991 
ICCPR Art. 41 State Complaints 1966 -- 
CAT Art. 21 State Complaints 1984 -- 
ICCPR Opt. Individual Complaints 1966 1980* 
CERD 14 Individual Complaints 1966 -- 
CAT 22 Individual Complaints 1984 -- 
CEDAW Opt. Individual Complaints 1999 -- 
CAT Opt. Committee Visits 2003 -- 
  
Below, I address the country‘s death penalty and corporal punishment practices and 
discuss how those practices likely informed its decision to decline to ratify the CAT, but 
nevertheless to ratify the ICCPR Optional Protocol and the American Convention.  I build on 
that discussion by tracing the events which culminated in Trinidad and Tobago‘s decision to 
denounce the ICCPR Optional Protocol and the American Convention.  I conclude that Trinidad 
and Tobago‘s behavior in failing to commit to the CAT and in denouncing the other human 
rights treaties was the result of rational and strategic calculations.  Trinidad and Tobago avoids 
international human rights treaties that are against its material interests and which significantly 
infringe on its sovereign rights to mete out justice as it deems appropriate.   
Trinidad and Tobago’s Death Penalty and Corporal Punishment Practices  
Both capital and corporal punishment are lawful penalties for certain crimes in Trinidad 
and Tobago.  For example, capital punishment was, and is, a legal sanction for murder in 
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Trinidad and Tobago – as well as in other English-speaking Caribbean nations.290  Moreover, as 
discussed above, imposing the death penalty as punishment for murder has enjoyed substantial 
popular support in the country as a desired means in which to deter the violent acts that 
accompany narcotics trafficking offenses.  Trinidad and Tobago also has a history of supporting 
the use of corporal punishment, including flogging and caning.  Pursuant to the Corporal 
Punishment Act of 1953, a court may order any male offender over the age of eighteen years to 
be struck or flogged with a ―cat-o-nine tails‖ if he has been convicted of certain crimes, such as 
rape.  Prior to its amendment in 2000, that same Act permitted flogging of male offenders over 
the age of sixteen.  
On the other hand, although the death penalty and corporal punishment are still lawful in 
Trinidad and Tobago, neither is frequently imposed.  A review of Amnesty International Country 
reports indicates that the country has not actually carried out an execution since the Chadee 
hangings in 1999.
291
 In addition, according to a 2005 Amnesty International Report, the 
government of Trinidad and Tobago stated that judicial corporal punishment had not been 
imposed since 2002.
292
 News searches, however, indicate that courts have imposed birch caning 
for sexual offenses and murder between 2006 and 2009.
293
     
Trinidad and Tobago’s Refusal to Ratify the Convention Against Torture 
 Nevertheless, even if the death penalty and corporal punishment are not frequently 
imposed, Trinidad and Tobago‘s preference for continuing to have both punishments on its law 
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books likely explains the country‘s strategic and rational decision to commit to, refuse to commit 
to, or withdraw from certain human rights treaties.  First, regarding Trinidad and Tobago‘s 
decision to refuse to commit to the CAT, both the language of the treaty and statements by the 
Committee Against Torture provide evidence showing that commitment to that treaty may 
impose significant sovereignty costs that the country would not wish to assume given its 
domestic penalty preferences.  The CAT – unlike the ICCPR and the American Convention – 
does not explicitly exempt from the definition of torture the lawful, and already established, 
imposition of the death penalty.  In addition, the Committee Against Torture has stated that it 
considers corporal punishment to constitute torture, even when national legislation permits such 
punishment.
294
      
A comparison of the language of the three treaties as relates to prohibitions on torture 
serves to illustrate the point about the relative costliness of commitment to the CAT for a state 
like Trinidad and Tobago which favors the possibility of imposing the death penalty as a lawful 
sanction.  Each of the CAT, the ICCPR, and the American Convention prohibits torture, or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
 295
  However, the language of the CAT treaty – 
in contrast to that of the ICCPR and the American Convention – does not specifically address the 
death penalty and acknowledge that states can impose it as punishment for serious crimes 
without running afoul of treaty terms.  For example, Article 6, paragraph 2, of the ICCPR 
provides:   
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
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imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the 
present Covenant . . . . This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgment rendered by a competent court.   
 
Article 4, paragraph 2, of the American Convention similarly provides:   
In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed only for 
the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent 
court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to 
the commission of the crime.  The application of such punishment shall not be 
extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply. 
 
Therefore, although the ICCPR and the American Convention ostensibly prohibit the 
same conduct as the later-enacted CAT, those treaties also make clear that states can legally 
impose the death penalty domestically without violating the treaty – whereas the CAT does not.  
Accordingly, because the CAT treaty did not expressly exempt from its definition of torture the 
lawful imposition of the death penalty, Trinidad and Tobago would understand that commitment 
to that treaty could prove costly as it would interfere with the country‘s sovereign right to impose 
a lawful penalty for certain crimes that it deemed deserving of such punishment.   
Commitment to, and Denunciation of, the ICCPR Optional Protocol and the American 
Convention 
 
 While there is no absolute evidence proving why Trinidad and Tobago has refused to 
commit to the CAT, the record is replete with evidence demonstrating that Trinidad and 
Tobago‘s denounced the ICCPR Optional Protocol and the American Convention for strategic 
and rational reasons related to its preference for continuing to be able to lawfully impose the 
death penalty.  Indeed, the evidence shows that even though those treaties contained additional 
enforcement mechanisms, Trinidad and Tobago was rational in committing to them because, as 
the treaty language set out above shows, both explicitly exempted from the definition of torture 
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the lawful imposition of the death penalty.  Trinidad and Tobago was equally rational and 
strategic in deciding to denounce both treaties when events transpired so as to impose a threat to 
its domestic penalty regime that it could not have foreseen when it initially committed to those 
treaties.   
By way of background, Trinidad and Tobago ratified the ICCPR in 1978.  Thereafter, in 
1980, it ratified the ICCPR Optional Protocol, by which it agreed that individuals could bring 
complaints against it alleging violations of treaty terms before the Human Rights Committee.  
The country also committed to the American Convention – which is a regional treaty modeled on 
the ICCPR – in 1991.  Parties to the American Convention are automatically subject to the 
jurisdiction of the IAHRC, a body which, like the Human Rights Committee, is only permitted to 
make findings and issue nonbinding recommendations to the governments accused by 
individuals of violating treaty terms.  In addition, however, in 1991, Trinidad and Tobago 
voluntarily recognized the jurisdiction of the IACtHR.  Although individuals cannot directly 
petition the IACtHR, the Commission has the option of referring to it any petitions it has been 
unable to settle amicably.  By the terms of the American Convention, the IACtHR is empowered 
to interpret the treaty‘s provisions and issue legally binding decisions on the cases before it as to 
any state that has recognized its jurisdiction.
296
   
To understand why Trinidad and Tobago took the unusual step of later denouncing the 
ICCPR Optional Protocol and the American Convention, one must first understand how the 
country‘s death penalty practices were affected by its death penalty review process and also its 
membership in these two treaties allowing for individual complaints.  First, and despite its 
independence from Great Britain in 1962, Trinidad and Tobago – like other Caribbean nations – 
retains as its highest court of appeal the London-based Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
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(the ―Privy Council‖).297 Thus, although the death penalty is a lawful punishment in Trinidad and 
Tobago, persons sentenced to death were able to appeal their convictions to the Privy Council.  
However, it was not until 1993, and the Privy Council‘s decision in Pratt v. Attorney General for 
Jamaica that the Privy Council‘s review of death penalty convictions posed a problem for 
Trinidad and Tobago.
298
  In Pratt, the Council held that carrying out a capital sentence after a 
five-year delay not the fault of the accused would be in contravention of a constitutional 
provision against cruel, inhumane, and degrading punishment.  Notably, delays resulting from 
domestic appeals processes (including to the Privy Council) and petitions to international human 
rights bodies were to be included in calculating the five-year time period.  Therefore, the Privy 
Council held that any death sentences for which the appeals and petition processes were not 
concluded within five years must be commuted to life imprisonment.
299
  As a result of the Pratt 
ruling, all Caribbean jurisdictions which had prisoners on death row in excess of five years were 
required to commute those sentences to life imprisonment.  Trinidad and Tobago immediately 
commuted the death sentences of fifty-three death row inmates.
300
   
 Not only did the Pratt decision cause Trinidad and Tobago to commute sentences of its 
death row inmates, but it also tied the country‘s ability to carry out its domestic death penalty 
policies to the timeliness of the review processes of the Human Rights Committee and the 
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IACtHR.  And, those review processes apparently were not quick to conclude since the tribunals 
had crowded dockets and were also part-time bodies that met only a few times per year.
301
 In 
addition, after the Pratt decision, capital defendants increased the number of death row petitions 
they filed before both the Human Rights Committee and the IAHRC.
302
    
While Trinidad and Tobago did make efforts to address the timing of international 
petition processes, its efforts in that regard were not successful.  For example, in 1995, 
Caribbean governments sought relief from the Privy Council, arguing that ―either the periods of 
time relating to applications to the human rights bodies should be excluded from the computation 
of delay or the period of five years should be increased to take account of delays normally 
involved in the disposal of such complaints.‖303  The Privy Council rejected this argument even 
though Barbados threatened to denounce the ICCPR Optional Protocol in the absence of a time 
extension.
304
  In addition, in August 1997, Trinidad and Tobago unilaterally issued instructions 
to the Human Rights Committee and the IAHRC requiring that these bodies complete their 
review process in approximately 7 months.
305
  The Human Rights Committee, however, 
immediately rejected the imposition of time limits, stating that time limits ―cannot be invoked as 
justification for any measure that would deviate from the Covenant, the Optional Protocol, or 
requests by the Committee for interim measures of protection.‖306  Thus, as a result of the Privy 
Council‘s decision, Trinidad and Tobago was effectively banned from imposing the death 
penalty domestically:  by invoking domestic and international review mechanisms, capital 
defendants were able to force the country to commute their sentences to life imprisonment. 
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 In 1998, after its efforts in seeking relief from the Pratt decision were soundly thwarted, 
Trinidad and Tobago took the unusual step of denouncing its treaty obligations under the ICCPR 
Optional Protocol and the American Convention.
307
  First, on May 26, 1998, Trinidad and 
Tobago denounced the ICCPR Optional Protocol and then re-acceded with a reservation that 
makes clear that its concerns with being a member of the treaty related to its being able to carry 
out its domestic penalty regime.  The reservation stated:   
Trinidad and Tobago re-accedes to the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a Reservation to article 1 thereof to 
the effect that the Human Rights Committee shall not be competent to receive and 
consider communications relating to any prisoner who is under sentence of death 
in respect of any matter relating to his prosecution, his detention, his trial, his 
conviction, his sentence or the carrying out of the death sentence on him and any 
matter connected therewith.  
 
Accepting the principle that States cannot use the Optional Protocol as a vehicle 
to enter reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
itself, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago stresses that its Reservation to the 
Optional Protocol in no way detracts from its obligations and engagements under 
the Covenant, including its undertaking to respect and ensure to all individuals 
within the territory of Trinidad and Tobago and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the Covenant (in so far as not already reserved against) as set 
out in article 2 thereof, as well as its undertaking to report to the Human Rights 
Committee under the monitoring mechanism established by article 40 thereof. 
 
However, in a December 1999 decision, the Human Rights Committee declared 
that the reservation was severable from the country‘s decision to re-accede to the treaty 
since it was incompatible with the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol.
308
  It 
stated that it could not ―accept a reservation which singles out a certain group of 
individuals for lesser procedural protection than that which is enjoyed by the rest of the 
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population.‖309  In response, on March 27, 2000, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the 
ICCPR Optional Protocol – this time, in its entirety.   
As to the American Convention, Trinidad and Tobago notified the Secretary General of 
the Organization of American States that it was withdrawing its ratification of that treaty on May 
26, 1998.
310
  Again, Trinidad and Tobago made clear that its reasons for withdrawing from the 
treaty related to the threat that treaty commitment was posing to its sovereign right to enforce its 
domestic lawful penalty regime.  Trinidad and Tobago argued that because the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights could not expedite petitions in death penalty cases, the result was 
that persons sentenced to capital punishment in its country would be subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment because of the delay in implementing that punishment in contravention of 
Article 5(2)(b) of the country‘s constitution.  It further noted that it would not ―allow the 
inability of the Commission to deal with applications in respect of capital cases expeditiously to 
frustrate the implementation of the lawful penalty for the crime of murder in Trinidad and 
Tobago.‖311 Pursuant to the terms of the American Convention, the withdrawal became effective 
one year later.
312
  
In sum, Trinidad and Tobago‘s decisions to denounce the ICCPR Optional Protocol and 
the American Convention were based on rational and strategic calculations regarding the 
costliness of treaty commitment.  The country joined both treaties – notwithstanding their 
stronger enforcement mechanisms – rationally believing that neither treaty would threaten its 
domestic penalty regime.  Indeed, both treaties expressly exempted from their definitions of 
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torture the lawful imposition of the death penalty by states that already had that penalty 
enshrined in domestic law.  And, it was only because of the Privy Council‘s 1993 decision 
requiring that death sentences be carried out within five years that Trinidad and Tobago became 
aware that its treaty obligations would interfere with its domestic death penalty practices.  
Moreover, it only denounced the treaties after the bodies that could consider individual death 
row petitions refused to commit to concluding their reviews of those petitions promptly enough 
so that Trinidad and Tobago could carry out its death sentences within the five-year period.  
Even then, it did not fully denounce the ICCPR Optional Protocol until its reservation carving 
out only death row petitions was rejected by the Human Rights Committee.  Only when events 
transpired to change the costliness of its treaty commitments in a way that Trinidad and Tobago 
could not have foreseen when it entered into the treaties did it make a calculated decision to 
denounce them.   
Trinidad and Tobago and the ICC:  Assessing the Explanatory Power of the 
Credible Threat Theory 
 
Trinidad and Tobago‘s behavior in ratifying the ICC treaty is consistent with the credible 
threat theory and the idea that states that are more able to comply with treaty terms are also those 
that are more likely to commit to treaties with strong enforcement mechanisms.  The evidence 
shows that Trinidad and Tobago acts rationally and retrospectively calculates compliance costs 
when determining whether or not to join international human rights treaties.  For example, the 
country refused to join the CAT treaty.  It also denounced the ICCPR Optional Protocol and the 
American Convention when later events (which Trinidad and Tobago could not have anticipated 
at the time it joined those treaties) showed that its continued commitment would significantly 
impinge on its domestic penalty regime.     
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In this case, however, commitment to the ICC should pose no significant sovereignty 
costs on Trinidad and Tobago – a fact which its own representative emphasized when supporting 
the passage of the International Criminal Court Bill.  Trinidad and Tobago‘s human rights ratings 
are, and have been, relatively high, and it otherwise has no reason to believe its citizens would 
commit the kinds of mass atrocities covered by the ICC treaty.  Furthermore, it is not a country 
that has experienced genocidal episodes in the past, nor has it experienced civil wars.  The 
country does have a problem with narcotics trafficking and associated crimes like murders, but 
those are not crimes covered by the ICC treaty.  Furthermore, as to the death penalty and 
corporal punishment, the death penalty is not illegal under international law, and it is not made a 
crime by the terms of the ICC treaty.  And, while some international human rights bodies have 
concluded that flogging can constitute torture, even that penalty – which is imposed for rape and 
similar crimes – would not constitute a crime covered by the ICC treaty.  The Rome Statute 
makes torture a crime only in the context of war crimes or crimes against humanity.  Because 
Trinidad and Tobago does not participate in international wars or in United Nations 
Peacekeeping efforts, its citizens are unlikely to commit war crimes.  Moreover, occasional 
judicially imposed floggings should not rise to the level of a crime against humanity, which 
requires a systematic attack against a civilian population.   
That Trinidad and Tobago has relatively weak domestic law enforcement institutions 
does not mean that it is unable to comply with the terms of the ICC treaty.  The quality of a 
country‘s law enforcement institutions is a component of ICC compliance, but domestic 
institutional capabilities are less relevant in this case because Trinidad and Tobago would not 
expect its citizens to commit the kinds of mass atrocities covered by the Rome Statute.  Again, 
the evidence from parliamentary debates shows that Trinidad and Tobago believes that its 
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commitment to the ICC will not result in a loss of sovereignty – since it can avoid ICC 
prosecutions if its citizens do not commit mass atrocities.  Furthermore, in February 2006, 
Trinidad and Tobago passed the International Criminal Court Bill, thereby making provision for 
the punishment of certain international crimes: namely, genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.  By passing the Act, not only did Trinidad and Tobago demonstrate that it views the 
ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat, but it also took steps to minimize its 
sovereignty costs by ensuring that it could prosecute domestically any crimes covered by the 
ICC‘s terms.313 Accordingly, even if Trinidad and Tobago‘s domestic legal institutions are weak, 
the country‘s ability to prosecute mass atrocities is now stronger than it was previously.   
Although compliance costs related to ICC treaty terms and the credible threat theory may 
not completely and definitively explain why Trinidad and Tobago committed to the ICC, I 
suggest that the theory is more explanatory than others that have been offered to explain state 
commitment to international human rights regimes.  First, and like Germany, because Trinidad 
and Tobago has good human rights practices and no recent history of government-sponsored 
violence, this is not a case where the credible commitment theory can explain its ratification 
behavior.  Similarly, this is not a case where the evidence suggests the country is committing in 
order to lock-in democracy or tie itself to a regime that will deter it from committing violent acts 
against its citizens.  Trinidad and Tobago has been a democracy since its independence in 1962, 
and no evidence suggests its government has ever acted violently against its citizenry.   
Nor does the evidence suggest that Trinidad and Tobago ignored rational concerns and 
committed to the ICC because of normative pressures.  It proposed the idea of an international 
criminal court, and it was the second state to join the court.    
It is true that since joining the court, Trinidad and Tobago has acted in ways that 
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demonstrate its commitment to the court and its goals, but these acts do not detract from the 
explanatory power of the credible threat theory since the facts still show that the country 
committed to the ICC based on rational and retrospective calculations regarding sovereignty 
costs.  For example, Trinidad and Tobago publicly refused to sign a bilateral immunity 
agreement with the United States, a decision which did cost it $450,000 in funding for its coast 
guard.
314
  However, although this decision was costly, it did not make commitment to the ICC 
more costly in terms of Trinidad and Tobago‘s sovereign rights to conduct its internal affairs as it 
saw fit.  It entailed only a loss of aid and assistance.  Furthermore, it was a cost of ratification 
that Trinidad and Tobago could not have anticipated in 1999 when it ratified the Rome Statute.  
The Bush Administration – not the Clinton Administration which was in office when the Rome 
Statute was adopted –instituted the policy of pursuing bilateral immunity agreements.  And, the 
Bush Administration only started seeking those agreements at about the time the court became a 
reality – in July 2002.315  Accordingly, at the time it ratified the ICC treaty, Trinidad and Tobago 
would not have been able to calculate these additional costs of joining the court, and in any 
event, these additional costs still did not impinge on its sovereignty.   
In addition, although Trinidad and Tobago‘s refusal to sign a bilateral immunity 
agreement did make its ICC commitment more costly from an aid perspective, Trinidad and 
Tobago worked to minimize those costs – further demonstrating that it is a country that acts 
rationally and strategically to minimize its costs of commitment.  By United States law, military 
assistance would not be withdrawn for states that refused to sign a bilateral immunity agreement 
until July 2003.  Furthermore, the President had the authority to waive any withdrawal of 
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military to any countries if he deemed it in the national interest to do so.
316
  In 2003, even while 
Trinidad and Tobago was standing firm on its intention to refuse to sign a bilateral immunity 
agreement, it was also seeking to persuade the United States President that it and other Caribbean 
nations were effectively a ―Third Border,‖ which they alone could not protect and which was 
critical to the national interest of the United States.
317
  Trinidad and Tobago was not initially 
successful in seeking a waiver.  But, by 2006, the United States eventually cleared a block on 
military assistance to Trinidad and Tobago and to other countries that had not signed bilateral 
immunity agreements.
318
 Therefore, unlike with the ICCPR Optional Protocol and the American 
Convention, the later events concerning the bilateral immunity agreements never imposed 
additional domestic sovereignty costs on Trinidad and Tobago.  Moreover, the threat to Trinidad 
and Tobago‘s ability to receive military aid were resolved relatively quickly, such that the 
country‘s initial ratification decision remained relatively costless in any event. 
Nor does the fact that Trinidad and Tobago advocates for the court and encourages other 
countries to commit and comply detract from the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  
For example, in a statement issued on November 15, 2008 during an Assembly of States Parties, 
Trinidad and Tobago encouraged other countries to join the court and also to comply with treaty 
terms by, for example, enacting domestic implementing legislation and cooperating with the 
court in the execution of arrest warrants, the surrender of accused persons, and the protection of 
witnesses.
319
  It made a similar statement during the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala.  
Again, it called on states to enact legislation to give domestic legal effect to the provisions of the 
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Rome Statute and also to execute outstanding arrest warrants.
320
  But, Trinidad and Tobago has 
committed to the ICC, and it makes sense that it would stand by that commitment, particularly 
since as noted above, there is evidence that Trinidad and Tobago is normatively aligned with the 
court‘s ideas and principles.  In fact, its normative alignment and its relatively good human rights 
practices serve to support a conclusion that its commitment to the ICC would be relatively 
costless from a sovereignty standpoint.   
Of course, although none of these other theories explain Trinidad and Tobago‘s behavior, 
one cannot ignore the role that Arthur N.R. Robinson played in making the country‘s support for, 
and ratification of, the court possible.  Furthermore, national pride in the country and its leader‘s 
role in creating the court may help to explain the swift ratification and the later efforts to comply 
with and support the ICC.  These additional factors leading to Trinidad and Tobago‘s 
commitment, however, do not lessen or detract from the explanatory power of the credible threat 
theory.  Instead, by the case study method, we are able to better understand Trinidad and 
Tobago‘s decision to commit to the ICC.  In particular, the presence of Robinson and national 
pride help explain the impetus for the decision, its timing, and the strength of the country‘s 
commitment to it.  Simply put, the presence of Robinson may have made Trinidad and Tobago‘s 
commitment to the ICC more prompt or stronger than it otherwise would have been, but the 
evidence still shows that the country ratified the treaty rationally and strategically knowing that it 
could and would comply with treaty terms.   
Finally, an examination of the country‘s prior actions with respect to other human rights 
treaties only serves to further demonstrate the explanatory power of the credible threat theory as 
it relates to Trinidad and Tobago‘s decision to join the ICC.  It joined treaties with weak 
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enforcement mechanisms, except for the CAT with which it knew it could not comply because of 
its domestic laws allowing for the death penalty.  And, it denounced two treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms after circumstances it could not have known about at the time of 
ratification would affect its domestic policies in a way it could not have envisioned.  One should 
expect that Trinidad and Tobago learned from that experience not to take its commitments to 
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms lightly.  More importantly, in this case, because 
the terms of the ICC treaty address only mass atrocities and because the evidence suggests that 
Trinidad and Tobago‘s citizens will not commit those crimes, the country could rationally 
conclude that commitment would not impose significant sovereignty costs.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RWANDA:  CREDIBLE THREAT, NOT CREDIBLE COMMITMENT 
 
By contrast to the earlier case study chapters which examined ratification decisions of 
states with good human rights practices and at least average domestic law enforcement 
institutions, this chapter examines the ratification decision of Rwanda – a state with poor human 
rights practices and poor institutions.  Although Rwanda did send delegates to the Rome 
Conference, and although Rwanda‘s Minister of Justice stated his support for the establishment 
of an international criminal court to help eradicate genocides like that experienced in Rwanda, 
Rwanda nevertheless has not joined the ICC.
321
  In fact, it neither signed the ICC treaty nor 
ratified it.    
Rwanda‘s failure to readily commit to the ICC is consistent with theoretical expectations 
because the data suggest that its costs of complying with the ICC treaty and the risks to its 
sovereignty should it join the ICC are significant.  First, Rwanda has experienced a recent and 
horrendous genocidal episode.  Over several months in 1994, the Hutu majority killed 
approximately 800,000 Tutsi men, women, and children.  Also, even since the genocide, 
Rwanda‘s human rights ratings have remained quite poor.  Between 1994 and 2007, Rwanda has 
most frequently scored either a 2 or 3 on the physical integrity rights scale, although only very 
recently in 2005, it scored a 5 on the scale.  Furthermore, in recent decades, Rwanda has 
consistently received a 0 on the democracy scale which ranges from 0 to 10.  
In addition to having a history of genocide and poor human rights practices, Rwanda also 
appears to lack the kinds of institutions that would enable it to fairly and capably prosecute mass 
atrocities domestically.  Between 1996 and 2008, Rwanda‘s rule of law ratings have ranged 
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between -1.49 and -.250.  Other anecdotal evidence also indicates that Rwanda‘s judicial 
capacity is weak.  While Rwanda‘s judicial system has apparently been improving, criticisms 
concerning Rwanda‘s ability to fairly prosecute persons who allegedly committed genocide 
during 1994 caused the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (―ICTR‖) to refuse to 
transfer cases to Rwanda for prosecution.
322
  As recently as 2008, Human Rights Watch argued 
that Rwanda‘s justice system is seriously flawed in ―areas such as judicial independence, the 
right to present a defense, and the right to equal access to justice for all.‖323  In addition, Human 
Rights Watch, among others, has criticized Rwanda for failing to dispense equal justice, arguing 
that it has failed to prosecute senior officers of RPF forces (the rebel forces who succeeded in 
ending the genocide) who allegedly murdered and committed other serious crimes against Hutus 
because of their role in the genocide.
324
  Moreover, Rwanda‘s government has been accused of 
obstructing and hindering the ICTR‘s potential prosecution of those RPF soldiers.325 
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This case study examining Rwanda‘s behavior allows us to test how well the credible 
threat theory can explain the ratification behavior of a state with poor human rights practices and 
weak domestic law enforcement institutions.  In addition, it also allows us to compare the 
explanatory power of the credible threat theory to that of the credible commitment theory.  
Recall that Simmons‘ and Danner‘s credible commitment theory is addressed precisely to 
explaining the ratification behavior of states with poor human rights practices and a recent 
history of civil violence, but that also have weak institutions of domestic accountability.  Even if 
Rwanda was not one of the states that Simmons and Danner included in this category, Rwanda 
necessarily possesses the characteristics that make it a good case study test of the credible 
commitment theory.
326
  As noted above, Rwanda only recently experienced a horrendous 
genocide, its human rights ratings have been and continue to be poor, and both its democracy and 
rule of law ratings indicate that it has weak domestic institutions of accountability.   
Thus, according to Simmons and Danner‘s credible commitment threat theory, we should 
expect that Rwanda‘s autocratic leader, President Paul Kagame (and he has either actually or 
effectively been Rwanda‘s leader since the genocide ended in 1994), will want to commit to the 
ICC so as to demonstrate to Rwanda‘s domestic audience his determination to end the cycle of 
civil violence and the impunity that often accompanies such violence.  Indeed, according to that 
theory, because the state has weak domestic institutions of accountability, Kagame should 
embrace joining an international institution like the ICC with relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms because it will tie his hands – and the government‘s hands – and make him unable 
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to resort to violence in responding to any domestic crises.  And, Kagame should calculate the 
costs of joining the ICC prospectively, rather than retrospectively, and embrace joining the ICC 
despite the sovereignty costs because the potential future gains of making a credible commitment 
can outweigh those costs.
327
  Indeed, Simmons and Danner argue that the ICC is the perfect 
mechanism for demonstrating a government‘s credible commitment to end the cycle of domestic 
violence and impunity because the stakes of violating the ICC‘s treaty terms are so high: 
government leaders can be arrested and brought to The Hague for prosecution.
328
   
As the evidence shows, however, the credible threat theory, not the credible commitment 
theory, better explains Rwanda‘s and Kagame‘s behavior vis-à-vis the ICC.  Not only has 
Rwanda failed to ratify the ICC treaty, but the facts show that given his country‘s history of civil 
violence, Kagame wants no constraints on his power to lead as he sees fit.  Rather, Kagame‘s 
behavior shows that he believes he must have the power to resort to force and violence when 
doing so is in the best interests of the country as a whole in terms of its future peace and security.  
The facts demonstrate that Kagame is particularly wary of relinquishing his sovereignty and 
power to international institutions:  Kagame does not want the international community to 
impose its values on Rwanda, and he does not want to allow it to substitute its judgment for his 
on the question of whether certain acts he or his colleagues committed were proper or, instead, 
deserving of punishment.  For example, as described in detail below, in the aftermath of the 
genocide, Kagame ultimately decided that he had to use force in order to close the various 
refugee camps that had become home to many Rwandan Hutus who had participated in the 
genocide.  And, although what began as force ended, in some instances, with acts of violence by 
Kagame‘s soldiers, Kagame has maintained either that the force was justified and necessary in 
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order to avoid greater violence or that the acts of violence are not deserving of the same 
punishment that should be accorded to those who committed genocide.  Although some in the 
international community have severely criticized Kagame for failing to hold his soldiers 
sufficiently accountable for those acts of violence, he continues to maintain that he – and 
Rwanda – should be the judge of what justice is proper in Rwanda for acts involving its citizens.   
In addition, although there is a dearth of evidence on the specific question of why 
Rwanda refused to commit to the ICC, an examination of its relationship with the world 
community in connection with Rwanda‘s genocide and its relationship with the ICTR provides 
further evidence supportive of the credible threat theory – as opposed to the credible 
commitment theory.  Those actions again show that Rwanda closely guards its sovereignty and 
wants to make its own determinations about how and whether justice should be meted out to its 
citizens based on actions occurring inside Rwanda.  For example, Rwanda voted against the 
establishment of the ICTR on the grounds, among others, that the trials were not going to be held 
in Rwanda and because the tribunal would not be able to impose the death penalty.  When the 
ICTR suggested that it may even want to prosecute some of Kagame‘s RPF soldiers for acts they 
had committed while fighting against the genocidaires, Rwanda became even more protective of 
its sovereignty.  It launched a campaign against the ICTR and its prosecutor that was so 
successful in criticizing the tribunal and its actions that to this day, the tribunal has not issued 
any indictments against Kagame‘s soldiers.       
In short, the evidence shows that the credible threat theory and rational and retrospective 
calculations about compliance costs best explains Rwanda‘s refusal to commit to the ICC.  
Rwanda has the kind of violent history and history of poor human rights practices that indicate it 
may not be able to fully comply with the terms of the ICC treaty.  It also has poor domestic law 
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enforcement institutions, which means that if its government or citizens committed a crime 
covered by the ICC treaty, it may not be able to prosecute that crime domestically.  Furthermore, 
the evidence shows that Rwanda closely guards its sovereignty and does not wish to have its 
hands tied by the international community or international institutions.   
Moreover, based on its experience with the ICTR, Rwanda has learned – if it did not 
know so already – that its views about which of its citizens and what crimes are actually 
deserving of punishment may differ from those of the international community.  But by joining 
the ICC, Rwanda would be committing to an enforcement mechanism that would allow an 
international institution to substitute its own judgment as to who and what actions were 
deserving of punishment for Rwanda‘s.  Accordingly, because compliance with the ICC treaty 
would be difficult, Rwanda acted rationally in being wary of committing to the ICC because of 
the credible threat posed by its relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, rather than embracing 
those enforcement mechanisms so as to credibly commit to change its behavior – or risk being 
the subject of an international prosecution.   
Although this case study focuses only on Rwanda, it serves to illustrate the power of the 
credible threat theory to explain the ratification behavior of other states with poor human rights 
practices and a history of violence.  Like President Kagame, leaders of other states with similarly 
complicated and violent histories (even if the details of that history vary) also may not want to tie 
their hands and make a credible commitment to refuse to respond with force or violence to any 
domestic crises.  In fact, as the case study of Rwanda shows, states with a history of violence 
may have the kinds of social cleavages that can continue to make civil violence a possibility, and 
the state may feel justified in responding with force simply so as to quell that violence and 
establish some sense of peace and security for the population as a whole.  Thus, leaders of states 
199 
 
with a history of domestic violence, like Kagame, are more likely to be concerned about the 
credible threat posed by committing to an institution like the ICC with which they may not be 
able to comply and which they cannot control.  Indeed, particularly where the state with the 
history of violence has an autocratic leader, commitment to the ICC seems disingenuous.  If the 
autocratic regime is not willing to impose domestic constraints on its power to act as it pleases – 
thereby signaling its credible commitment not to act violently – why would it join the ICC so as 
to make that credible commitment?  After all, while the autocratic regime may be able to put a 
stop to the domestic machinery it creates to impose accountability, it should not be confident that 
it would be able to stop the international machinery of the ICC – by which its leaders could be 
hauled to The Hague to stand trial.  
This chapter is organized as follows.  By way of background, I first discuss Rwanda‘s 
ethnic conflict and the 1994 genocide.  The next section focuses on examining Kagame‘s actions 
in closing the refugee camps to which many genocidaires had fled in the immediate aftermath of 
the genocide.  Providing support for the idea that autocratic leaders in post-violence situations 
will not want to tie their hands – particularly in a way the international community might deem 
appropriate – the evidence adduced in this section shows not only that Kagame resorted to using 
force (and his soldiers even resorted to violence), but also that Kagame maintained that given the 
circumstances, force was the only way to obtain what was necessary for Rwanda and its people.   
I follow with an examination of Rwanda‘s relationship with the ICTR – an international 
criminal tribunal, which although not identical to the ICC, provides much evidence regarding 
Rwanda‘s reluctance to relinquish to the international community its sovereign right to 
administer justice to its citizens within its own borders.  Again, not only does this examination of 
Rwanda‘s relationship with the ICTR provide evidence regarding its preferences, but it is useful 
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for understanding how other states with poor human rights practices and a history of civil 
violence – particularly under autocratic leadership – will view commitment to international 
human rights institutions.  Rwanda‘s actions demonstrate that it is concerned with the credible 
threat associated with committing to such institutions:  no evidence suggests that it or its leader 
wants to bind Rwanda to any institution over which it does not have control and which would be 
able to constrain it from managing its affairs as it sees fit.  To provide additional context for 
Rwanda‘s decision to refrain from joining the ICC, I look at Rwanda‘s behavior in connection 
with other international human rights treaties.  That behavior too provides support for the 
credible threat theory and shows that Rwanda is strategic in committing to international human 
rights treaties and avoids those with strong enforcement mechanisms and with which it cannot 
comply.  I conclude with a section that assesses the credible threat theory, particularly in light of 
Rwanda‘s words and acts as they relate to the ICC.   
Background:  The Genocide of the 1990s 
Colonial Rule and the “Ethnic” Divide 
 Rwanda is a country with three primary ethnic or tribal peoples.  Historically, about 85% 
of the populace has been of Hutu origin; about 14% is of Tutsi origin; and about 1% is Twa 
peoples – descendents of cave-dwelling pygmies.329  With colonial rule, first by the Germans and 
later by the Belgians (after WWI), however, Hutus and Tutsis became identified as opposing 
―ethnic‖ identities.  In fact, the Belgians exploited these perceived ethnic differences and made 
them a cornerstone of their colonial policy:  they made the taller, thinner, more ―noble-looking‖ 
Tutsis the favored ones, providing them with a monopoly on administrative and political jobs.  
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The ―coarser‖ looking Hutus were required to work as forced laborers in the fields and in 
construction works, with the Tutsis assigned to look on as taskmasters.
330
  To ensure there was 
no confusion as to the rulers and the ruled, all Rwandans were labeled and issued ―ethnic‖ 
identify cards.
331
   
Although the Tutsi minority was favored with privileges during colonial rule, on the eve 
of independence, the Hutu majority began to demand ―democracy‖ and the power to which it 
claimed to be entitled by virtue of being the majority.  Its quest for control included a popular 
uprising, whereby during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Hutus attacked Tutsi authorities, 
torched Tutsi homes, and even sporadically murdered Tutsis.  When they realized they would 
receive no help from their Belgian rulers – who had transferred power to Rwanda‘s new Hutu 
leaders in January 1961 – Tutsis began fleeing to neighboring countries.332 Discrimination and 
violence against Tutsis continued over the next several decades, such that the Tutsi exiled 
community grew to be quite substantial, especially in Uganda.   
The 1994 Genocide 
It was that Tutsi community in Uganda which in 1986 formed the Rwandese Patriotic 
Front – the rebel army that was responsible for defeating Hutu forces and ending the 1994 
genocide.  The RPF was founded to fight against the regime of Rwanda‘s longstanding Hutu 
dictator, President Juvenal Habyarimana.  Habyarimana‘s policies had always involved 
discriminating against Tutsis; however, those policies turned increasingly violent.
333
  In 1990, 
the RPF responded to Habyarimana‘s policies by declaring war on his regime and calling for an 
end to tyranny, corruption, and the ideology of exclusion which generated Tutsi refugees.  
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Habyarimana, in turn only stepped up his government‘s repressive policies towards Tutsis: 
Tutsis were imprisoned or killed – all with the help of the new civilian militias know as the 
―interahamwe‖ who had been trained by the government army to fight against the RPF.334  
Fighting continued during 1992 and 1993, as did a print and radio propaganda genocidal 
campaign aimed at eliminating Tutsis.
335
  
Although in August 1993, President Habyarimana entered into a peace accord with the 
RPF ensuring a right of return for Rwanda‘s refugees and a new power-sharing government, that 
peace was short-lived.  Instead, the genocidal campaign continued, and when President 
Habayarima‘s plane was shot down in Kigali by missiles on April 6, 1994, killing began in 
earnest.
336
  Rwandan government forces and the interahamwe set up road blocks and went on a 
search to massacre Tutsis with their machetes.
337
  In only the first weeks of April, 1994, and 
while United Nations peacekeepers that had been deployed to Rwanda‘s capital city to 
implement the 1993 peace accord stood by, thousands of Tutsis were killed.  After ten Belgian 
peacekeepers were murdered by Hutu troops, the United Nations effectively withdrew its 
peacekeepers, allowing a ―wholesale extermination‖ of Tutsis to get underway.338  The wave of 
killings ended in mid-July when the RPF captured the city of Kigali.  By that time, and in only a 
few short months, approximately 800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates had been slaughtered.
339
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On July 19, 1994, the RPF decided to form a power-sharing government along the lines 
of that envisioned by the peace accords agreed to in Arusha.  As Rwanda‘s President, the RPF 
chose Pasteur Bizimungu, the most prominent Hutu in the RPF who had previously served the 
old regime for some years before defecting.  Paul Kagame assumed the role of Vice President 
and Minister of Defense.  By all accounts, however, Kagame was the de facto leader of the 
country even before he was elected President in 2000.
340
  
The Aftermath of the Genocide: Kagame Closes the Refugee Camps 
In the aftermath of the genocide, and much to the new regime‘s dismay, rather than 
standing by as it had during the genocide, the world community instead rushed to the aid of the 
many ―refugees‖ of the genocide.  The problem was not that the world community wanted to aid 
refugees.  Rather, the problem was that in this case, most of those ―refugees‖ were actually 
Hutus who had fled Rwanda beginning in mid-July once they sensed defeat.
341
  In addition, 
many of the camps themselves had been created along Rwanda‘s borders with Burundi and 
Zaire, within what was called the ―Turquoise Zone‖ – a protected area that was presided over by 
French troops as part of a 60-day humanitarian mission approved by the Security Council.
342
  
These camps were predominately occupied by Hutu genocidaires, and ex-army officers of the 
ousted government and the interahamwe presided over the camps.
343
  Moreover, because these 
camps were often located extremely close to the Rwandan border and because these ex-
militiamen also had weapons – even though they should have been disarmed – they were able to 
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wage raids into Rwanda where they set about terrorizing and killing Tutsis.
344
  
Not only did the mere fact of the camps and their inhabitants cause the new regime to be 
frustrated and angry with the international community, but that frustration mounted as Rwanda 
sought to have the camps closed and the ―refugees‖ returned to their homeland.  The new 
Rwandan government said the country was safe enough for everyone to go home, even though of 
course, it intended to arrest persons who had participated in the genocide.
345
  But, the 
genocidaires, fearing that they would be treated as they had treated the Tutsis, refused to leave 
the camps, and the international organizations running those camps would not force their 
repatriation.   
Violence in Closing the Kibeho Camp 
Because Kagame deemed closing the camps a necessity, and because his pleas for 
assistance from the international community in closing the camps were generally met with 
inaction,
 346
 Kagame and his soldiers took action.  While Kagame‘s forces were able to close 
some camps in a relatively peaceful manner,
 347 
they had no such luck when it finally sought to 
close Kibeho – the last remaining camp – in 1995.  That closing was chaotic from the beginning 
since some of the genocidaires were pressuring others in the camp not to cooperate with the 
forced repatriation.  A conflict ensued with refugees hurling rocks at soldiers, to which the 
soldiers responded with gun fire.  When refugees began running for the hills, the army opened 
fire into the crowd, shooting indiscriminately and lobbing grenades at them.  The soldiers 
engaged in another round of shooting later that day when another group of refugees broke 
through the army‘s lines.  In the end, the death toll reached into the thousands.  Although some 
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had died in stampedes or been killed by interahamwe, many had also been killed by the 
Rwandan army.
348
  Rwanda estimated the number killed in Kibeho at some 360, while the United 
Nations and others suggested the number was somewhere between 2000 and 8000 people.
349
    
The Kibeho tragedy (as it has been called) provides support for the idea that autocratic 
leaders in post-violence situations will not want to tie their hands – particularly in a way the 
international community might deem appropriate.  The situation in the aftermath was 
complicated, and Kagame was unable to convince the world community to quickly close the 
refugee camps that were housing genocidaires and being used as staging grounds to plan and 
execute more violent attacks against the remaining Tutsi population.  When he could not get the 
international community to act, Kagame mobilized his troops and sent them to close the camps.  
Although some camp closings proceeded peacefully, in the case of Kibeho, violence ensued.  
Indeed, an Independent International Commission of Inquiry determined that although the 
violence had not been one-sided, some RPF soldiers had summarily executed persons in the 
camp.
350
   
Nevertheless, although some of Kagame‘s soldiers did resort to violence, Kagame has 
maintained that force was the only way to obtain what was necessary for Rwanda and its people.  
Kagame has acknowledged that the army‘s actions were unfortunate, but he emphasizes that the 
camps had to be closed and that the international community had refused to close them of its 
own accord or to assist in closing them.
351
  He explained:  ―We said, ‗If you don‘t want to close 
them, then we shall close them.‘  And that‘s what happened, that tragic situation.  But, the camps 
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were no more, you see, and you could have had more trouble for the whole country by keeping 
the camps there.‖352 
Furthermore, Kagame has generally ignored calls by the international community to 
prosecute those of his soldiers who committed acts of violence in closing the Kibeho camp – 
further demonstrating that he does not believe the soldier‘s actions are deserving of significant 
punishment and also that he believes Rwanda is entitled to decide how the acts of its citizens 
should be judged.  In April 1996, Amnesty International reported that the RPF had killed 
thousands of people in the Kibeho camp closure and asked the government to bring to justice 
those who had committed the killings.
353
  Journalist Philip Gourevitch reports that two RPF 
officers who were in command at Kibeho were arrested shortly after the event and later tried, but 
he suggests the verdict only showed that the new regime did not view the soldiers‘ actions as 
particularly criminal.  They were convicted, but they were found guilty only of ―having failed to 
use the military means at their disposal to protect civilians in danger.‖354      
Kagame’s 1996 Attack on the Paramilitary Camps in Zaire 
The difficulties with the camps did not end with Kibeho, nor did Kagame‘s difficulties 
with the international community.  According to Kagame, by 1996, Hutu genocidaires in refugee 
camps in Zaire were preparing to invade Rwanda so that they could reclaim their power and 
conclude their extermination plan.  In July 1996, Kagame visited Washington, Europe, and the 
United Nations and explained that if the international community would not stop the problem 
that was brewing in those camps, then Kagame would have to handle the problem himself.  
Apparently few believed his threat, in part because Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo) was ninety-four times larger than Rwanda, but also because its leader, Mobutu Sese 
Seko, was an extremely powerful man in Africa, and attacking camps in his country would be a 
direct challenge to his regime.
355
   
After the international community refused to act, however, Kagame again determined to 
act on his own plan:  to close the camps in Zaire; to repatriate the hundreds of thousands of 
Hutus who were living there as refuges; and to overthrow Mobutu.
356
  Kagame created an 
alliance with Congolese rebel leader, Laurent Kabila, in order to accomplish his plan.
357
  In 
October 1996, Rwandan and Congolese rebel forces began attacking the camps around Goma in 
Zaire.  In the course of the fighting, thousands of innocent refugees, as well as Hutu genocidaires 
were killed.  And, as a result of the attacks, Kagame realized the goals of his mission:  the camps 
were disbanded, about 1 million people returned to Rwanda, and Mobutu was forced to flee his 
country.
358
  
Again, the RPF was accused of committing crimes in connection with closing the camps 
in Zaire (the Congo).
359
  Again, though, Kagame‘s statements stress the necessity of his actions 
given the international community‘s failure to act.  When asked by journalist Philip Gourevitch 
about his actions in the Eastern Congo, Kagame pointed out that former Rwandan military 
genocidaires had begun killing Tutsis again and that the genocidaires, who were armed with 
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weapons and grenades, were refusing repatriation.  He stated that the war in the Congo happened 
as it had in order that Rwanda would not ―‘be rubbed off the surface of the earth.‘‖360   
Rwanda and the ICTR 
Establishment of the ICTR and Rwanda’s Lone Dissenting Vote 
An examination of the events leading up to the establishment of an international tribunal 
to try Rwanda‘s genocidaires similarly demonstrates that Rwanda is a country that closely guards 
its sovereignty and wants to make its own determinations about how and whether justice should 
be meted out to its citizens based on actions occurring inside Rwanda.   
For example, even though Rwanda had asked the international community to establish an 
international tribunal to assist it with prosecuting perpetrators of the genocide, it thereafter voted 
against establishing the ICTR.  Rwanda sought international assistance precisely because in the 
aftermath of the genocide, it did not have the institutions or resources to carry out a plan for 
prosecutions without assistance.  According to a Human Rights Watch report issued shortly after 
the genocide, as a result of the wholesale slaughter of Tutsis, Rwanda had only 36 judges, 14 
prosecutors, and 26 police inspectors (none of whom even had access to a vehicle).
361
  Thus, by a 
letter to the Security Council, among other things, Rwanda asked the international community 
for assistance in improving its own security forces, including the police, and to establish an 
international tribunal to prosecute the genocidaires.
362
  In its request, Rwanda noted that the 
crimes committed in Rwanda were of an international nature and the international community 
should be involved in punishing such crimes.  Second, it emphasized that an international 
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tribunal would have an advantage of appearing fair and neutral and would avoid any suspicion 
that Rwanda was trying to organize vengeful justice.  Third, Rwanda stated that involving the 
international community would make it easier to arrest and bring to justice those criminals who 
had taken refuge in foreign countries.
363
  
However, when it came time to vote for establishing that international tribunal, Rwanda, 
as a temporary member of the Security Council (merely coincidental), stood alone in voting 
against it.
364
 Apparently although the Rwandan government had wanted an international tribunal, 
it only wanted a tribunal that would be shaped according to its wishes and that would take into 
account its customs and concerns.
365
  In voting against the tribunal, Rwanda emphasized several 
aspects of the ICTR‘s institutional design that it viewed as unacceptable.   
First, Rwanda objected to the ICTR‘s temporal jurisdictional restrictions which would 
only allow it to consider crimes that occurred between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 
1994.
366
  Rwanda had proposed instead that the ICTR should be able to consider crimes 
committed between the time period from October 1, 1990 and July 17, 1994.  As the Rwandan 
Ambassador noted, excluding the earlier time periods would mean that the tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to prosecute persons who participated in planning the genocide in the several years 
leading up to 1994.
367
  Victor Peskin, however, explains that by seeking an end date of July 17, 
1994, the Rwandan government also hoped to ensure the tribunal could not consider any of the 
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crimes the RPF committed against Hutu civilians after the conclusion of the conflict.
368
  In a 
related vein, Peskin points out that Rwanda also objected to the lack of clear rules requiring the 
tribunal to use its limited resources to prosecute the most serious crimes of genocide, rather than 
any lesser crimes.  Again, Peskin suggests that this objection, too, was designed – at least in part 
– to insure that the tribunal would have no legal authority to indict RPF officers who had 
committed non-genocidal crimes against Hutus.
369
     
Second, Rwanda objected to what it perceived to be the limited institutional capacity of 
the tribunal.  Against its wishes, the ICTR was slated to share resources – such as a prosecutor 
and an appeals chamber – with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (―ICTY‖).  
In addition, the ICTR was created with funding only for two courtrooms.  In Rwanda‘s opinion, 
without additional resources, the tribunal would not be able to fulfill its mission of efficiently 
and effectively dispensing justice and holding the many high-level perpetrators of the genocide 
accountable.  Indeed, Rwanda‘s Ambassador to the United Nations argued that these facts 
showed the international community had little interest in having the ICTR succeed in its mission.  
He stated:  ―My delegation considers that the establishment of so ineffective an international 
tribunal would only appease the conscience of the international community rather than respond 
to the expectations of the Rwandese people and of the victims of genocide in particular.‖370   
Third, Rwanda could not abide a tribunal that would not impose the death penalty as 
punishment for those found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity.  At the time, under 
its domestic laws, Rwanda allowed the death penalty for murder, and it believed that the death 
penalty was a punishment commensurate with the gravity of the crime of genocide.  Rwanda 
pointed out the failure to impose the death penalty at the ICTR would create an unfair disparity 
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in punishments.  The high-level suspects who had planned the genocide would receive sentences 
at the ICTR lighter than those Rwanda would be imposing on the lower-level suspects it would 
be trying domestically.  Rwanda‘s Ambassador to the United Nations further emphasized that 
such a situation would not be ―conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.‖371  In an 
interview with Philip Gourevitch, President Kagame similarly stated that Rwanda could not 
support a tribunal that would not provide for capital punishment out of respect for Rwanda‘s 
laws.  In response to Rwanda‘s objections, however, according to Kagame, the United Nations 
advised Rwanda to abolish the death penalty – a position that Kagame suggested was 
―cynical.‖372   
 Finally, in terms of other significant objections, Rwanda stated that it could not support a 
tribunal that was not located within its country.  The Rwandan Ambassador to the United 
Nations explained that the main reason Rwanda requested an international tribunal was ―to teach 
the Rwandese people a lesson, to fight against the impunity to which it had become accustomed 
since 1959 and to promote national reconciliation.‖  Therefore, he suggested that since the 
tribunal would have to deal with Rwandese suspects who had committed crimes in Rwanda 
against Rwandese, the tribunal adjudicating those crimes should sit in Rwanda.  He further noted 
that ―establishing the seat of the Tribunal on Rwandese soil would promote the harmonization of 
international and national jurisprudence.‖373 The international community, however, refused to 
commit to locating the ICTR in Rwanda at the time it voted to establish the tribunal.  And, 
ultimately, it decided to locate the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania.  Basically, the United Nations 
worried that concerns about fairness and independence, as well as administrative efficiency, 
counseled against locating the tribunal in Rwanda:  if the tribunal was in Kigali, the Rwandan 
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government might be able to wield too much influence over it and thereby undermine its 
independence.
374
  In fact, Victor Peskin suggests that while the Rwandan government may have 
pushed for locating the tribunal in Rwanda so as to promote national reconciliation, it also knew 
that it would have more influence over the tribunal if it was within the country.  He stated:  ―A 
UN decision to locate the court inside Rwanda could be used by the government as 
demonstration of power over the international community and the Hutu masterminds of the 
genocide.  But, as long as the tribunal remained out of the country – even in neighboring 
Tanzania – it ran the risk of being seen by Rwandans as an abstract international enterprise.‖   
 Nevertheless, although it is true that the international community did not yield to all of 
Rwanda‘s requests when it created the ICTR, the evidence does show that the Rwandan 
government was able to convince the Security Council to grant it some concessions.  As Victor 
Peskin points out, the United Nations finally agreed to locate the deputy prosecutor‘s office in 
Kigali.  The Council also permitted the ICTR to hold trials in Rwanda if it chose to do so.  In 
addition, the United Nations changed the tribunal statute to allow convicted ICTR defendants to 
serve their time in Rwanda.  Moreover, the temporal restrictions on the ICTR‘s jurisdiction 
actually aided the Rwandan government as they ensured that any crimes committed by the RPF 
after the conclusion of the genocide would not be investigated by the tribunal.
375
  Despite these 
concessions, however, Rwanda remained critical of the ICTR and continued to portray the 
institution as one that was created only to assuage the international community‘s conscience and 
with little regard for Rwanda or its many victims.  In short, the evidence at the time of 
negotiations and thereafter shows that Rwanda wanted an international tribunal to try 
perpetrators of the genocide that was carried out within its borders, but it also wanted significant 
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control over that organization.  Absent significant control, Rwanda would not vote for 
establishing the ICTR or, as discussed below, cease from criticizing the institution or fully 
cooperate with it.   
Rwanda and the ICTR in Practice: The Issue of RPF Indictments 
Rwanda‘s interest in having a tribunal that was under its control – rather than the control 
of the international community – also manifested itself in how Rwanda criticized the tribunal or, 
at times, sought to assert its own influence over it.  Rwanda voiced criticisms about – and 
mounted demonstrations against – many aspects of the ICTR‘s operations and practices, 
including the slow pace of indictments and prosecutions.
 376
  However, it is the facts relating to 
the ICTR‘s decision to potentially indict RPF soldiers for acts they had committed while fighting 
against the genocidiares which show just how far Rwanda would go to protect its sovereignty 
against the international community‘s attempt to substitute its own judgment for Rwanda‘s as to 
how and against whom justice should be dispensed.  When ICTR Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
appeared to be focusing on potentially indicting RPF soldiers for atrocities they committed 
during the genocide, Rwanda ceased cooperating with the tribunal and even managed to have the 
prosecutor removed from her post.  Its campaign against the ICTR and its prosecutor was so 
successful that to this day, the tribunal has not issued any indictments against Kagame‘s soldiers.  
And, although Rwanda has – perhaps because of tribunal pressure – domestically prosecuted 
some RPF soldiers for killing Hutu civilians during the course of the genocide, the fact that the 
ICTR itself has not brought such cases has led some commentators and international human 
rights organizations to charge the ICTR with dispensing only ―victor‘s justice.‖377      
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 The conflict between Rwanda and the tribunal was triggered when then-Chief Prosecutor 
Del Ponte announced in December 2000 that she had decided to expand her probe beyond the 
Hutu-perpetrated genocide to include an investigation of Tutsi RPF army officers suspected of 
committing atrocities against Hutu civilians during 1994.
378
 Although the Rwandan government 
initially agreed to cooperate with the ICTR‘s so-called special investigation, the scenario played 
out differently.
379
  Not only did Rwanda withhold cooperation, but also, early on, it went on the 
offensive against the ICTR, continuing to criticize it for the slow pace of the genocide trials.
380
  
It also managed to mobilize Tutsi survivor groups who accused the tribunal of victim and 
witness mistreatment.  For example, Rwanda noted that the tribunal had arrested a veteran Hutu 
defense investigator after evidence showed that he had participated in massacring Tutsis during 
the genocide.  In addition, it accused a panel of ICTR judges of demeaning and unprofessional 
conduct for laughing during the cross-examination of a Tutsi rape victim.
381
  The prosecutor‘s 
office countered that the arrest was an isolated incident and that the judge‘s behavior had been 
misinterpreted.   
 Nevertheless, by April 2002, when Prosecutor Del Ponte publicly stated that indictments 
would be forthcoming in late 2002, the Rwandan government was well poised to block her 
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efforts.
382
  Citing concerns about witness protection, during June 2002, the Rwandan government 
actually managed to shut down most tribunal business when it prevented Tutsi genocide 
survivors scheduled to testify on behalf of the ICTR prosecution from boarding the UN plane to 
Arusha.  Victor Peskin reports that although the government‘s actual motivation for preventing 
witness travel cannot be known with certainty, his own interviews of tribunal officials and 
Western diplomats suggested that the government was, in effect, warning the ICTR that if it 
followed through on issuing RPF indictments, it would not be able to count on Rwanda‘s 
cooperation.
383
      
Although the Rwandan government did resume allowing witnesses to travel in July 2002, 
its offensive against Del Ponte continued until it ultimately succeeded in having her removed 
from her post as the ICTR‘s chief prosecutor.  After she met in The Hague with a Hutu rebel 
group to gather facts for her proposed RPF indictments, the Rwandan government publicly 
alleged that she was consorting with genocidaires, had lost her moral authority to prosecute 
genocide cases, and was unfit to serve the ICTR.
384
  Del Ponte defended her actions, pointing out 
that she had a right to investigate as she saw fit and called for punitive action to enforce 
Rwanda‘s obligation to cooperate with the tribunal even if it was investigating RPF actions.  But, 
2002 passed without Del Ponte handing down any RPF indictments.  And, even though the 
reasons for the absence of such indictments are unknown, Peskin reports that according to his 
sources, the RPF investigations had ceased after Rwanda had resumed allowing witnesses to 
travel.
385
   
Nor did Del Ponte have much chance in the following year to obtain those indictments 
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since by the summer of 2003, and after much lobbying of UN delegations by the Rwandan 
government, the United Nations decided to appoint a chief prosecutor for each tribunal:  it 
dismissed Del Ponte from her role at the ICTR and retained her as the prosecutor of the ICTY 
only.
386
  While it would likely be impossible to unravel the many reasons why the United 
Nations might decide some nine years later to appoint a single prosecutor to head each of the 
tribunals, the timing does suggest that Rwanda‘s campaign against Del Ponte played a role.  
Indeed, Del Ponte herself suggests that the dismissal was meant to prevent her from gathering 
enough evidence to issue RPF indictments.
387
  She noted that both the United States and Britain 
had pressured her to drop the RPF investigations and allow Rwanda to handle them on its own.  
She said that Western officials argued that the possibility of instability in the wake of RPF 
indictments was a reason to drop the investigations.  But, Del Ponte was convinced other reasons 
were behind the United States‘ pressure to drop the investigation:  she suggested that the Bush 
administration may have agreed to help Rwanda keep the ICTR from indicting RPF suspects in 
exchange for Rwanda‘s agreement to sign a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States 
ensuring that it would not extradite any indicted United States military to the ICC.
388
     
In sum, the way the events played out again show that Rwanda was not interested in an 
international tribunal which it could not control.  Rather, events show that the Rwandan 
government – which was under the de-facto control of former-RPF leader, Paul Kagame – was 
only interested in an international tribunal that would focus on prosecuting its enemies.
389
  As 
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noted above, the tribunal has still not issued any indictments against RPF soldiers, and although 
it has been criticized for failing to do so, it has also defended its decision to allow Rwanda to 
deal with those crimes on its own.
390
    
This examination of Rwanda‘s relationship with the ICTR provides evidence that it 
carefully guards its sovereignty and does not want to relinquish control over its own domestic 
affairs to an international institution.  It had many objections to the ICTR, but it was particularly 
hostile to the tribunal and ceased cooperating with it when the tribunal sought to hold Kagame‘s 
soldiers accountable for acts they committed during the course of the genocide.  Indeed, the 
evidence shows that Kagame believes that he, rather than the international community, should be 
in charge of determining whether he and his soldiers are deserving of punishment.  Given this 
evidence about how Rwanda acted in connection with the ICTR, it makes sense that it would be 
concerned with the credible threat associated with joining the ICC – an institution over which it 
would not have control and which would be able to constrain it from managing its affairs as it 
sees fit.   
Rwanda‘s experience with the ICTR is also useful for understanding how other autocratic 
states with poor human rights practices and a history of civil violence may view commitment to 
an international human rights institution like the ICC which would be able to substitute its own 
judgment for the state‘s judgment regarding who, and what actions, should be prosecuted.  
Although Rwanda‘s experience is certainly unique, all states that have experienced civil violence 
have some cleavage between certain elements of society, and whether a particular person or 
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group is deserving of punishment based on its actions may differ depending on which person or 
group has prevailed in the conflict.  Furthermore, it is likely that persons on all sides of the 
violence committed some crimes – even if some crimes, as in Rwanda‘s case with the crimes of 
genocide, may be considered more deserving of punishment.  Like Kagame, leaders of countries 
with a history of civil violence may rationally believe that they are in the best position to 
determine who and what should be punished inasmuch as they – not the international community 
– had direct experience with the violence.  Like Kagame, they may wish to avoid joining an 
institution like the ICC which could seek to punish them or others who they believe are not 
deserving of punishment.   
Rwanda’s Participation in the International Human Rights Regime:  Avoiding 
Costly Commitment 
 
Rwanda‘s participation in the international human rights regime is consistent with the 
evidence adduced above which shows that Rwanda is a country that closely guards its 
sovereignty and is, at the very least, wary of making costly commitments to international 
institutions.  As Table 22 shows, with only one exception, Rwanda has chosen to participate only 
in those international human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms – and 
accordingly, those that do not impose significant sovereignty costs on the state by virtue of 
membership.     
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Table 22:  Commitment to the Six Primary International Human Rights 
Treaties 
Treaty Enforcement Mechanism Date Open Ratification Date 
ICCPR Reports 1966 1975 
ICESCR Reports 1966 1975 
CERD Reports 1966 1975 
CEDAW Reports 1980 1981 
CAT Reports 1984 2008 
CRC Reports 1989 1991 
ICCPR Art. 41 State Complaints 1966 -- 
CAT Art. 21 State Complaints 1984 -- 
ICCPR Opt. Individual Complaints 1966 -- 
CERD 14 Individual Complaints 1966 -- 
CAT 22 Individual Complaints 1984 -- 
CEDAW Opt. Individual Complaints 1999 2008 
CAT Opt. Committee Visits 2003 -- 
 
A closer look at Rwanda‘s recent ratification of the CAT treaty and the CEDAW 
Optional Protocol also support a conclusion that Rwanda approaches international human rights 
treaties with a goal towards avoiding costly commitments.  As to the CAT treaty which requires 
only state reporting, Rwanda did not ratify that treaty until December 2008, which as discussed 
below, was only after it had abolished the death penalty in 2007.  In addition, it did not ratify the 
CEDAW Optional Protocol allowing for individual complaints until December 2008, a date by 
which it could likely see that the Committee overseeing those complaints – as mentioned in 
Chapter Four – is not particularly active.391  Of course, it is true that given the genocide and the 
difficulties of rebuilding the country in the aftermath of that tragedy, the government likely lost 
many years in which it would even consider joining international human rights treaties.  
However, Rwanda has stabilized in recent years, and its timing in ratifying the CAT and its 
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decision to ratify only the one treaty containing additional enforcement mechanisms suggest that 
it retrospectively calculates its compliance costs and seeks to avoid committing to treaties with 
which it cannot comply. 
Indeed, with respect to the CAT, not only did Rwanda wait to ratify the CAT until after it 
had abolished the death penalty, but it also only abolished the death penalty when it realized that 
doing so could aid it in recapturing its sovereign rights to prosecute perpetrators of the genocide.  
One main reason that states in Europe and the ICTR were refusing to transfer genocide cases to 
Rwanda to try domestically was because Rwanda‘s laws allowed it to impose the death 
penalty.
392
  Therefore, on March 16, 2007, the government abolished the death penalty – but only 
for persons who were convicted in a case transferred to Rwanda from the ICTR.  Only later, in 
July 2007, did the government entirely abolish the death penalty from Rwandan law.
393
  By the 
new laws, however, certain offenses that were previously punished by the death penalty were 
punishable instead by life imprisonment with ―special provisions,‖ – meaning that persons may 
have to serve their life sentences in solitary confinement.
394
  Nevertheless, and providing further 
evidence that the Rwandan government‘s changes to its sentencing laws were motivated by a 
strategic desire to obtain the transfer of ICTR cases, that ―special provisions‖ law was amended 
to exclude genocide suspects transferred by the ICTR.  Specifically, after the ICTR court refused 
a transfer request because there was a possibility that Rwandan courts might impose life 
imprisonment in solitary confinement, in November 2008, Rwanda passed another law which 
provides that life imprisonment with special provisions shall not be imposed in cases transferred 
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to Rwanda from the ICTR.
395
   
In short, although international human rights organizations still accuse Rwanda of 
treating its prisoners poorly and argue that imposition of life imprisonment with solitary 
confinement constitutes torture,
396
 the facts still demonstrate that Rwanda only ratified the CAT 
after it had taken steps to minimize the costs of complying with the treaty.  After all, unlike the 
ICCPR, the CAT is not express in stating that for countries ―which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed‖ for the most serious crimes.397 And, courts in many 
parts of the world have concluded that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment.
398
  As to life imprisonment with solitary confinement, on the other hand, whether 
that constitutes torture may be less clear.  For example, the Human Rights Committee has stated 
only that ―prolonged solitary confinement of the . . . imprisoned person may amount to‖ torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
399
  Thus, although Rwanda‘s sentencing regime still 
may be subjected to criticism, by joining the CAT only after it had abolished the death penalty, 
Rwanda eliminated the death penalty as a subject of criticism by the Committee against Torture 
or others.       
The evidence also suggests that Rwanda joined the CEDAW Optional Protocol in 
December 2008 only when it could have been assured that compliance costs and the associated 
risks to its sovereignty would not be significant.  That Convention provides that States Parties 
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms and agree to pursue policies of 
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eliminating discrimination against women in all fields – including the political, social, economic, 
and cultural fields.  By the Optional Protocol, states agree that individuals may file complaints 
with a committee alleging that the state has not complied with treaty requirements.  Although the 
Optional Protocol does contain increased enforcement mechanisms, the evidence also suggests 
that by joining the treaty, Rwanda does not face a significant threat to its sovereignty.  First, a 
review of the Committee‘s 2009 draft concluding observations regarding Rwanda show that 
Rwanda is not particularly noncompliant with the treaty‘s terms and that ―a number of changes 
in laws, policies and programmes with positive impact on the rights of women have occurred‖ 
recently.
400
 Second, the CEDAW Committee reviewing individual complaints is not particularly 
active, and Rwanda would have reason to believe that it would not be subjected to such 
complaints.  Even if individuals did file complaints against Rwanda, the Committee is only 
entitled to try to persuade the country to adopt its views.  Therefore, because it may be able to 
substantially comply with treaty terms, and because the Committee is not particularly active, and 
in any event has no power to force Rwanda to adopt its views, Rwanda likely determined that 
committing to the CEDAW Optional Protocol would not impose significant sovereignty costs.   
 One might ask why Rwanda would join any international human rights institution given 
the difficult relationship it has had with the international community both before and after the 
genocide.  Indeed, Rwanda joined the CAT and the CEDAW Optional Protocol while under the 
leadership of President Kagame, a person who has been vocal in expressing his frustration with 
and distrust of the international human rights community.  While one may never know precisely 
why Rwanda joined these institutions, the facts still suggest that the decisions to join were based 
on rational and retrospective calculations about the costs of complying with treaty terms.  By 
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abolishing the death penalty, and thereafter joining the CAT, Rwanda hopes to make a better 
case for being able to try genocide cases domestically – something of a bid to regain some 
sovereign rights.  In addition, even putting aside the fact that Rwanda may be able to sufficiently 
comply with these treaties, the treaties do not have enforcement mechanisms that are strong 
enough to impose significant sovereignty costs on Rwanda.  By joining these treaties, unlike by 
joining the ICC, Rwanda is not agreeing that an international body can bring its citizens before a 
court in The Hague if that international body decides that Rwanda‘s practices and processes do 
not meet international standards.  Instead, because commitment to these treaties is not 
particularly costly, Rwanda can join as ―window dressing‖ only and appear to embrace 
international human rights norms.  Such window dressing could be beneficial given that Rwanda 
is presently on a path whereby it is pursuing economic growth and the international investment 
that can be critical to that growth.  As Steven Kinzer explains, President Kagame‘s goal is to pull 
Rwanda from poverty into prosperity in relatively short order.
401
  
Rwanda and the ICC:  Assessing the Explanatory Power of the Credible Threat 
Theory 
 
As noted above, Rwanda did express some interest in an international criminal court, but 
it has neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute.  Based on the evidence outlined above, the 
country‘s decision to refrain from joining the ICC is not surprising, and indeed, is consistent with 
the credible threat theory.  Because Rwanda‘s human rights practices and domestic law 
institutions are poor, Kagame has acted rationally in focusing on the credible threat associated 
with the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms and in refusing to relinquish Rwanda‘s sovereign right 
to mete out justice as it sees fit to an international institution that would be able to substitute its 
own judgment as to what is right and proper for Rwanda‘s.  And, Rwanda‘s decision to refrain 
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from joining the ICC is consistent with its behavior in connection with other international human 
rights treaties.  The evidence suggests that Rwanda acts in a rational and strategic manner when 
determining whether or not to join international human rights treaties and avoids those with 
strong enforcement mechanisms and with which it cannot comply.  For example, the country 
only joined the CAT after it had abolished the death penalty, and it only abolished the death 
penalty so that it could regain its sovereign right to prosecute genocide suspects domestically.   
The explanatory power of the credible threat theory is all the more clear when one 
compares it to the explanatory power of Simmons and Danner‘s credible commitment hand-tying 
theory.  Those scholars argue that by committing to the ICC, states with weak domestic 
accountability mechanisms can credibly demonstrate that they will not resort to the usual tactics 
that recklessly endanger civilians, such as wantonly mistreating prisoners and violently 
persecuting opposition groups, since should they do so, they may be prosecuted.
402
  But, Rwanda 
is a case that clearly demonstrates that countries with poor practices and weak domestic 
accountability will not necessarily want to tie their hands by committing to the ICC and risking 
prosecution.   
The evidence shows that Kagame wants to rule in his way without interference; he does 
not want his actions or leadership style judged or challenged by others; and he certainly does not 
want himself or his colleagues to be subjected to the possibility of prosecution by an 
international institution.  However, by joining the ICC, states must agree that an international 
institution has the right to require the country‘s citizens to stand for trial in The Hague if the 
institution decides the country was ―unwilling or unable‖ to prosecute any of covered crimes 
domestically.  The evidence does not suggest that Kagame would accept such a costly 
arrangement especially since he has had the experience of having his country‘s and his soldiers‘ 
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human rights practices criticized by the world community.  He has justified conduct by the RPF 
that some in the international community have argued constitute mass atrocities.  When he was 
criticized for how he and his soldiers handled closing the refugee camps, he fought back by 
arguing that the actions were necessary given the threat to Rwanda and given the inaction of the 
world community.  And, Kagame‘s leadership style is still being criticized to this day – a fact 
which would contribute to a conclusion that joining the ICC would be risky and costly.  Even 
recent reports of international human rights organizations accuse Kagame of ruling repressively, 
treating prisoners badly, and persecuting his political opponents. 
In addition, there is much evidence which shows that Kagame does not take kindly to 
criticisms by outsiders, particularly when those outsiders seek to substitute their own judgment 
for his regarding his actions and how he and his government mete out justice.  For example, in 
2006, when a French judge issued a report charging Kagame and others with having orchestrated 
the assassination of President Habyarimana, Kagame responded by breaking diplomatic relations 
with France.
403
 In addition, Kagame admits to having contempt for the various human rights 
groups that claim Rwanda does not respect civil liberties, follow the rule of law, or fairly 
dispense justice.
404
 After Human Rights Watch issued a report claiming that some 20 Rwandans 
had died in police custody, Kagame told reporters that anyone who would make such charges 
had ―‘probably consumed drugs.‘‖405  Kagame also responded badly after Paul Rusesabagina of 
Hotel Rwanda fame accused Kagame and his RPF soldiers of committing mass atrocities against 
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Hutus for which they have not been held accountable.
406
  In a series of speeches and interviews, 
Kagame called Rusesabagina a ―‘hero made in Hollywood‘‖ and disputed that he had saved 
anyone during the genocide.
407
   
Furthermore, Kagame has demonstrated by his actions that he does not agree with the 
international community‘s views as to which persons or what actions should be punished.  
Kagame was active in blocking the ICTR‘s potential prosecutions of RPF soldiers, and while 
some soldiers have been prosecuted domestically, Kagame has stated that he does not view those 
crimes as deserving of the same treatment or punishment as those who committed the genocide.  
And, he defends against allegations that he is wrongly allowing impunity to reign by failing to 
fully prosecute RPF crimes.       
In fact, an examination of Rwanda‘s relationship with the world community in 
connection with the ICTR provides further evidence supportive of the credible threat theory – as 
opposed to the credible commitment theory.  Rwanda‘s actions show that it wanted a tribunal 
that was more or less under its control, and when the tribunal was not structured in the way it 
preferred, it declined to vote for its creation.  It continued to show that it wanted control over the 
ICTR even after it was created.  When the tribunal did not move quickly enough, when it did not 
treat Rwanda‘s witnesses as Rwanda would have expected, and when it turned its sights on 
investigating RPF crimes, Rwanda and its people voiced their displeasure and even ceased 
cooperating with the tribunal.   
Because the evidence shows that Rwanda was frustrated with the ICTR experience and 
how the world community sought to control how Rwanda dealt with the perpetrators of the 
genocide, it makes sense that Rwanda would not join an institution like the ICC over which it 
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could not expect to have control.  And, because Rwanda‘s human rights practices and domestic 
law enforcement institutions have been, and still are, poor and criticized by the world 
community, Rwanda has reason to focus on the credible threat posed by the ICC‘s relatively 
strong enforcement mechanisms.  It makes little sense to suggest that Rwanda would join the 
ICC to demonstrate its credible commitment to end any cycle of violence when the facts show 
that Rwanda‘s autocratic leader does not otherwise impose domestic constraints on his ability to 
rule as he sees fit – even if that means resorting to force and violence.  Instead, because 
compliance with the ICC treaty would be difficult, Rwanda has acted rationally in being wary of 
the credible threat posed by the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, rather than 
embracing those enforcement mechanisms so as to credibly commit to change its behavior – or 
risk being the subject of an international prosecution.   
Not only is Rwanda‘s behavior in refusing to commit to the ICC not consistent with the 
credible commitment theory, but its behavior is also not explained by the normative theories 
about state ratification of international human rights treaties.  For example, even though more 
than half of the countries in Africa have committed to the ICC, and even though according to the 
OECD, Rwanda is classified as one of the world‘s poorest countries, Rwanda has not bowed to 
any actual or implied pressure to act ―appropriately‖ and ratify the ICC so as to be perceived as a 
legitimate state deserving of rewards like aid and trade.  Rwanda has relationships with countries 
in Europe and Africa – many of whom have joined the court.  In fact, in 2009, Rwanda further 
strengthened its relationship with Britain and other countries by becoming a member of the 
British Commonwealth.
408
  In addition, for the years between 1997 and 2007, the European 
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Union and Kenya have been Rwanda‘s top two exports markets.409 Yet, Rwanda has not joined 
the ICC even though the countries from which it receives much of its trading income are 
members.    
It is true that Rwanda did sign a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States 
during the time period in which the United States was a vocal opponent of the ICC.  However, 
that agreement was a reciprocal one in which the United States also promised not to surrender 
any Rwandan citizen to an international tribunal unless both countries were parties to an 
international agreement obligating them to do so.
410
  In addition, the statement Rwanda made 
about signing the agreement only provides more support for the idea that Rwanda is approaching 
the ICC as a self-interested rational actor focused on the costliness of treaty commitment – in this 
case, the fact that the ICC could infringe on Rwanda‘s sovereign right to prosecute its own 
citizens domestically.  President Kagame stated:  ―Well, we thought first of all, we have to deal 
with some of these cases that require such a treatment where if the United States, for example, 
had a case that it's interested in, of their citizen to be tried in the United States, we respect that.  
And I'm sure if we had our own citizen who has committed an offense of a criminal nature, that 
we would have interest in, it would be interesting to us for the United States, where that is 
possible, for the United States to hand over such a person.‖411  
In conclusion, Rwanda‘s actions in refusing to join the ICC are consistent with the 
credible threat theory.  The evidence shows that Rwanda closely guards its sovereignty and is 
distrustful, and even disdainful, of the international community.  It particularly guards its 
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sovereign rights to govern as it deems necessary, even if that means that it may have to use force 
to bring order, peace, and stability to the country.  In addition, the evidence shows that Rwanda 
is protective of its right to mete out justice within its borders.  It has shown that it wants to 
exercise control over the trials of those who committed the 1994 genocide, and it even abolished 
the death penalty and made other changes to its judiciary system so that it may be allowed to 
receive cases transferred from the ICTR.  Furthermore, it has shown that it wants to decide – 
without input from the international community – what suspects and what crimes should be 
punished.  Notwithstanding harsh criticism from some in the international community, the 
Rwandan government has refused to consider RPF crimes as deserving of the same level of 
punishment as those who committed genocide.  Given this evidence, and the fact that Rwanda 
has poor human rights practices and poor domestic law enforcement institutions, it is rational for 
Rwanda to conclude that joining an institution like the ICC with its relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms would impose sovereignty costs that are simply too high to accept.   
Nor do Rwanda‘s very recent comments about the ICC suggest that it will be joining the 
institution in the near future.  Rather, its comments simply serve to confirm that it is aware of the 
ICC‘s enforcement mechanism, but does not trust that the institution operates, or will operate, 
fairly.  Rwanda knew that Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir was the subject of an arrest 
warrant issued by the ICC, yet it defended Kenya‘s decision to allow Al-Bashir to attend a 
ceremony celebrating the passage of a new constitution – even though, as a member of the ICC, 
Kenya had an obligation to arrest Al-Bashir.  Rwanda‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louise 
Mushikiwabo, stated:  ―‘Rwanda totally supports the position of the sister nation, Kenya and the 
presence of Bashir in Kenya.  We need to look at the larger issue of universal jurisdiction and 
ICC in relation to Africa and Africans in particular. . . .  As far as my government is concerned, 
230 
 
this has nothing to do with whether Bashir is innocent or guilty of the crimes he is accused of; it 
is about Africans getting the respect they deserve.  ICC is a good instrument.  We are not against 
it but against only Africans being targeted. . .  Justice doesn‘t walk in a vacuum.  Justice is to 
bring order and not to create chaos to satisfy the international community.  Kenya is [involved] 
in efforts to stabilize Sudan.  Rwanda supports the AU decision on the ICC.‘‖412   
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CHAPTER NINE 
KENYA:  HOPE BECOMES REGRET? 
 
This chapter examines Kenya‘s decision to commit to the ICC notwithstanding its history 
of poor human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement institutions.  While under the 
leadership of long-time President Daniel arap Moi, Kenya signed the ICC treaty on August 11, 
1999 – only about one year after the treaty was available for signature.  Kenya‘s ratification, 
however, came much later – on March 15, 2005 – under the leadership of Kenya‘s current ruler, 
President Mwai Kibaki.    
Unlike Rwanda‘s failure to readily commit to the ICC, Kenya‘s commitment to the ICC 
in 2005 is not consistent with the credible threat theory inasmuch as the data suggest that 
Kenya‘s costs of complying with the ICC treaty and the risks to its sovereignty by joining the 
ICC have been, and continue to be, significant.  For example, between 1994 and 2007, Kenya 
has scored between 1 and 4 on the physical integrity rights scale.  Since 2005 – the year Kenya 
ratified the ICC treaty – it has scored a 3 on the scale.  Furthermore, in addition to having a 
history of poor human rights practices, Kenya – like Rwanda – also appears to lack the kinds of 
institutions that would enable it to fairly and capably prosecute mass atrocities domestically.  
Between 1996 and 2008, Kenya‘s rule of law ratings have averaged approximately -1.00.  Other 
evidence also indicates that Kenya‘s domestic law enforcement capacity has been, and continues 
to be, weak.  A Special Rapporteur for the United Nations pointed to the ―terrible‖ Kenyan 
criminal justice system, at least in part, to explain why police could murder with impunity.  He 
noted that the investigation, prosecution, and judicial processes in Kenya are slow and corrupt.
413
  
Therefore, if Kenya had perceived the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms as 
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a credible threat, even in 2005, rational retrospective cost calculations should have caused it to 
refuse to commit to the Rome Statute because the fact of its poor human rights practices and 
weak domestic law enforcement institutions indicated that it might not be able to comply with 
treaty terms.  
Indeed, this case study of Kenya well illustrates the perils a state may encounter when it 
commits to an international human rights treaty with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, 
but where the facts show that compliance with treaty terms may be difficult.  In November 2009, 
the ICC‘s Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo for the first time used his propio motu powers and 
sought authorization to open an investigation into the violence that occurred after the 2007 
election of President Kibaki.
414
  More than 1000 people died – and some 300,000 were displaced 
– during the course of ethnically charged violence that erupted after President Kibaki was 
declared the winner of the December 2007 elections which challenger Raila Odinga and his 
supporters argued were rigged.
415
  Although the ICC Prosecutor had given Kenya numerous 
opportunities to avoid an ICC prosecution by establishing a local tribunal to try those responsible 
for the violence, after Kenya‘s parliament failed to pass a bill establishing a tribunal, the ICC 
granted the Prosecutor‘s request to proceed.416  By an order dated March 31, 2010, the ICC 
authorized the Prosecutor to launch an investigation into the crimes against humanity which 
allegedly occurred during the course of Kenya‘s 2007 post-election violence.417  On December 
15, 2010, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo announced his intention to charge six prominent Kenyans 
from Kibaki‘s and Odinga‘s political parties with having committed crimes against humanity for 
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their roles in organizing the post-election violence.
418
  Apparently, the sovereignty costs 
associated with complying with the ICC treaty became overwhelmingly clear to some in Kenya 
after the Prosecutor announced his list of suspects:  immediately, a member of Kenya‘s 
parliament put forth a motion to withdraw from the ICC.
419
  And, even though the country has 
not to date withdrawn from the ICC, it continues its efforts to stop the ICC‘s processes vis-à-vis 
the six Kenyans charged with committing crimes against humanity.
420
 
But, even though Kenya‘s decision to commit to the ICC in 2005 is not consistent with 
the credible threat theory, I suggest that in the years both before and after ratification, Kenya‘s 
behavior is consistent with that theory.  As noted above, although Kenya promptly made the 
costless decision to sign the Rome Statute, it waited another six years to actually ratify the treaty.  
By its participation in Rome Conference negotiations, Kenya knew of the content of the ICC‘s 
enforcement mechanisms and that states had agreed to create a strong and independent court and 
prosecutor.  And, for the following six years – during all of which Kenya had poor human rights 
practices and weak domestic law enforcement institutions – Kenya refused to make the costly 
decision of committing to the ICC treaty.  That costs likely explains Kenya‘s decision during this 
time period to refrain from ratifying the ICC is supported by other evidence as well.  In fact, 
Kenya has consistently refused to commit to international human rights treaties with any but the 
weakest enforcement mechanisms. 
In addition, Kenya‘s behavior post-ratification is consistent with the credible threat 
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theory inasmuch as Kenya has shown that it does not now want to be bound to a treaty that it 
now knows only too well is imposing significant costs on its sovereignty.  As described in more 
detail below, the record shows a government that in the aftermath of the 2007 post-election 
violence is intent on ensuring that impunity reigns.  The Kenyan government has not prosecuted 
those most responsible for the violence.
 421
  In addition, it refused to follow the ICC‘s 
recommendations and set up a Special Tribunal within Kenya to try perpetrators.
 422
  
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that Kenya is not fully cooperating with the ICC 
Prosecutor‘s efforts to gather evidence. 423  Finally, immediately after the Prosecutor named the 
six suspects that he intended to try in The Hague, Kenya‘s parliament voted overwhelmingly to 
withdraw from the ICC.
 424
  Of course, now that the ICC has demonstrated that it will enforce 
compliance with treaty terms and try perpetrators of mass atrocities where States Parties fail to 
act, those same Kenyan legislators now argue that it would be better to establish a local tribunal 
to try perpetrators – something they could have done years ago. 425  In short, because Kenya is 
either unwilling or unable to comply with the terms of the Rome Statute, and because it is only 
too aware of the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms, it is now acting consistently with the credible 
threat theory and seeking to avoid its commitment to the court.     
Even though Kenya‘s 2005 ratification is not consistent with the credible threat theory, 
however, the evidence also discredits the power of the credible commitment theory to explain 
Kenya‘s behavior.  Kenya is a state with a history of poor human rights practices and a history of 
civil violence.  Accordingly, it could be amongst the states whose ICC ratification behavior 
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could be explained by the credible commitment theory.  In fact, according to a Human Rights 
Watch report, Kenya has often experienced ethnic violence leading up to or following elections 
inasmuch as candidates are elected not so much for their unique political ideology, but instead 
along ethnic lines.  It reports that some of the worst episodes of violence occurred between 1991 
and 1993 when President Moi stirred up ethnic violence against the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley so 
as to consolidate his favorable votes among the Kalinjin people once they had driven out the 
Kikuyu.  That violence resulted in some 1500 dead and another 300,000 displaced.
426
 Under the 
credible commitment theory, one might have expected that President Moi – an authoritarian ruler 
– would have joined the ICC so as to credibly commit to end the cycle of violence.  But, he only 
signed the ICC treaty – establishing that he did not embrace the ICC‘s strong enforcement 
mechanisms.  Of course, I suggest that Moi‘s refusal to commit to the ICC is not surprising:  as 
an authoritarian leader, he did not want to impose any domestic constraints on his power to do as 
he wished; therefore, it would make little sense for him to impose international constraints on his 
power.   
Rather, and further discrediting the explanatory power of the credible commitment 
theory, Kenya ratified the ICC treaty only after it had purportedly transitioned to a democracy 
under the leadership of President Kibaki.
427
  According to Simmons‘ and Danner‘s logic, 
democratic states with poor human rights practices and a recent history of civil violence should 
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avoid committing to the ICC because they have domestic institutions – such as a civil society and 
courts that adhere to the rule of law – which can ensure leaders would be held accountable for 
any future acts of violence.
428
  Of course, although civil society‘s role in Kenya‘s governance has 
increased since Kibaki‘s reign,429 Kenya‘s continued weak rule of law ratings indicate that its 
domestic institutions may not be independent enough or capable enough to fairly dispense 
justice.  Nor does the anecdotal evidence indicate there are strong domestic institutions that 
could hold President Kibaki accountable should he resort to violence.  Indeed, although he may 
not have participated in the 2007 post-election violence, Kibaki was the country‘s disputed 
leader while that violence in which his security forces participated was ongoing,
 430
 and his 
government has allegedly failed to hold any high-level perpetrators accountable for the violence 
they inflicted during the riots.
 431
   
Accordingly, perhaps even under Kibaki‘s reign, one might characterize Kenya as a non-
democracy with a history of civil violence and a country that should embrace joining the ICC so 
as to credibly commit to end Kenya‘s cycle of violence and the impunity that accompanies such 
violence.  But, even so, the credible commitment theory fails to explain Kenya‘s decision to join 
the ICC in 2005.  Again, the fact of the 2007 post-election violence; the fact that Kibaki‘s 
allegedly rigged election prompted the violence; and the fact that Kibaki‘s police forces 
allegedly committed many crimes during the riots for which they have not been held accountable 
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all suggest that Kenya does not want to commit to end any cycle of violence.
432
 Furthermore, the 
facts immediately after Kenya committed to the ICC show that Kibaki did not want to be held 
accountable domestically, and there is no reason to believe he wants to be held accountable by 
the ICC.  Indeed, only months after Kenya committed to the ICC, Kibaki proposed a new 
constitution – but it was one that the voters overwhelmingly rejected because by it, Kibaki 
refused to release his stronghold on executive power.
433
  Thus, whether one characterizes Kenya 
as a democracy or a non-democracy, the facts still do not support the explanatory power of the 
credible commitment theory to explain Kenya‘s ICC ratification behavior.  
This chapter is organized as follows.  First, by way of background, I examine Kenya‘s 
transition from the leadership of President Moi to that of President Kibaki.  I then look at 
Kenya‘s behavior in connection with other international human rights treaties in an effort to 
generate a more complete picture of what factors influence its commitment decisions.  Next, I 
trace Kenya‘s participation in the creation of the ICC, and its decisions to sign and later ratify the 
Rome Statute.  The following section examines Kenya‘s compliance with ICC treaty terms, 
addressing in particular the 2007 post-election violence, the ICC‘s investigation of that violence, 
and the government‘s responses to it.  Finally, I assess the credible threat theory and other 
competing theories in light of Kenya‘s behavior up to and following ratification of the Rome 
Statute and explore how and whether each is able to explain that behavior.  I conclude that 
although Kenya‘s decision to ratify the ICC treaty in 2005 is not consistent with the credible 
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threat theory, in the years both before and after ratification, Kenya‘s acts have been consistent 
with those of a rational state concerned with compliance costs.  Simply put, Kenya did not 
immediately ratify the Rome Statute, and now that the strength of the treaty‘s enforcement 
mechanisms is all too obvious, many in the Kenyan government have indicated they want to 
withdraw from the treaty – or at least stop the ICC‘s processes.   
Background:  Kenya’s Transition from the Moi to the Kibaki Presidency 
For some 24 years prior to December 2002, Kenya was ruled as an autocracy by 
President Daniel arap Moi, leader of the Kenyan African National Union (―KANU‖).  Moi is 
charged with being responsible for Kenya‘s abject poverty because of his administration‘s 
endemic corruption and plunder of state resources.  In addition, as noted above, under Moi, 
Kenya‘s human rights practices and the quality of its domestic law enforcement institutions were 
both poor.  Human Rights Watch reports issues with personal security resulting from, among 
other things, police brutality.  In terms of the judiciary, not only was it accused of taking bribes, 
but also the president‘s power over the judiciary allowed executive interference with its 
operations and decisions.
434
  In addition, as noted above, since the restoration of multi-party 
politics in 1991, significant ethnic-based violence accompanied Moi‘s electoral wins in 1992 and 
1997.  Human Rights Watch reports that during the 1990s, at least 2000 people were killed and 
some 400,000 displaced in politically-motivated violence directed at ethnic groups perceived to 
support Moi‘s opponents.  Although high-ranking party officials evidently directly instigated the 
violence, Moi generally allowed impunity to reign and refused to punish the instigators.
435
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In 2002, Kibaki came to power on a platform promising sweeping constitutional and 
judicial reforms and pledging to put an end to the endemic corruption that had characterized 
Moi‘s administration.436  However, although after Kibaki‘s victory Kenya has been characterized 
as a democracy, the promised reforms were often delayed or – in some cases – not forthcoming.  
According to a 2008 Human Rights Watch report, ―[d]espite a promising start – which included 
improvements in freedom of expression and association coupled with strong economic growth – 
corruption,
437
 patronage politics, state-sponsored violence, and persistent police abuses have 
defined the order of the day.‖438  Moreover, the constitution limiting presidential powers that 
Kibaki promised to deliver within 100 days of assuming the office of president was actually not 
delivered until August 2010.  Kibaki did present a draft constitution in 2005, but that constitution 
included a non-executive prime minister who was subservient to the president.  As a result, the 
2005 draft constitution was rejected by voters.
439
  Kibaki‘s response to that rejection only served 
to further demonstrate his reluctance to deliver on his campaign promise to limit presidential 
power since he thereafter dismissed his entire cabinet – including all of those who supported his 
opponent and present Prime Minister, Raila Odinga (a man who had helped get Kibaki elected in 
2002).
440
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Kenya’s Participation in the International Human Rights Regime:  Avoiding 
Costly Commitment 
 
In the context of Kenya‘s conduct vis-à-vis other international human rights treaties, 
Kenya‘s decision to ratify the Rome Statute in 2005 is somewhat unusual since the country 
typically avoids international human rights treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms.  As 
shown in Table 23, Kenya has ratified only those treaties with the weakest enforcement 
mechanisms – those that require the state to self-report its compliance.  Thus, even if it cannot 
comply with treaty terms – and Kenya may not be able or willing to comply with them based on 
its human rights ratings – Kenya faces no real consequences for committing to the six treaties 
listed below.  That Kenya has otherwise refused to ratify any of the other treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms suggests that Kenya typically avoids costly commitment and risks to 
its sovereignty:  it avoids treaties with which it may not be able to comply where the 
enforcement mechanisms may result in a situation where Kenya could be punished for its non-
compliance.   
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Table 23:  Commitment to the Six Primary International Human Rights 
Treaties 
Treaty Enforcement Mechanism Date Open Ratification Date 
ICCPR Reports 1966 1972 
ICESCR Reports 1966 1972 
CERD Reports 1966 2001 
CEDAW Reports 1980 1984 
CAT Reports 1984 1997 
CRC Reports 1989 1990 
ICCPR Art. 41 State Complaints 1966 -- 
CAT Art. 21 State Complaints 1984 -- 
ICCPR Opt. Individual Complaints 1966 -- 
CERD 14 Individual Complaints 1966 -- 
CAT 22 Individual Complaints 1984 -- 
CEDAW Opt. Individual Complaints 1999 -- 
CAT Opt. Committee Visits 2003 -- 
 
In sum, when considered in the context of its ratification behavior concerning other 
international human rights treaties, Kenya‘s decision to ratify the ICC seems less than rational – 
and inconsistent with the credible threat theory.  Because Kenya had poor human rights practices 
and weak domestic law enforcement institutions, all indications were that compliance with ICC 
treaty terms would be difficult and costly.   
Kenya’s Commitment to the ICC:  Rationality Succumbs to Pressure 
Kenya did participate in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statute, 
and although the few records of its statements indicate that it supported the idea of a court, it was 
more inclined to favor fewer powers for the prosecutor.  Summary records of the proceedings at 
the Rome Conference show that Kenya‘s Head of Delegation and Attorney General, Mr. Wako, 
―reaffirmed Kenya‘s commitment to the establishment of an effective, impartial, credible and 
independent international criminal court, free from political manipulation, pursuing only the 
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interests of justice, with due regard to the rights of the accused and the interests of the victims‖ 
and stated that his delegation would support all efforts to seek consensus on the establishment of 
the court.
441
   He further referenced the central importance of the principle of complementarity 
which would allow the ICC to act only where national criminal justice systems ―were not 
available or were ineffective.‖442 However, in the case of proprio motu powers for the 
prosecutor, Kenya‘s Mr. Kandie stated that his delegation saw no reason why the prosecutor 
should have such powers inasmuch as the twin triggers of state and Security Council referrals 
(subject to appropriate controls) should be sufficient to cover all cases that would need to go 
before the court.
443
  Mr. Mwangi of Kenya said that while his delegation was prepared to support 
automatic acceptance by states of jurisdiction over the core crimes upon ratification, his 
delegation ―continued to doubt the desirability of conferring proprio motu powers‖ on the 
prosecutor since he might be subject to political pressures.  However, Mr. Mwangi stated that his 
delegation would not stand in the way of a consensus on the issue.
444
   
But, making statements during treaty negotiations – and even signing international human 
rights treaties – does not subject states to compliance costs.  Thus, even though Kenya‘s 
representatives made statements during negotiations indicating their support for the 
establishment of a strong and independent ICC with the goal of ending impunity for perpetrators 
of mass atrocities, and even though Kenya signed the Rome Statute in August, 1999, none of 
those acts bound Kenya to comply with the terms of the ICC treaty.  Rather, the fact that Kenya 
did not ratify the Rome Statute during Moi‘s reign is consistent with the credible threat theory.  
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First, Kenya knew of the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms in the form of 
an independent court and prosecutor.  In fact, it voiced objections to granting the prosecutor the 
strong proprio motu powers that states eventually agreed on at the conclusion of the Rome 
Conference.  Because at the time of the Rome Conference and for years thereafter, Kenya was an 
authoritarian state with poor human rights practices, poor domestic law enforcement institutions, 
and a reputation for government-sponsored violence that went unpunished, it makes sense that 
the country would not want to commit to a treaty like the Rome Statute with relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms.   
In any event, there is little reason to believe that the statements Kenya made during Rome 
Statute negotiations reflected Kenya‘s sincere commitment to embrace an international norm 
aimed at ending impunity.  In this vein, it is interesting to note that Kenya‘s Head of Delegation 
during the Rome Statute negotiations, Mr. Wako, has been Kenya‘s Attorney General from 1991 
to the present.  Accordingly, he has been Kenya‘s top law enforcement official during these 
many years that Kenya has had poor human rights practices, a corrupt government, and 
institutions that allow impunity to reign.  He has been Kenya‘s top law enforcement official 
during all of the violent election-related clashes that have occurred since Kenya began allowing 
multi-party politics in 1991.  And, although he spoke during negotiations of Kenya‘s 
commitment to a strong and independent court to punish impunity, even recently he has been 
criticized for failing to end Kenya‘s cycle of impunity and accused of being an obstacle in the 
country‘s fight against corruption.  In fact, in October 2009, the United States banned Attorney 
General Wako from traveling to the United States, citing these very same criticisms and alleging 
that he has been responsible for deliberately blocking political reforms following the 2007 post-
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election violence.
445
 Although Mr. Wako denies the allegations, the very fact that he has been the 
country‘s top law enforcement official during many years of violence and impunity tends to 
suggest that his words during Rome Conference negotiations were more in the nature of ―empty 
promises.‖446   
  In March 2005, however, and despite the fact that its human rights ratings and rule of law 
ratings remained poor, Kenya ratified the Rome Statute.  Although one may never know exactly 
why Kenya decided to ratify the treaty at that time, for the most part its decision to do so – given 
its poor prospects for compliance – is not consistent with the credible threat theory.  It is true that 
after Kibaki was elected, Kenya began being classified as a democracy, rather than an autocracy.  
And, it is true that Kibaki was elected based on a platform that promised democratic reforms, an 
end to corruption, and greater respect for the rule of law.  But, although this evidence may have 
suggested a potential for compliance, the bulk of the evidence does not suggest that at the time of 
ratification, Kenya had fully committed to bettering its practices so as to ensure its compliance 
with ICC treaty terms and its norms against ending impunity.  As noted above, although Kibaki 
had promised to promptly deliver a new constitution that would limit executive powers, he did 
not deliver a new constitution until late 2005, and the constitution he delivered did not limit 
presidential powers.  These actions, which occurred after the ratification of the ICC treaty, do not 
suggest a leader who is truly committed to democratic reforms.  And, of course, as described in 
more detail below, the record otherwise also indicates that Kenya had little intention of 
complying with the ICC treaty.  The facts suggesting that Kibaki rigged his own 2007 election 
and the fact that he was the leader at the time of the post-election violence which involved his 
own security forces are proof that Kibaki was not committed to democratic practices or 
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improving Kenya‘s human rights practices.   
But, if Kenya was unable to, or did not intend to, comply with ICC treaty terms, why 
would it commit to a treaty that had strong enforcement mechanisms which could be invoked to 
punish it – with great costs to its sovereignty – for failing to comply?  One answer, of course, is 
that Kenya did not view the Rome Statute‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat.  But, 
this answer is less than satisfying.  After all, Kenya did participate in negotiations and was aware 
of treaty terms.  Also, that Kenya understands the potential threat of stronger enforcement 
mechanisms is evidenced by the fact that it has not ratified any of the main international human 
rights treaties with enforcement mechanisms beyond self-reporting.  Finally, by the time Kenya 
ratified the ICC treaty, it knew the ICC had already commenced some cases – although the 
prosecutor had not yet commenced a case using his proprio motu powers.  Prior to March 2005, 
in fact, all of the other four situations before the ICC had already been referred to the court, 
including the Security Council‘s referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan.447 
On the other hand, normative pressure may have helped prompt Kenya to commit to the 
ICC when it did and despite the treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms.  There is 
evidence that Kenya was subjected to considerable domestic and international lobbying designed 
to persuade it to commit to the Rome Statute – particularly after Kibaki became President.  After 
all, Kibaki and his government had claimed to be democratic reformers and interested in 
improving human rights, and refusing to commit to the ICC might be viewed as contrary to such 
a reformist agenda.  Indeed, in October 2004, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
sponsored a forum to raise awareness about the importance of the ICC and other institutions.  In 
January 2005, the CICC and its members chose Kenya as its target country on which to focus its 
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ICC ratification efforts.
 448
  Among other things, the CICC referenced Kenya‘s role as a peace-
builder in Africa and suggested that Kenya‘s ratification of the ICC would send an ―‘important to 
signal to other African states who have yet to ratify about Africa‘s growing commitment to 
international justice and the rule of law.‘‖ 449  Furthermore, by 2005, some 26 other African 
countries were already ICC members, a fact which some argued reflected badly on Kenya‘s 
image.
450
 And, after Kenya ratified the ICC treaty, it was praised for sending a strong message 
that it will make a break from its past cycle of impunity.
451
   
As discussed in more detail below, however, Kenya‘s post-ratification behavior does not 
demonstrate that it was committed to breaking from its past cycle of impunity.  The evidence 
instead suggests that Kenya may have succumbed to normative pressure to ratify the ICC treaty, 
but without committing to the required normative changes that would allow it to comply with 
treaty terms.   
Kenya’s Commitment to the ICC Post-Ratification: Mainly a Record of Non-
Compliance 
 
The Refusal to Sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement 
One fact which may have suggested the sincerity of Kenya‘s intention to comply with the 
ICC‘s terms was its refusal to bow to United States pressure to sign a bilateral immunity 
agreement.  Apparently the United States had sought Kenya‘s signature on an immunity 
agreement since 2003, threatening to suspend a military aid package of approximately $9.8 
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million should Kenya refuse to sign.
452
  However, The United States stepped up its pressure to 
get Kenya to sign an immunity agreement after Kenya ratified the ICC in March 2005.  Although 
Kenya purportedly initially looked favorably on the agreement, it ultimately succumbed to 
domestic and international groups which were beseeching Kenya not to sign.  Among other 
things, those groups stressed Kenya‘s sovereignty, but also the fact that signing the agreement 
would contradict its obligations under the Rome Statute.
453
  Kenya‘s decision to withstand 
United States pressure was well-received by the international community:  the CICC sent a letter 
to President Kibaki stating that ―Kenya‘s decision to uphold its commitment to the ICC treaty 
and to the concept of equality of all before the law despite the threatened loss of US aid 
‗exemplifies a victory of principle over brute power.‘‖454 
 Thus, in the early days after ratification, the fact of Kenya‘s refusal to sign a bilateral 
immunity agreement could be viewed as evidence that Kenya was normatively committed to the 
court and intended to abide by its obligations under the Rome Statute.  That piece of evidence 
suggesting an intention to comply, however, it generally outweighed by the evidence which 
tends to demonstrate a lack of normative commitment to ending impunity.
455
  First, even Kenya‘s 
refusal to sign the immunity agreement eventually became irrelevant.  In January 2009, the 
United States waived the prohibitions on aid to Kenya on the grounds that supporting Kenya 
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militarily was important to the national interests of the United States.
456
  Second, as discussed in 
more detail below, the facts of the 2007 post-election violence and Kenya‘s interactions with the 
ICC regarding its investigation of that violence are not compatible with those of a country 
committed to good human rights practices and an intention to end impunity for those who 
commit serious international crimes.  Finally, also as discussed below, Kenya‘s decision to invite 
Sudan‘s President Bashir to Kenya to celebrate its new constitution in August 2010 is further 
evidence of Kenya‘s non-compliance with the ICC‘s terms.  Indeed, Kenya‘s actions are quite 
clearly at odds with the statement Kenya‘s Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moses 
Wetangula, made about Kenya‘s intended compliance shortly after it refused to sign an immunity 
agreement with the United States.  He said:  ―‘The Kenyan government has no intention of 
exempting anybody or any country under any circumstances [from the operation of the ICC‘s 
processes].‘‖457 Yet, it was Mr. Wetangula himself who invited Bashir to visit Kenya, 
notwithstanding that Bashir was the subject of an ICC arrest warrant.
458
   
The 2007 Post-Election Violence and the ICC Investigation 
The facts surrounding Kenya‘s 2007 post-election violence and Kenya‘s interactions with 
the ICC as a result of that violence are proof of Kenya‘s refusal to comply with treaty terms.  
They also suggest that Kenya‘s ratification did not signify any sincere intention to commit to 
positive normative change.  As noted above, Kenya has had a history of election-related ethnic 
violence – a fact of which President Kibaki was well-aware when Kenya ratified the ICC treaty.  
Yet, Kibaki allegedly rigged election results which voting tallies had suggested were favoring 
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Kibaki‘s opponent, Raila Odinga.459  Even if Kibaki did not himself rig the results, his actions 
after Odinga‘s party alleged Kibaki had committed electoral fraud did not help to ease an already 
tense situation.  Indeed, within only one hour after the Chair of the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya declared Kibaki the winner of the presidential elections – and even though Odinga‘s party 
was still alleging fraud – Kibaki quickly had himself sworn into office before the people had any 
chance to voice their anger or concern.
460
  Immediately after the results were announced to the 
public, violence erupted.  Although reports suggest that some violence was spontaneous and 
some was orchestrated by Odinga supporters against the ethnic groups that supported Kibaki, the 
facts also show that Kibaki‘s own police forces actually contributed to the violence which left 
more than one thousand people dead and hundreds of thousands displaced.
461
  
As the extent of the violence became known, the international community intervened, and 
established a mediation process led by former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi 
Annan.  The main outcome of that process was the formation of a grand coalition Government, 
with Kibaki as President and Odinga as Prime Minister.  In addition, a Commission of Inquiry 
was charged with investigating the post-election violence and making recommendations.  That 
Commission of Inquiry was chaired by Justice Philip Waki, of the Kenyan Court of Appeal.  On 
October 15, 2008, the Commission issued its report (the ―Waki Report‖) which concluded that 
some individuals may have committed crimes against humanity in the context of the post-
election violence.  The Waki Report recommended establishing a Special Tribunal in Kenya, but 
with some judges from the international community, to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate the 
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identified alleged crimes.  In the event the Special Tribunal failed to carry out its functions, the 
Commission recommended delivering to the ICC the names of the individuals most responsible 
for instigating the violence so that they could be prosecuted internationally.  To insure that its 
wishes might be followed, the Commission provided Kofi Annan with a list of names that he 
could give to the ICC in the event the Special Tribunal processes did not proceed.
462
   
As is evident from the fact that the ICC is now proceeding to prosecute six high-level 
Kenyans for crimes against humanity based on their roles in instigating the 2007 post-election 
violence, Kenya did not comply with the Commission‘s recommendations – or its obligations 
under the Rome Statute to put an end to impunity for mass atrocities by prosecuting such crimes 
domestically.  Indeed, far from showing a government committed to ending impunity, this record 
shows a government intent on stonewalling any attempt to hold its representatives accountable, 
whether domestically or internationally.  First, it was only hours before the Waki Commission‘s 
deadline was set to expire – and names forwarded to the ICC – that Kibaki and Odinga finally 
signed a bill starting the legislative process towards establishing a Special Tribunal to try post-
election violence suspects.
463
 Second, when the bill to establish a Special Tribunal came to a 
vote, Parliament rejected it.
464
  And, even though it is true that Kibaki and Odinga presented and 
lobbied for the bill, reports indicate that Kibaki and Odinga were actually less than supportive of 
it.
465
   In fact, one Member of Parliament recently argued to the press that if Kibaki and Odinga 
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had really wanted a Special Tribunal established, they could have used their leadership roles and 
more assertively pressed for it.
466
  Third, Kenya has done little otherwise to hold accountable 
those responsible for instigating the post-election violence and causing thousands of deaths and 
displacements.  Indeed, in its March 31, 2010 decision authorizing the ICC Prosecutor‘s request 
to proceed with his investigation of the post-election violence, the ICC court noted that the only 
domestic investigations and prosecutions were of relatively minor offenses and against persons 
who did not bear the greatest responsibility.
467
    
Kenya‘s interactions with the ICC and its investigation similarly show a government that 
is not committed to ending impunity or complying with its treaty obligations.  Although Kibaki 
and Odinga both pledged to cooperate with the ICC‘s investigation, there is evidence that Kenya 
has been frustrating some of the Prosecutor‘s efforts to gather evidence.  For example, the 
government is arguing that some documents can be withheld on grounds of national security, and 
Kenya‘s police commissioners and officers have refused to give statements.468 Kenya‘s reaction 
to the Prosecutor‘s naming of his six suspects only provides more evidence of a government 
committed to obfuscating the processes of justice.  Immediately thereafter, Kenya‘s parliament 
voted overwhelmingly to withdraw from the ICC,
469
 notwithstanding that polls show that most 
ordinary Kenyans support the ICC and hope that it can bring perpetrators of the violence to 
justice.
470
 Of course, the legislators now argue that it would be better to establish a local tribunal 
to try Kenyans for the crimes committed during the post-election violence.  And, they have now 
presented that plea to halt ICC processes so that Kenya may try 2007 post-election violence 
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suspects domestically to the African Union, the ICC court, and the United Nations.
471
  The 
United Nations Security Council denied that bid for postponement in March 2011, prompting 
Kenya to now appeal to the ICC court to halt the cases on the grounds that it will commence 
domestic proceedings.
472
  But, as one Member of Parliament has noted, had the government 
really wanted a local tribunal, it could have voted for that option a year before.
473
 
Kenya Invites Sudan’s President Bashir to Celebrate its New Constitution 
Kenya‘s decision to invite President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan to attend Kenya‘s August 
2010 celebration of the passage of its new constitution is further evidence that Kenya did not 
support the ICC‘s normative goals or intend to comply with them when it joined the court in 
2005.  On the one hand, Kenya finally implemented a new constitution providing for a more 
decentralized political system which will minimize presidential power and independence of the 
judiciary – facts which suggest that Kenya may be embracing democracy and ideas about 
holding leaders accountable to respect the rule of law.
474
  On the other hand, however, Kenya 
extended an invitation to the celebration of its new constitution to a leader who is the subject of 
an ICC arrest warrant charging him with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
based on violence in Sudan‘s Darfur region which has left some 300,000 people dead.475  Indeed, 
not only did Kenya extend that invitation to President Bashir, it also hosted him in the country 
and allowed him to return to Sudan – a fact which Human Rights Watch has suggested will 
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―‘tarnish [Kenya‘s] celebration of its long-awaited constitution.‘‖476 Kenya‘s own National 
Human Rights and Equality Commission stated that the ―government‘s lack of action is a 
statement of impunity and sends a worrying message on the implementation of the new 
constitution.‖477  As a member of the ICC, Kenya was required to arrest Bashir and transfer him 
to The Hague.  It did not do so even in the face of pleas to cooperate by the ICC and the EU.
478
   
Of course, Kenya has advanced various reasons for its failure to comply with its 
obligations under the ICC treaty, but none changes the fact of its noncompliance.  For example, 
Kenyan representatives have stressed that peace in Southern Sudan and Darfur may suffer if 
African nations are seen to be putting too much pressure on President Bashir.
479
  Kenya has 
further noted that by refusing to arrest Bashir, it is following the recommendation of the African 
Union which decided not to cooperate with the United Nations in arresting Bashir and instead 
asked for a Security Council postponement of the case.
480
  Prime Minister Odinga advanced a 
different reason for failing to take a role in ensuring that Kenya complied with its obligations 
under the Rome Statute:  he claimed not to have been aware that Bashir was invited to the 
celebration of the new constitution.  Members of Odinga‘s party state that Bashir was invited to 
the celebration by Foreign Minister Wetangula, a member of Kibaki‘s party.  Indeed, Odinga is 
reported as saying that he has no problem with Sudan as a neighbor, but that he knows that 
Kenya looks ―‘very bad in the eyes of the international community if [it] invited somebody 
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indicted to spoil the party for us.‘‖   Again, however, actions speak louder than words.  Odinga‘s 
statement suggests he knows Kenya has an obligation to comply with the Rome Statute‘s terms 
and arrest Bashir, but there is no evidence to suggest he took any actions to ensure that 
compliance.    
In sum, even assuming that Kenya had some good reasons for believing that Bashir 
should not be arrested or prosecuted by the ICC, its refusal to arrest him evidences a lack of 
normative commitment to the ICC‘s goals and a refusal to comply with ICC treaty terms.  
Moreover, this is not a situation where Bashir simply appeared in Kenya unannounced.  By 
inviting President Bashir to visit, Kenya purposely went out of its way to demonstrate its disdain 
for the ICC‘s stated goal of ensuring that perpetrators of mass atrocities are brought to justice – a 
goal it committed to advancing by joining the court.   
Kenya and the ICC:  Assessing the Explanatory Power of the Credible Threat 
Theory 
 
Kenya‘s decision to commit to the ICC treaty in 2005 is not consistent with the credible 
threat theory since at that time, Kenya‘s human rights practices were still poor and its domestic 
law enforcement institutions were still weak.  By its participation in the negotiations leading to 
the adoption of the Rome Statute, and by the comments its representatives made during those 
negotiations, there can be no doubt that Kenya knew of the relative strength of the ICC‘s 
enforcement mechanisms.  Yet, and in contrast to its behavior in connection with other 
international human rights treaties, in 2005, Kenya committed to the ICC treaty notwithstanding 
that the facts at the time suggested compliance with treaty terms may be difficult.   
So, why did Kenya commit to the ICC treaty in 2005?  While we may never have an 
unequivocal answer to that question, the evidence does indicate that normative pressures played 
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a significant role in Kenya‘s ratification decision.  By the time it ratified the Rome Statute in 
2005, some 26 African states had already committed to the court.  Moreover, after Kibaki 
became President, Kenya was the subject of considerable domestic and international lobbying 
designed to persuade it to join the ICC.  Indeed, that normative pressures may have contributed 
to Kenya‘s decision to join the ICC seems likely inasmuch as Kenya has not shown itself to be a 
state that joins international human rights treaties with which it may not be able to comply unless 
those treaties have the very weakest enforcement mechanisms.  And, of course, the facts post-
ratification show that Kenya was not really committed to complying with the court‘s normative 
goals.  It is true that Kibaki resisted signing a bilateral immunity agreement with the United 
States.  But, that fact suggesting compliance is easily outweighed by the other evidence – such as 
the 2007 post-election violence, the invitation to Bashir, and the interactions with the ICC – 
which demonstrates Kenya‘s noncompliance with ICC treaty terms.  
On the other hand, although Kenya‘s decision to commit to the ICC in 2005 is not 
consistent with the credible threat theory, Kenya‘s behavior both before and after commitment is 
consistent with the theory – and consistent with the idea that states with bad practices will avoid 
costly commitments with which they cannot, or will not, comply.  Most particularly, the facts 
show that while Kenya was an early signer of the ICC treaty (a costless decision), for some six 
years thereafter, it refused to ratify the treaty and commit to its relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms.  And, of course, during all this time, Kenya had the poor human rights practices 
and weak domestic law enforcement institutions that would make commitment to the court 
particularly costly.  That costs likely explains Kenya‘s decision to refrain from joining the ICC 
during this time period is supported by other evidence as well.  First, Kenya‘s ratification 
behavior in connection with other international human rights treaties shows that it avoids those 
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with stronger enforcement mechanisms.  Furthermore, this was not a situation where ratification 
would have been domestically difficult.  Moi ran the country as an autocracy, and the previous 
Kenyan constitution allowed the president and his cabinet to make treaty ratification decisions. 
In addition, after ratifying the ICC treaty in 2005, Kenya has also acted consistently with 
the credible threat theory in that it has shown that it is well-aware of the strength of the ICC‘s 
enforcement mechanisms and seeks to now avoid its costly commitment.  Not only did Kenya 
fail to comply with ICC treaty terms by virtue of its leaders‘ roles in instigating and participating 
in the 2007 post-election violence, but in the aftermath of that violence, Kenya has allowed 
impunity to reign.  It has not prosecuted those most responsible for the violence; it refused to set 
up a Special Tribunal to try perpetrators; it is not fully cooperating with the ICC‘s investigation; 
and at least some in Kenya‘s government are now seeking to withdraw from the ICC and/or 
seeking to halt its processes.  In short, because Kenya is either unwilling or unable to comply 
with the terms of the Rome Statute, and because it is only too aware of the ICC‘s enforcement 
mechanisms, its behavior is consistent with that predicted by the credible threat theory:  Kenya is 
seeking to avoid its costly commitment to the court.   
    In any event, even if Kenya‘s decision to ratify the ICC in 2005 is not consistent with 
the credible threat theory, it is also not consistent with the credible commitment theory.  First, as 
noted above, Kenya did not ratify the treaty during President Moi‘s reign.  Yet, at that time, the 
country had a history of civil violence, poor human rights practices, and weak institutions of 
domestic accountability – meaning that, according to the credible commitment theory, Moi could 
have benefited from ratifying the ICC treaty so as to tie his hands and demonstrate to his 
domestic audience his intention to end Kenya‘s cycle of violence and impunity.  Again, however, 
there is no reason to believe that Moi would want to subject himself to an international institution 
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that would hold him accountable when he did not want to commit to any domestic accountability 
mechanisms.   
Nor is the fact that Kenya committed to the ICC during Kibaki‘s reign consistent with the 
credible commitment theory.  To the extent that Kenya was a democracy in 2005, then the 
credible commitment theory would predict that a state like Kenya with a history of civil violence 
and poor human rights practices would avoid ICC commitment.  In that case, theory predicts the 
sovereignty costs of commitment would not be outweighed by any benefit from signaling the 
government‘s credible commitment to end any cycle of violence or impunity because the 
stronger domestic institutions of accountability could provide that signal instead to the domestic 
audience.  Yet, Kibaki committed to the ICC at a time after Kenya had theoretically become a 
democracy and had allowed for some controls on his actions – for example, by way of civil 
society institutions like the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights.   
Nor is Kenya‘s decision to commit to the ICC in 2005 consistent with the credible 
commitment theory even if in 2005 one characterizes Kenya as a non-democracy.  It is true that 
if Kenya was a non-democracy in 2005, it acted as predicted by the credible commitment theory 
since it ratified the Rome Statute.  At the same time, however, the evidence post-ratification 
overwhelmingly shows that the Kenyan government did not join the ICC so as to credibly 
commit to end a cycle of violence and impunity.  Rather, Kenya‘s post-ratification record is 
littered with evidence that the country was not committed to ending violence or impunity.  
Again, as to the cycle of violence, both of the main government parties are implicated in the 
2007 post-election clashes that resulted in over 1000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of 
displacements.  The post-ratification evidence regarding ending impunity is equally bad.  First, 
the country is the subject of an ICC investigation precisely because it has failed to hold those 
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accountable for the acts committed during the post-election violence.  Second, it was only in 
August 2010 that the government finally put into force a new constitution that would limit 
presidential powers and provide for greater judicial independence.  And, even that supposed step 
forward in the fight towards ending impunity was marred by the fact that the government 
essentially promoted impunity by asking President Bashir to visit the celebration of the new 
constitution.  Finally, even if Kenya ultimately does not withdraw from the ICC,
 481
 the 
legislature‘s vote for withdrawal is further proof that Kenya is not committed to ending the cycle 
of impunity.
482
  Indeed, the vote itself provides support for the credible threat theory since it 
shows that Kenya recognizes the costliness of committing to the ICC – costs it wants to avoid, 
rather than commit to credibly.  
Along similar lines, it bears noting that Kenya‘s decision to ratify the ICC treaty is also 
not consistent with the hand-tying theory advanced by Andrew Moravcsik to explain the 
ratification behavior of states that are transitioning democracies.  It is true that Kenya may have 
been a transitioning democracy during 2005, but the same evidence discussed above also shows 
that Kenya was not committed to tying its hands to lock-in domestic democratic reforms.
483
  The 
evidence shows instead that Kenya committed to the ICC, but did not at the same time commit to 
the normative changes that would have allowed it to comply with treaty terms.  Instead of 
locking in democratic reforms, after committing to the ICC, Kibaki failed to limit his own 
presidential power as promised; allegedly rigged his own election; and failed to prevent his 
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security forces from committing criminal acts during the violence that followed his disputed 
presidential win.   
In conclusion, although Kenya‘s decision to refrain from committing to the ICC as long 
as it did is consistent with the credible threat theory, Kenya‘s decision to commit to the ICC in 
2005 when it still had poor human rights practices and poor domestic law enforcement 
institutions is not.  Although Kenya was ostensibly in the process of reforming its domestic 
practices and institutions under Kibaki‘s reign, at the time of ratification, and as the country‘s 
later actions show, there is little doubt that the country was not truly ready to commit to 
complying with the terms of the ICC treaty.  And, Kenya‘s decision to ratify the ICC treaty 
without making the concomitant commitment to honor the treaty‘s normative goals has caused it 
to incur significant sovereignty costs:  it is now the subject of an ICC investigation to punish its 
noncompliant behavior.  
But, while that investigation may be bad news for Kenya, the very fact of the 
investigation has served to show the strength of the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms.  The ICC 
prosecutor gave Kenya an opportunity to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of the 2007 post-
election violence domestically, but when it did not, the ICC prosecutor acted.  In fact, for the 
very first time the prosecutor used his proprio motu powers to commence a case.  And, although 
there is much evidence of Kenya‘s noncompliance, the evidence also shows that the cases 
against the six named suspects will go forward.  They will go forward even if Kenya withdraws 
from the ICC.     
The situation with Kenya also serves to show the potential for treaties with strong 
enforcement mechanisms to improve human rights practices and end impunity.  Even if Kenya 
does not commence any of its own domestic investigations, the ICC‘s strong enforcement 
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mechanisms have ensured that at least some of the worst perpetrators will be held accountable.  
In addition, the fact of the ICC‘s investigation into Kenya‘s 2007 post-election violence should 
provide a warning to other states that their failure to comply with treaty terms will not go 
unpunished.  Even if states may have committed to the ICC treaty despite their inability to 
comply and trusting that the enforcement mechanisms would never be invoked, they now have 
evidence to the contrary.  If they want to avoid a fate similar to Kenya‘s – and one might expect 
that if they are at all logical they would – they will improve their human rights practices.   
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
Credible Threat and the Case for Stronger Enforcement Mechanisms 
What explains the puzzle of state commitment to the ICC?  Why would states commit to 
an international human rights treaty with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms even though 
states typically guard their sovereignty?  Can we expect that the more than 100 states that have 
ratified the ICC treaty will abide by treaty terms and protect against human rights abuses and/or 
domestically prosecute any of their citizens who commit mass atrocities?  Can we further expect 
that these more than 100 states are committed to the goal of ending impunity for perpetrators of 
mass atrocities?  On the other hand, why did some 90 states fail to ratify the ICC treaty or do so 
more slowly than others?  Given the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, can 
we expect that states with the worst human rights practices and worst domestic law enforcement 
institutions are among the states that have not ratified?  If the majority of states joining the court 
are also those that already have the best human rights practices, can the ICC really have a 
significant impact on improving universal respect for human rights and deterring mass atrocities?   
These are the questions that were posed in the introduction and to which I suggest this 
study has provided some answers.  Both the quantitative and case study analyses have shown that 
states tend to view the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and 
are more likely to commit to the court when their retrospective calculations about compliance 
costs show that commitment will pose little threat to their sovereignty.  The results of the 
quantitative analyses show that states with good human rights records are more likely to ratify 
the ICC treaty than are states with poor human rights records.  This finding regarding ICC 
commitment is in stark contrast to other published findings for international human rights treaties 
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with the weakest enforcement mechanisms.
484
  Indeed, only very recently, Christine Wotipka and 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui found that states with poor human rights practices were actually more likely to 
ratify international human rights treaties: but all of the treaties included in their study only 
require states to file reports regarding their compliance.
485
 
The finding regarding state commitment to the ICC is also in stark contrast to the results 
of the quantitative tests conducted in this study of state commitment to other international human 
rights treaties.  Those results show that states with poor human rights records regularly commit 
to international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms, but they are 
wary of committing to the treaty creating the ICC.  The implication is that where enforcement 
mechanisms are stronger, states take their commitment to international human rights treaties 
seriously and consider the likely costs to their sovereignty by committing to a treaty that can 
actually punish bad and noncompliant behavior.  Thus, it may be that states are committing to 
treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms in an effort to signal their legitimacy, without any 
real intention of bettering their human rights practices.  At least some of those states may 
conclude that the costs of commitment are cheap and the consequences of noncompliance are 
meager or nonexistent.  On the whole, states may commit to the ICC for other reasons entirely:  
because they intend to comply with treaty terms and seek to realize the treaty‘s goals.  After all, 
according to the terms of the ICC treaty, states can be punished for failing to comply by an 
independent prosecutor and court that can require the state‘s citizens appear in The Hague to 
stand trial for any of the covered crimes.   
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In addition, however, the results of the quantitative analyses also show that states only 
view enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat where those mechanisms include a formal 
grant of power to engage in legally-binding decision making accompanied by resources to coerce 
compliance.  The results in Chapter Four show that states did not view any of the enforcement 
mechanisms in Levels 1 through 4 as a credible threat.  In none of those cases was a state‘s level 
of human rights practices a significant and positive predictor of ratification, suggesting that states 
are not overly concerned with the costs of complying with treaty terms where enforcement 
mechanisms do not include a grant of power to engage in legally-binding decision making.  Only 
in the case of the ICC treaty was a state‘s level of human rights practices a significant and 
positive predictor of ratification.  And, only that treaty contains an enforcement mechanism 
which allows for legally-binding decision making.  States joining the ICC delegate to an 
independent prosecutor and court the powers to mount investigations, issue arrest warrants, 
commence investigations, and punish persons who commit mass atrocities where the state 
refuses or is unable to do so domestically.  Accordingly, the evidence suggests that in the case of 
ICC commitment, states are concerned about the costs of the compliance and the relative 
strength of the ICC treaty‘s enforcement mechanisms and engage in retrospective calculations 
about their likelihood of compliance prior to commitment. 
On the other hand, there is little evidence – either quantitative or qualitative – to support 
the power of the other rationalist theories, the credible commitment theory, or normative theories 
to generally explain state decisions to join the ICC.  For the most part, states are not committing 
to the ICC treaty even though they cannot comply with its terms so as to demonstrate any future 
promise to change their ways and commit to ending violence and impunity in the future.  Nor are 
states as a rule committing to the ICC despite their ability to comply because of normative 
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pressures.  Indeed, the case study of Rwanda well illustrates the explanatory power of the 
credible threat theory as it relates to states with poor human rights practices, a recent history of 
domestic conflict, and weak domestic law enforcement institutions.  The facts show that 
President Kagame is well aware of the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms and also 
that he is aware that Rwanda‘s government and its people may not be able to comply with treaty 
terms.  As to the government, Kagame has made clear that he believes the government may need 
to resort to force and violence in order to ensure that Rwanda does not experience another 
genocidal episode.  And, even though some in the international community have severely 
criticized Kagame for failing to hold his soldiers sufficiently accountable for acts of violence 
committed during the genocide and thereafter, he continues to maintain that he – and Rwanda – 
should be the judge of what justice is proper in Rwanda for acts involving its citizens.  Given 
these facts, the country rationally engaged in retrospective calculations about whether it could 
comply with the ICC‘s treaty‘s terms and avoided committing to a treaty with which it may not 
be able to comply and which could impose significant costs on its sovereign rights to rule and 
administer justice as it believes is necessary and warranted given its history.  
Furthermore, although the Rwanda case study necessarily involved only one state, there 
is reason to believe that the credible threat theory can also explain the decision of other states 
with poor human rights records, a history of domestic violence, and poor domestic law 
enforcement institutions to refuse to ratify the Rome Statute.  Like President Kagame, leaders of 
other states with similarly complicated and violent histories may be wary of committing to 
international institutions that can tie their hands and prevent them from responding with force or 
violence to domestic crises.  On the contrary, states with a history of violence may have the 
kinds of social cleavages that can continue to make civil violence a possibility, and the state may 
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feel justified in responding with force simply so as to quell that violence and establish some 
sense of peace and security for the population as a whole.  Leaders of states with a history of 
domestic violence, like Kagame, are likely to be concerned about the credible threat posed by 
committing to an institution like the ICC with which they may not be able to comply and which 
they cannot control.  Because the costs of committing to such a treaty are high, states that cannot, 
or do not intend to, comply with treaty terms will more typically avoid commitment.   
Naturally, no theory can explain the behavior of all states, and we know that some states 
with poor human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement institutions have 
committed to the ICC.  However, because the ICC treaty has relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms, and because states typically guard their sovereignty, the evidence shows that states 
do not typically make ICC commitment decisions without regard for their ability to comply with 
treaty terms.  In fact, the case study of Kenya provides evidence as to what may happen to states 
that fail to calculate, or disregard calculations about, their costs of compliance when deciding to 
commit to the ICC.  Kenya is now the subject of an ICC investigation, and many in its 
government now want to withdraw from the ICC and escape the yoke of its strong enforcement 
mechanisms.   
But, even if the evidence does suggest that states typically engage in cost-of-compliance 
calculations when determining whether or not to commit to the ICC, does this also mean that 
states committing to the ICC treaty on the whole also intend to comply with treaty terms?  Is 
there evidence that those states embrace and intend to promote international human rights norms 
– including the Rome Statute‘s stated goals of deterring mass atrocities and ending impunity for 
those that commit them?  Although this study cannot provide unequivocal answers to these 
questions, I suggest that there is some support for a conclusion that in the case of the ICC – and 
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on the whole – states are committing to the treaty because they intend to abide by treaty terms 
and seek to end impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities.  First, the fact that more states with 
better human rights practices join the ICC treaty more readily than do states with bad practices 
indicates that states are generally committing because their retrospective cost calculations show 
they can comply with treaty terms and avoid a costly loss of their sovereignty.  The case study 
evidence shows that even states with good human rights practices continue to make efforts to 
comply with ICC treaty terms even after ratifying the statute.  Both Germany and Trinidad and 
Tobago have enacted domestic legislation enabling them to prosecute mass atrocities 
domestically.  Not only does such legislation serve as a warning to the states‘ leaders and 
citizens that human rights abuses will not be tolerated in the future, it also means that those 
countries have taken steps to insure that perpetrators of mass atrocities that seek safe harbor in 
their countries will not be allowed to escape justice.  Thus, the enactment of the legislation alone 
serves to further the goal of deterring crime and ending impunity for mass atrocities.  And, it is 
because of the ICC treaty that these countries have taken these additional steps in furtherance of 
the treaty‘s goals.   
In addition, however, the evidence also suggests that the credible threat to state 
sovereignty posed by the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms is generally 
deterring states with poor human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement 
institutions from committing to the court.  If this is the case, then, can the ICC really make a 
difference where it most needs to make a difference?  After all, if the states with the worst 
practices are not joining the court, can the ICC treaty actually make strides in deterring mass 
atrocities and ensuring that the perpetrators of mass atrocities are brought to justice?  
Again, although no unequivocal answer to these questions is possible, this study has also 
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produced evidence which provides hope that the ICC can make a difference even as to those 
states with the worst human rights practices.  First, there is some evidence suggesting that the 
ICC‘s complementarity provision may play a positive role in prompting at least the more 
democratic states among those with poor human rights practices to commit to the court.  
According to the results of the quantitative analyses conducted in Chapter Three, a state‘s level 
of democracy is a significant and positive predictor of ICC treaty ratification.  In addition, Table 
6 shows that amongst states with poor human rights practices – and contrary to the predictions of 
the credible commitment theory – the more democratic states are more likely to join the ICC.  
Therefore, it may be that even though a state has poor practices, where it is more democratic and 
already has checks and balances on its domestic power – such as through an independent 
judiciary – it may still conclude that commitment to the ICC does not impose significant 
sovereignty costs.  In short, the government may assume that it will be punished domestically 
anyway should it commit human rights abuses, and because the ICC treaty‘s complementarity 
provision allows the state to avoid an ICC prosecution if it prosecutes human rights abuses 
domestically, the government could rationally conclude that commitment would not reduce its 
power.   
Indeed, for states with poor human rights practices that are more democratic such that 
they have checks and balances on their domestic powers, ICC commitment may in some cases 
prove beneficial in increasing government power.  Even though the state may have judicial or 
other mechanisms to hold opposition powers accountable should they commit human rights 
abuses, the ICC can provide an additional fall-back mechanism by which to hold those powers 
accountable should domestic institutions fail for some reason.  On the other hand, as one might 
expect of non-democracies where leaders enjoy concentrated power – and contrary to the 
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predictions of the credible commitment theory – non-democracies with poor practices will view 
ICC commitment as a costly check on their power to rule and punish as they please domestically.  
What this implies for the future of international organizations is that they are more likely to be 
successful in getting nations to risk some costly commitments and a potential loss of sovereignty 
where power within the nation is not concentrated.  
As such, at least in some cases, we may see that states with poor human rights records 
that are more democratic will conclude that commitment to the ICC is not overly costly because 
the leaders of those states already have domestic constraints on their power.  Should such states 
commit to the ICC, because the treaty creating the court has relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms, both the current leaders, any opposition powers, and any future leaders will have to 
comply with treaty provisions.  If the state or its citizens commit mass atrocities, and if the state 
is unwilling or unable to prosecute those crimes domestically, then the state will have to suffer 
the costly consequences.   
Second, even if states with poor practices are not prompted to join the ICC because they 
already have domestic checks and balances on government power, the fact remains that a number 
of states with bad human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement institutions, like 
Kenya, have joined the court.  They have done so notwithstanding that the credible threat theory 
predicts that states with bad human rights practices would rationally avoid the potentially costly 
commitment to the ICC.  But, because the ICC treaty‘s terms include relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms, states with poor practices and poor institutions will have to improve 
their potential for compliance with ICC treaty terms unless they – like Kenya – want to be the 
subject of the ICC‘s next investigation.     
Furthermore, even though Kenya apparently did not fear the ICC‘s enforcement 
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mechanisms enough to improve its practices, the Kenya case now provides ample evidence to 
other similarly situated states of the perils of failing to comply with the terms of the ICC treaty.  
Moreover, even though ICC commitment did not cause Kenya to improve its practices, there is 
still good news as it relates to the power of strong enforcement mechanisms to aid in realizing 
treaty goals:  in this case, the goal of ending impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities.  It 
appears that at least six suspects who participated in Kenya‘s 2007 post-election violence will be 
required to answer for their conduct in The Hague before the ICC court.   
Third, the ICC‘s jurisdictional grant allows it to investigate and prosecute in some 
circumstances even where the atrocities have not been committed by a citizen of a State Party to 
the court.  Sudan is not a party to the court, but because the Security Council referred that matter 
to the ICC, President Bashir has become the subject of an ICC arrest warrant.  And, although he 
has not yet been arrested, the fact of the arrest warrant has most certainly curtailed his activities.  
Only very recently, the Security Council also referred to the ICC ―the situation in Libya since 15 
February 2011, while recognizing that the country is not party to the Rome Statute that created 
the Court.‖  In the resolution referring the matter, the Council stated it considered the 
―‘widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libya Arab Jamahiriya against 
the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.‘‖486 Although the United States 
simply refrained from vetoing the referral of the Darfur matter to the ICC, in this case, the 
United States affirmatively voted to refer the Libya matter.  Consistent with the United States‘ 
tendency to protect its own sovereignty, however, the Obama administration did insist on a 
special provision in the resolution carving out from the ICC‘s jurisdiction any alleged crimes 
committed by non-parties to the ICC stemming from operations in Libya authorized by the 
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Security Council.  But, the fact of the referral overall is a positive sign that the ICC and its 
relatively strong enforcement mechanisms will play a role in deterring mass atrocities and ending 
impunity for those who commit them.  As one commentator noted, by virtue of the referral to the 
ICC, those who instruct or carry out instructions to bomb or otherwise use violence against the 
civil population in Libya now know that they will potentially be subject to international 
justice.
487
  
Finally, the ICC also has jurisdiction in cases where the citizens of a non-State Party 
commit atrocities in the territory of a State Party.
488
  Indeed, it is this jurisdictional provision that 
caused the United States to seek bilateral immunity agreements from States Parties agreeing to 
refuse to transfer any United States personnel to the custody of the ICC.  This same jurisdictional 
provision is what caused the United States to insist on the provision in the Libyan referral 
carving out from the ICC‘s jurisdiction any citizens of non-parties based on alleged actions 
stemming from actions in Libya authorized by the Security Council.  Therefore, states with bad 
practices – and with leaders and citizens who commit mass atrocities – will generally have 
reason to fear the ICC even if those states do not become States Parties. 
It is true that the ICC is only as effective as the States Parties, and some critics have 
noted that it has obtained custody over very few of its subjects since it began operating.  And, 
some wonder about the eventual effectiveness of the court without the participation of the United 
States.  While these are both valid concerns, I suggest that the evidence still shows that the court 
is functioning -- albeit slowly perhaps – and that it is altering state behavior.  In its relatively 
short life, the court has already commenced five cases and issued a number of arrest warrants.  
Although President Bashir has not appeared in The Hague, other Darfur suspects voluntarily 
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surrendered.
489
  And, again, although Bashir may be able to travel freely in parts of Africa, he is 
unlikely to risk venturing to Europe.  Indeed, the fact that the ICC has done as much as it has in 
the relatively short period in which it has been functioning, tends to show that it can be effective 
– even if the United States is not a member.  In any event, even though there is no indication that 
the United States will become a State Party any time soon, the United States has lent some 
support to the court, and there is promise that it will continue to cooperate in some respects.  By 
abstaining from the March 2005 Security Council vote, the United States made the referral of the 
Sudan case to the ICC possible.
490
 It has also condemned Kenya for failing to hold those who 
instigated the 2007 post-election violence accountable, and has refused to back Kenya‘s request 
to intervene to stop the ICC processes from moving forward.
491
  As noted above, the United 
States also affirmatively voted to refer the Libya matter to the ICC.
492
 
In sum, the evidence does suggest that the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms can make a difference not only in screening states at the ratification stage, but also 
in constraining state behavior – and thereby preventing mass atrocities and/or ending impunity 
for those who do commit mass atrocities.  Of course, it is hard to measure the absence of an 
event, meaning that we may never know for certain what mass atrocities have been deterred 
because of the creation of the ICC.  And, from the Kenya case study, we do know that even 
states that commit to the court may thereafter commit crimes that come within the ICC‘s 
jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the existence of the ICC apparently did not deter Libya from 
committing crimes against humanity.  But, even though the ICC did not deter those events, this 
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does not mean that the ICC and its relatively strong enforcement mechanisms are not catalysts 
for positive change.  Again, it appears that one way or another, some of the instigators of the 
2007 post-election violence in Kenya will be brought to justice.  In addition, the very existence 
of the ICC has made it much easier than it would otherwise have been for the Security Council to 
send a strong message to Libya.  Without the ICC, the Security Council would have had to 
threaten to create an ad hoc tribunal like the ICTR or the ICTY.  Creating those ad hoc tribunals, 
however, is not a simple matter which means that Libya would not have had to take seriously any 
threat to create a new tribunal.  While we may never know precisely what violent acts are not 
committed in Libya because of the Security Council‘s referral of the matter, at least in this case, 
Libya knows that the threat of investigation and prosecution is real since the ICC exists and is 
functioning.   
In addition, other evidence as well shows that the ICC and its relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms are producing positive change in advancing international human rights 
norms and the goals of ending impunity for mass atrocities.  The evidence does indicate that 
states have altered their behavior in an effort to comply with the ICC treaty‘s relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms.  For example, the case studies show that some states have 
implemented domestic legislation criminalizing the conduct covered by the Rome Statute.  
Future research projects could seek out other evidence of compliance by looking more generally 
at how and whether states have implemented domestic legislation, whether states are otherwise 
improving their domestic law enforcement institutions, or whether they are conducting more 
trials of mass atrocities or human rights abuses.  
In conclusion, I suggest that the fact that states appear to be focused on compliance costs 
and the credible threat associated with the ICC‘s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms is a 
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positive sign.  After all, the point of having states commit to international human rights treaties is 
to actually encourage those states to promote better human rights practices.  But, the ICC treaty 
can only deal with a small portion of human rights abuses: those that amount to mass atrocities 
and that are committed by the highest-level offenders.  If we hope to improve states‘ domestic 
human rights practices using international human rights treaties, we should structure those 
treaties with ―hard law‖ enforcement provisions that are clear, precise, binding, and backed by 
resources to coerce compliance and punish noncompliance.  Otherwise, without the threat of 
punishment via strong enforcement mechanisms, states may commit as window dressing only 
and without an actual intention to further the goals of the treaty or abide by its terms.  And, 
historically, states have done just that according to the studies which have found that states 
frequently join international human rights treaties, but thereafter continue to abuse human rights.   
Some may argue that ramping up the enforcement mechanisms could create a situation 
where only those states with good human rights practices will actually commit to human rights 
treaties.  I contend, however, that this potential issue is not a reason to proceed with a regime that 
is essentially toothless and which encourages states to commit to treaties with which they have 
no intention of complying.  As noted above, some states with bad practices are joining the ICC 
even though it has serious enforcement mechanisms to punish bad and noncompliant behavior.  
We should expect that for a variety of reasons, states with bad practices would join other 
international human rights treaties even if those treaties have stronger enforcement mechanisms 
that can hold states accountable to complying with treaty terms.  At least if treaties are designed 
with ―hard law,‖ legally binding enforcement mechanisms, states that do commit to the treaty 
will also be required to comply.   
Second, designing international human rights treaties with strong enforcement 
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mechanisms still makes sense even if the majority of states that will join such treaties are those 
with good practices.  Strong enforcement mechanisms can incentivize states with good practices 
to make their practices even better.  First, as noted above, because the ICC relies on a system of 
complementarity, even states with good practices will want to ensure that should they experience 
a mass atrocity, they have the domestic wherewithal to handle the matter.  In addition, in the case 
of the ICC, states with generally good human rights practices may still have reason to fear the 
ICC because it covers war crimes.  In fact, one main reason the United States – a state with good 
human rights practices overall – has apparently refused to commit to the ICC is because of the 
fear that its citizens could be accused of committing war crimes during international conflicts.  
States that have committed to the ICC, or are contemplating committing to the ICC, may have 
similar fears.  As a result, those states may change their military codes or military training 
practices so that their military are forced to comply with the treaty‘s terms.   
Of course, even with the credible threat of a strong enforcement mechanism, states simply 
may not have the ability to improve their human rights practices and/or domestic law enforcement 
institutions without help from the outside.  In some cases, NGOs might be able to provide that 
support.  The CICC, for example, provides some resources and advice to states still needing to 
implement into their domestic legislation all of the crimes covered the Rome Statute (so that such 
crimes theoretically can be prosecuted domestically).
493
  William Burke-White argues that the 
ICC should have the power and ability to engage in a policy of ―proactive complementarity,‖ 
whereby the court can help states with the training and resources to actually prosecute mass 
atrocities domestically.
494
  States and other policy makers should consider assisting further in 
these and other ways so that states currently without the ability to comply with the Rome Statute 
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are able to at least able to take steps towards compliance.  States may more readily commit to 
human rights treaties with strong enforcement mechanisms if they know they will receive 
assistance in their efforts to comply.  
This study provides evidence that states do view strong enforcement mechanisms in 
international human rights treaties as a credible threat, causing them to care about their ability to 
comply with those treaties when making commitment decisions and thereafter.  For all of the 
reasons discussed above, there is reason to believe that structuring international human rights 
treaties with stronger ―hard law‖ enforcement mechanisms will produce greater international 
cooperation precisely because states will be more likely to comply with, rather than ignore, the 
international agreements they make.  This study has looked at the role treaty terms can play in 
states‘ ex ante beliefs about the institution and the role that the existence of apparently stronger 
enforcement mechanisms can play in screening states at the ratification stage, and constraining 
their behavior both before and after ratification so that the state can comply with treaty terms.  
And, among other reasons, it makes sense that at this early stage of the ICC‘s life, treaty terms 
will guide state behavior.  Although, as discussed above, I view the prospect for ICC 
effectiveness as promising, time and future research will provide more guidance as to whether 
the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms will be as strong in practice as they are on paper.   
Future research should look at whether and how the ICC‘s activities and behavior relative 
to carrying out its duties to independently prosecute mass atrocities influences state ratification, 
commitment, and/or compliance behavior.  As information about the institution‘s actual 
activities and functioning accumulates, that actual functioning might alter states‘ posterior beliefs 
about whether ICC commitment is or is not costly.  If the ICC proves over time to be ineffective 
at holding suspects accountable, then as in the case of other international human rights treaties, 
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states with even bad practices may join because they will see that commitment – notwithstanding 
treaty terms that appear to have legally-binding enforcement mechanisms – is not costly to state 
sovereignty.  On the other hand – and as I would expect given the preliminary evidence which is 
somewhat positive about the ICC‘s effectiveness and intention to enforce treaty terms – if states 
see that the ICC is functioning and is able to obtain and prosecute suspects, states should have 
even more reason to view the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and behave 
accordingly.  In short, if future research shows that the ICC‘s enforcement mechanisms are as 
strong in practice as they are on paper, there is even more hope that states will alter their 
behavior so as to comply with those enforcement mechanisms.  If states do alter their behavior 
accordingly, the ICC may actually realize its goals of ending impunity for those who commit the 
most heinous crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.   
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Appendix A 
States Parties to the ICC Treaty and Ratification Dates (as of December 31, 
2008)  
State Date State Date State Date 
Afghanistan 2/10/2003 Fiji 11/29/1999 Nauru 11/12/2001 
Albania 1/31/2003 Finland 12/29/2000 Netherlands 7/17/2001 
Andorra 4/30/2001 France 6/9/2000 New Zealand 9/7/2000 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
6/18/2001 Gabon 9/20/2000 Niger 4/11/2002 
Argentina 2/8/2001 Gambia 6/28/2002 Nigeria 9/27/2001 
Australia 7/1/2002 Georgia 9/5/2003 Norway 2/16/2000 
Austria 12/28/2000 Germany 12/11/2000 Panama 3/21/2002 
Barbados 12/10/2002 Ghana 12/20/1999 Paraguay 5/14/2001 
Belgium 6/28/2000 Greece 5/15/2002 Peru 11/10/2001 
Belize 4/5/2000 Guinea 7/14/2003 Poland 11/12/2001 
Benin 1/22/2002 Guyana 9/24/2004 Portugal 2/5/2002 
Bolivia 6/27/2002 Honduras 7/1/2002 South Korea 11/13/2002 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
4/11/2002 Hungary 11/30/2001 Romania 4/11/2002 
Botswana 9/8/2000 Iceland 5/25/2000 Samoa 9/16/2002 
Brazil 6/20/2002 Ireland 4/11/2002 San Marino 5/13/1999 
Bulgaria 4/11/2002 Italy 7/26/1999 Senegal 2/2/1999 
Burkina Faso 4/16/2004 Japan 7/17/2007 Serbia 9/6/2001 
Burundi 9/21/2004 Jordan 4/11/2002 Sierra Leone 9/15/2001 
Cambodia 4/11/2002 Kenya 3/15/2005 Slovakia 4/11/2002 
Canada 7/7/2000 Latvia 6/28/2002 Slovenia 12/31/2001 
Central African 
Republic 
10/3/2001 Lesotho 9/6/2000 South Africa 11/27/2000 
Chad 11/1/2006 Liberia 9/22/2004 Spain 10/24/2000 
Colombia 8/5/2002 Liechtenstein 10/2/2001 St. Kitts  and Nevis 8/22/2006 
Comoros 8/18/2006 Lithuania 5/12/2003 St. Vincent  12/3/2002 
Congo Brazzaville 5/3/2004 Luxembourg 9/8/2000 Suriname 7/15/2008 
Cook Islands 7/18/2008 Macedonia 3/6/2002 Sweden 6/28/2001 
Costa Rica 6/7/2001 Madagascar 3/14/2008 Switzerland 11/12/2001 
Croatia 5/21/2001 Malawi 9/19/2002 Tajikistan 5/5/2000 
Cyprus 3/7/2002 Mali 8/16/2000 Tanzania 8/20/2002 
Dem. Rep. Congo 4/11/2002 Malta 11/29/2002 Timor Leste 9/6/2002 
Denmark 6/21/2001 Marshall Islands 12/7/2000 Trinidad and Tobago 4/6/1999 
Djibouti 11/5/2002 Mauritius 3/5/2002 Uganda 6/14/2002 
Dominica 2/12/2001 Mexico 11/28/2005 United Kingdom 10/4/2001 
Dominican 
Republic 
5/12/2005 Mongolia 4/11/2002 Uruguay 6/28/2002 
Ecuador 2/5/2002 Montenegro 11/23/2006 Venezuela 6/7/2000 
Estonia 1/30/2002 Namibia 6/25/2002 Zambia 11/13/2002 
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Appendix B 
States Parties to the 14 Different Treaties, Articles, and/or Protocols (as of 
2010). 
ICCPR (166 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d‘Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, 
Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Article 41 (48 State Parties):  Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Zimbabwe. 
Optional Protocol (115 State Parties):  Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d‘Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South 
Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Sweden, Tajikistan, Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago 
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(denounced 2000), Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Zambia. 
 
ICESCR (160 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia,  Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway,  Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San 
Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon 
Islands, Somalia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
CERD (173 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, East Timor, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq , Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,  Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,  Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, 
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Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Article 14 (53 State Parties):  Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 
CEDAW (185 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d‘Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,  
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon 
Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe. 
Optional Protocol (98 State Parties):  Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Canada, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela. 
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CAT (147 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d‘Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia. 
Article 21 (60 State Parties):  Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, South 
Korea, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Article 22 (64 State Parties): Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, 
Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Optional Protocol (48 State Parties):  Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Moldova, 
Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Macedonia, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, Uruguay. 
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CRC (193 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Israel, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Jamaica, Japan , Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan , Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
 
ICC (110 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook 
Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, South Korea, Romania, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, 
San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia. 
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Appendix C 
Countries by World Bank Regions 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Republic of Congo 
Ivory Coast 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan  
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
East Asia/Pacific 
Brunei 
Cambodia 
China 
Cook Islands 
East Timor 
Fiji 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan  
Kiribati 
Nauru 
New Caledonia 
North Korea 
South Korea 
Laos 
Malaysia 
 
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia 
Mongolia 
Myanmar  
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Samoa 
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Tuvalu 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
Vietnam 
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Eastern Europe/Central Asia 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bosnia 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Kazakhstan 
Kosovo 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Serbia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
Latin America/Caribbean 
Antigua 
Argentina 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Cuba 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
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Middle East/North Africa 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Djibouti 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq  
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
Tunisia 
United Arab Emirates 
Yemen 
 
South Asia 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
 
The West 
Andorra 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland  
Italy 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Monaco 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
San Marino 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
